The impact of individual expertise and public information on group decision-making. by Strunz, Ulrich Gabriel Theodor
 
ESCUELA INTERNACIONAL DE DOCTORADO 
Programa de Doctorado en Ciencias Sociales  
 
The impact of individual expertise and public 
information on group decision-making 
 
Autor: 
Ulrich G. Strunz 
Directores: 
Prof. Dr. Alfonso Rosa García 
Prof. Dr. Germán López Buenache 
Prof. Dr. Barnim G. Jeschke 





AUTHORIZATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE THESIS  
FOR SUBMISSION 
Prof. Dr. Alfonso Rosa García, Prof. Dr. Germán López Buenache and Prof. 
Dr. Barnim G. Jeschke as Directors of the Doctoral Thesis “The impact of individual 
expertise and public information on group decision-making.” by Mr. Ulrich G. 
Strunz in the Departamento de Ciencias Sociales, Jurídicas y de la Empresa, 
authorizes for submission since it has the conditions necessary for his defense. 
Sign, to comply with the Royal Decrees 99/2011, 1393/2007, 56/2005 y 778/98, 
in Murcia, February 27, 2020. 
 






This is the result of your actions, and my stubbornness. 








Alfonso Rosa García  
Germán López Buenache 
Barnim Jeschke 
Familie Schmid, Gasthaus Klostermaier Icking 
NeoBird Nuremberg 
Christian Chlupsa 
Gabi, Ute, Julia, Ariane, Rita, Petra, Holle, Anja, Norbert Samhammer 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... VII 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... XI 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... XV 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................... XVII 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 19 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................ 23 
2.1 KEY ASPECTS FOR REAL ECONOMIC PROBLEM-SOLVING ........ 28 
2.1.1 Well-defined problems ................................................................... 29 
2.1.2 Ill-defined problems ........................................................................ 29 
2.1.3 Definitions of complexity ............................................................... 31 
2.1.4 Ignoring information ...................................................................... 37 
2.1.5 Uncertainty ....................................................................................... 39 
2.2 THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN DECISION-MAKING ................. 41 
2.2.1 Definitions of information .............................................................. 41 
2.2.2 Derivation of a definition for information ................................... 45 
2.2.3 Information perturbing events in behavioral experiments ....... 46 
2.2.4 Making decisions in a VUCA world ............................................. 47 
2.3 EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND PROBLEM-SOLVING ........................... 49 
2.3.1 Definition of knowledge, expertise and expert knowledge ...... 50 
2.3.2 Expert knowledge as a resource .................................................... 52 
VIII  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
2.3.3 The role of learning ......................................................................... 53 
2.4 AGENTS ACTING AS DISTURBANCES ................................................ 55 
2.4.1 The role of feedback in complex problems under uncertainty . 57 
2.4.2 Novel problems, real-world problems, and non-routine tasks 59 
2.4.3 Problem solving search and routine strength ............................. 64 
2.4.4 NPS: adaptation, beliefs, response times and emotion .............. 67 
2.4.5 The human class: an unbounded set of strategies ...................... 75 
2.5 A NETWORK OF INTERDEPENDENT BELIEFS ................................... 78 
2.5.1 From game theory to behavioral game theory ............................ 79 
2.5.2 Group behavior................................................................................ 85 
3 GENERAL RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ................................................................. 91 
3.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS ................................................................ 92 
3.2 MODEL FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ................................................... 93 
3.3 EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH OBJECTIVES .... 95 
4 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN ...................................................................... 97 
4.1 DEVELOPMENT AND MATERIALS ........................................................ 97 
4.1.1 Software development process...................................................... 97 
4.1.2 Legacy version of experiment........................................................ 99 
4.1.3 Problems with legacy experiment ............................................... 101 
4.1.4 Curiosity IO – structure and functionality ................................ 103 
4.1.5 “Tower of Hanoi” example session ............................................ 111 
4.1.6 Example session data output ....................................................... 113 
TABLE OF CONTENTS IX 
4.1.7 Response time and input .............................................................. 115 
4.1.8 States derived from state-space ................................................... 115 
4.1.9 Move states ..................................................................................... 116 
4.1.10 Operator output function ............................................................. 117 
4.1.11 State output function .................................................................... 119 
4.1.12 Logic and expected states ............................................................. 122 
4.2 PARTICIPANTS ........................................................................................... 129 
4.3 PROCEDURE ................................................................................................ 133 
5 SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ................................................................ 145 
5.1 DERIVATION OF HYPOTHESES ........................................................... 145 
5.2 HYPOTHESES AND VARIABLES ........................................................... 156 
6 RESULTS ................................................................................................................ 163 
6.1 TESTING FOR NONPARAMETRIC DISTRIBUTION ....................... 163 
6.2 EXPERTISE RANK AND LOGIC PROPORTION ................................ 165 
6.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND HUMAN ERROR ..................... 167 
6.4 INFORMATION CONDITIONS AND LOGIC DEVIATION ........... 168 
6.5 COMPLETE LOGIC PROPORTIONS OVER INFORMATION 
CONDITIONS .......................................................................................................... 170 
6.6 EXPECTED STATES AND LOGIC PROPORTION ............................. 171 
6.7 EXPECTED STATES AND LOGIC MARKER PROPORTION .......... 172 
6.8 COMPLETE EXPECTED STATES OVER INFORMATION 
CONDITIONS .......................................................................................................... 174 
6.9 ROUTINE CONSISTENCY........................................................................ 176 
6.10 FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGY AND GROUP PERFORMANCE ...... 177 
6.11 GROUP EXPERTISE AND LOGIC PROPORTIONS ........................... 178 
6.12 GENDER EFFECTS ...................................................................................... 180 
X  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
7 DISCUSSION......................................................................................................... 191 
7.1 DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS .................................... 191 
7.2 METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS .......................................................... 198 
7.3 LIMITATION ............................................................................................... 201 
7.4 FUTURE OUTLOOK ................................................................................... 202 
8 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 203 
APPENDIX .................................................................................................................... 207 




LIST OF FIGURES XI 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Top challenges of modern decision-making networks ............................. 21 
Figure 2: "The structure of a hypothetical theory of problem solving." .................. 31 
Figure 3: A generic framework for measuring complexity ....................................... 33 
Figure 4: Deviation distance of two perspectives on the individually perceived 
reality of some project over time ................................................................................... 34 
Figure 5: System boundaries defined by 2-dimensional selection rule ................... 35 
Figure 6:  Model of the human brain functionality as a fluent state ........................ 44 
Figure 7: Dimensions of complex systems ................................................................... 48 
Figure 8: Bias vs. Variance ............................................................................................. 56 
Figure 9: All learning is a feedback process ................................................................ 59 
Figure 10: “Bean-Fest” causal structure ....................................................................... 60 
Figure 11: Causal structure of Minimal Complex System „MicroDYN“ ................ 69 
Figure 12: Client-side view of “Flag Run” experiment .............................................. 73 
Figure 13: Paticipant’s actions can be watched live via Curiosity IO backend ...... 76 
Figure 14: Behavioral game theory vs. game theory, experimental results ............ 83 
Figure 15: The Engaged Scholarship Diamond Model by Van de Ven (2007) ....... 91 
Figure 16: Considered system states: instable, indifferent, stable, metastable ....... 94 
Figure 17: Software development process Water-Scrum-Fall ................................... 98 
Figure 18: Process model of the legacy “Hopfenpost” experiment ....................... 101 
XII  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
Figure 19: Tower of Hanoi state space model with their according integers ....... 116 
Figure 20: MTurk client side view of HIT .................................................................. 133 
Figure 21: Administrator perspective of entire experimental setup using Curiosity 
IO framework ................................................................................................................ 138 
Figure 22: Test results for nonparametric distribution of variables ....................... 164 
Figure 23: Correlation results of expertise and ideal routine strategy in “well-
defined” stages. ............................................................................................................. 165 
Figure 24: Boxplot results of expertise levels and logic proportion during „well-
defined“ stages .............................................................................................................. 166 
Figure 25: Boxplot results of logic proportion during “metastable” conditions over 
all information conditions: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC. ........ 169 
Figure 26: Boxplot results of logic proportion during “ill-defined” conditions over 
all information conditions: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC. ........ 171 
Figure 27: Correlation results between expected states and logic proportion ..... 172 
Figure 28: Correlation results between expected states and logic marker ............ 173 
Figure 29: Boxplot results of expected states during “ill-defined” stages over 
information conditions: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC. .............. 175 
Figure 30: Boxplot graph showing no gender effect between expertise and well-
defined logic proportion: 1 = female, 2 = male .......................................................... 181 
Figure 31: Logic deviation during metastable ill-defined stages: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 
2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC, and regarding sex: 1 = female, 2 = male .................... 184 
Figure 32: Expected states proportion during ill-defined stages: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 
2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC, and regarding sex: 1 = female, 2 = male .................... 185 
LIST OF FIGURES XIII 
Figure 33: Logic marker results during ill-defined stages: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-
IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC, and regarding sex: 1 = female, 2 = male ............................... 186 
Figure 34: Routine consistency results during ill-defined stages: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 
2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC, and regarding sex: 1 = female, 2 = male .................... 188 
Figure 35: Fundamental index results for mixed sexes (0), female-only (1) and male-
only (2) game groups. ................................................................................................... 189 
Figure 36: Group expertise results for mixed sexes (0), female-only (1) and male-
only (2) game groups. ................................................................................................... 190 
Figure 37: Boxplot results of logic proportion during „ill-defined“ stages over 
expertise levels ............................................................................................................... 192 
Figure 38: Boxplot results of logic marker proportions over expertise levels ...... 193 
Figure 39: Boxplot results of expected states proportion during „metastable“ stages 
over information conditions: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC. ..... 194 
Figure 40: Boxplot results of logic proportion during „instable“ stages over 
information conditions: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC. .............. 196 
Figure 41: Boxplot results of routine consistency over expertise levels. ............... 197 
 
  
XIV  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
 
  
LIST OF TABLES XV 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Model for empirical research: system conditions of online experiment ... 95 
Table 2: All permutations of lock and play buttons with effect explanation ........ 108 
Table 3: All possible input combinations leading to resulting „direction-deciders“.
 .......................................................................................................................................... 118 
Table 4: All possible input combinations of direction-deciders leading to direction 
of disk .............................................................................................................................. 119 
Table 5: All possible input combinations resulting in according logic category 
booleans .......................................................................................................................... 127 
Table 6: Year of Birth distribution of MTurks on workdays Mo-Fr, from 01.09.2019 
to 30.09.2019. .................................................................................................................. 131 
Table 7: Instruction texts for according information conditions in „ill-defined“ 
stages ............................................................................................................................... 142 
Table 8: Results of example experiment for explanation, part 1. ........................... 147 
Table 9: Results of example experiment for explanation, part 2. ........................... 148 
Table 10: Results of example experiment for explanation, part 3. ......................... 149 
Table 11: Group expertise rated as an integer in order from individual expertise 
levels ............................................................................................................................... 151 
Table 12: Results of example experiment for explanation, part 4. ......................... 152 
Table 13: Results of example experiment for explanation, part 5. ......................... 158 
Table 14: Independent and dependent variables, with according hypothesis. .... 162 
Table 15: Impact of “macrostructure shift” on decision-making performance .... 168 
XVI  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
Table 16: Impact of “macrostructure shift” on female decision-making performance
 .......................................................................................................................................... 182 
Table 17: Impact of “macrostructure shift” on male decision-making performance
 .......................................................................................................................................... 183 
 
  
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS XVII 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AI         Artificial intelligence 
AMT       Amazon Mechanical Turk 
CH         Cognitive hierarchy 
C-IC       Combined information condition 
CPS        Complex problem-solving 
Curiosity IO     Curiosity Information Online 
D-IC      Disillusioning information condition 
EI-I       Environmental influence interpretation 
EWA       Experience-weighted attraction learning 
IPCC      Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
fMRI   Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
F-L        Framed-logic 
GDM       Group decision-making 
G-IC      Group information condition 
GUI        Graphical user interface 
HIT        Human intelligence task 
ID   Identifier 
MIDDI    Multiplicity, Interdependency, Diversity, Dynamics, 
Imponderability  
XVIII  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
MTurk     Amazon Mechanical Turk worker 
N-IC      No-information condition 
NB-L      No-border logic 
NPS       Non-routine problem-solving 
PPF      Predictive processing-framework  
QRE       Quantal response equilibrium 
R-IC       Routine information condition 
SI-I       Social influence interpretation 
ToE        Tower of Europe 
ToH       Tower of Hanoi 
UNO       United Nations Organization 
VOTAT     Vary one thing at a time 
VUCA      Volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity 
WMC       Working memory capacity 




According to the 2019 World Trade Report, service trades are likely to 
increase their share of global trade by 50 percent until 2040. Services will benefit 
most likely from increasing the automatization and digitalization of former face-
to-face processes, and from an increasing demand of online services due to 
demographic change. The WTO states that global cooperation has to be increased 
such that all economies can collectively benefit from increasing service trade.  
With the globalization of services comes a globalization of knowledge. 
According to the Research Perspectives of the Max Planck Society, globalization is 
a nonlinear process, which can lead not only to homogeneity and the 
standardization of culture, but also to an increase in complexity, as tools and ideas 
tend to outpace cultural progress. As face-to-face problem-solving will be replaced 
more and more by digital services, global problems that require global cooperation 
will have to gain competence in global and complex problem-solving (CPS).  
A prominent example of such a complex, global problem is anthropogenic 
climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
challenges the high imponderability of climate change and its impact on decision-
making and policies with their “Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of 
Climate Change Response Policies”. In their report, the IPCC states the 
understanding that decision-makers tend to rather base their decisions on intuitive 
thinking processes than on thorough analysis and that the perception of risk has to 
be included in climate change risk management (Kunreuther et al., 2014).  
Human decision makers are led not only by rational decision-making, but 
insights derived from behavioral economics show that people are guided by 
intrinsic motives, bias, and myopic interpretations of feedback, – casting doubt on 
whether humanity is capable of effectively solving complex problems of global 
proportions.  
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With growing successes in the area of artificial intelligence (AI), the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council has stated concerns that AI may not only 
offer advantages, but also  
“disrupt societies in fundamental ways”,  
with people being replaced by automated decision-making devices (United 
Nations Economic and Social Council, 2019, p. 5). For this reason, talent search is 
of crucial importance, to support domains threatened to be replaced by artificial 
systems. The UNO High-level Committee on Management places a focus on the 
identification of talent by automated processes in the area of assessment and testing 
(United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2019). The hybrid approach of 
embedding expert knowledge into neural networks, commonly used for AI 
systems, has been suggested and implemented through the combined effort of 
various institutes (Barca, Porcu, Bruno, & Passarella, 2017; Chattha et al., 2012; Silva 
& Gombolay, 2019), raising questions regarding the accountability and regulation 
of such AI-guided decisions (Doshi-velez & Kortz, 2017). Since the global-
employment-changing economic crisis in 2008, the creation of sustainable 
employment has become a core goal for European institutions, such as the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. For 
systems to act sustainably, they must be flexible, and resilient, and knowledge 
about a system’s state is key (Jeschke & Mahnke, 2013). The European Commission 
further increased flexibility of the European “Stability and Growth Pact” in 2015, 
to “build up fiscal buffers” for its member states; these buffers were implemented 
successfully, according to a 2018 report from the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2018).  
The search for expert knowledge is guided not only by ethics. In trying to 
gain knowledge of a system as large and complex as the European market, 
obtaining sufficient amounts of empirical data can be a challenge. Expert 
knowledge can be used, to replace missing data in order to support sound 
predictions. With highly complex problems comes uncertainty, especially when 
empirical data is limited. Psychological observations have shown that expert 
knowledge tends to be biased, when expert knowledge faces uncertainty unguided 
(European Food and Safety Authority, 2014). Expert identification and 
management have been suggested by the European Food Safety Authority to be 
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organized in a structural manner, and should result in a data base of experts. The 
“Division for Sustainable Development” of the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs builds upon multi-agent action networks, consisting 
of resources, knowledge and experts in order to achieve their global sustainability 
goals. In their 2016 report, the top three challenges the listed as related to such 
networks are limited financial resources, followed secondly by changing mindsets 
and change management, and thirdly, by human resources, as depicted in figure 1 
(Division for Sustainable Development. United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, 2016, p. 13). 
 
Future economies will inevitably face global problems, due to the ever-
growing connectivity and service-oriented trade. Novel ideas and technological 
breakthroughs will outpace slow cultural development leading to increasing 
complexity. Global asymmetries in knowledge and information will further fuel 
change, making routine problem-solving unreliable and making its outcomes 
volatile, thus endangering those who cannot maintain modern workspace 
requirements.  
Figure 1: Top challenges of modern decision-making networks  
[source: Division for Sustainable Development. United Nations Department of 
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CPS and non-routine decision-making experts need to be identified, and 
placed in an environment, where their actions are the most fruitful, such that others 
can imitate and learn from their success. This scenario could be enabled by a cheap 
and effective online assessment tool, as financial resources are limited by default. 
As expert knowledge is especially biased when addressing problems under 
uncertainty, this thesis focuses on two major goals: i) developing of a non-routine 
problem-solving (NPS) assessment in the form of a highly efficient, online, web 
browser-based software tool; and ii) obtaining empirical results related to the 
human individual and group decision-making (GDM), faced with uncertainty, 
change, different system states, and various forms of environmental public 
information.  
Data and according information on human decision-making behavior was 
acquired by a randomized experiment, which is considered to be the “gold 
standard” in scientific research (Rubin, 2008). As in any experimental design, 
participants were randomly assigned to different public information conditions, 
where circumstances were actively manipulated. The experiment was both run off- 
and online, however, the online experiment granted many advantages over its 
offline counterpart, mostly being more cost-efficient, and enabling the possibility 
to model all participants’ perspectives via strategy- or logic-categories. 
Experiments are considered to increase innovation (Kohavi, Longbotham, 
Sommerfield, & Henne, 2009) and cost-efficient online assessments may support 
institutions and companies alike in finding experts, assigning them to their most 
skill-effective working domain, measuring and controlling the impact of 
information and ultimately supporting management in coping with complex 
problems successfully.
 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Imagine being born and raised on the Hawaiian island Kauaʻi, close to the 
shield volcano Waiʻaleʻale. On this island, yearly rainfall reaches 15 meters and 
more (Kido, Ha, & Kinzie, 1993, p. 44). You were stuck in this small region on this 
remote island your entire life, without any information ever having reached you to 
indicate that this extreme amount of rainfall was extra ordinary. To you, heavy rain 
is the daily norm. Your day-to-day decision-making has been thus influenced by 
this routine and led you to form the belief that constant rain is entirely normal. 
Even small periods of “rain dropouts” will not change your belief that rain is the 
regular “status quo” of life. You develop some strategy to survive on the island 
making use of the rain, by building water mills, collecting rain water to drink and 
recover energy in warm baths. Your tribe members too develop survival strategies 
based on the stream of rain, however, while all of them do not question there being 
lots of annual rain, some have noted that the small periods of “rain dropouts” were 
influenced by godly external factors, which cannot be influenced and were entirely 
random. Others question this worldview, suggesting that they had observed some 
regularities in the occurrences of “rain dropouts”, which, to their understanding, 
could be used to maximize the water mills effectiveness. Some tribe members even 
assure you that “rain dropouts” could not only be anticipated, but were influenced 
by tribal sacrifices.  
While worldviews of each tribe member might differ, all of them are true 
experts when it comes to making use of rain. Despite this, all individual 
worldviews of the tribe are wrong, since they lack global information about the true 
nature of rainfall. However, chance of collective survival was enhanced by actions 
and believes based on some mental model surrounding local experience with rain. 
So even though worldviews were at best a true representation of reality locally, in 
other words a homeomorphic mental model, these mental models did produce 
good performance measured in days of survival. These mental models had even 
proven to be effective in a group. Individual expert knowledge led to collective 
strategies following some focal point being “dealing with heavy rainfalls”. This 
focal point enabled the tribe to include heterogeneous decisions into a “direction” 
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or path towards a common goal, even though each individual’s decision is also 
influenced by other tribe members’ decisions. It might also be that some individual 
decisions were bad decisions, based on a locally wrong mental model, but 
ultimately led to a good group outcome, vice versa.  
These outcomes might lead to falsely confirming a certain mental model. A 
tribe member who believes in having found some pattern regarding “rain 
dropouts”, might invest less working time on “water mills” shortly before he 
anticipates lack of rain, focusing more on bathing in warm rain water. This lack of 
work discipline might alter decision-making of those who belief that bathing 
enraged the gods, which, to their understanding, led to less rain. As they see more 
and more “pattern-belief members” bathing, the “sacrifice-belief group” begins to 
collect more rain water, working in nightshifts, as a sacrifice to soothe the gods.  
Assuming that a short “rain dropout” actually occurred, which was no surprise to 
the “chaos-belief-group”, who regard short dropouts to happen randomly all the 
time, the sacrifice-, the pattern-, and the chaos-belief groups are all locally 
confirmed in their believe. However, group performance was still upholding well, 
since one group gathered strength by relaxing, others collected more resources for 
drier times, while the rest maintained their working routine. The collective group 
performance equilibrium was proven to be stable. 
A change in environmental conditions, such as “rain dropouts” only impede 
performance when individual strategies are touched, meaning, as long as there is 
enough rainfall reliability, individual decisions will not change too much. With a 
growing duration of “rain dropouts”, chances are that individual decisions will 
adapt to these changes, even influencing group performance, “perturbing” the 
collective group decision network. These perturbations can themselves lead to a 
change in individual decision making, when tribe members’ decision output, such 
as production, depend on each other. Causally linked decisions might break or be 
formed anew, re-arranging the “rules” of the network. In any case, “change in 
rules” of this network, whether it stemmed from environmental changes, mental 
models, third-party decisions or group-dynamics has to be first identified by an 
individual decision maker, building a new mental model based on this novel 
knowledge, before a new strategy was applied based on this new knowledge to 
reach a certain goal. 
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From this small island economy “Gedankenexperiment” several important 
aspects can be derived that play a role in modern scientific approaches to decision-
making.  
As mentioned at the beginning of the story, all tribe members (agents) only 
had access to local information: represented metaphorically by the small island, 
which can be regarded as a market, where decision-making takes place. Even 
though each individual had full access to necessary market information, decision-
making differed and was not optimal, as the delay of rainfall was interpreted 
differently. Feedback was interpreted myopically to confirm the own belief. Agents 
do not even act optimally when provided perfect information and knowledge of 
the system structure, due to the “misperception of feedback”, which is part of day-
to-day economic reality (Sterman, 1989). The tribe had three different theories 
regarding the “data” stemming from rainfall observations: the first group believed 
in being able to anticipate rainfall-dropouts by observing “patterns”, the second 
group thought it to be possible to control “rain-dropouts” and the third group saw 
“rain-dropouts” as an entirely random environmental condition, which cannot be 
controlled at all. The discrepancy between the tribe’s data and their theories lead 
to “errors”, which will influence outcomes of decision-making. From an empirical 
perspective, defining “error” is a complex task, which has a long history of 
development, and marks a corner stone in economic statistics (Louçã, 2007). Error 
can occur by an improper choice of some model, lacking precision in measurement 
or can even stem from cultural chaos (Louçã, 2007). The nature of an error may also 
vary. They can be seen as being part of nature, being an unobservable disturbance 
or as unpredictable random behavior. Some mathematical descriptions define error 
as residual and observable, some see them as corrigible, and some not. 
Disturbances can get “their own life” and are more than nonconformity of some 
anticipated value and in any event, an unobserved “disturbance vector” and an 
observed “residual vector” should be distinguished (Louçã, 2007, p. 151).  
In other words, even a small and simple economy can develop complex and 
unpredictable self-organizing behavior. Durlauf (1998) defines “economic 
complexity” as a system where choices depend directly on the decisions of others. 
Such systems are evolving, and cannot by be fully understood or described by 
“steady states”, when there is limited information about the intentions and goals 
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of third party agents (Durlauf, 1998). Such “steady states” are unchanging 
regularities or “atoms” of a system. The author further explains that “complex 
systems” inhibit nonlinear attributes because of the interdependence in decisions 
of its acting agents, and that a very important aspect of complex systems is its past 
history of events or its order of information by which its future outcomes are 
dependent on. This complex history can possibly result in “path dependence” 
(Durlauf, 1998). “Path dependence” roughly describes “ugly habits” of a system, 
which are persistent and can lead to recessions.   
To understand a complex system’s behavior by applying models, several 
problems have to be coped with, being that simply looking at unchanging 
consistencies does not suffice, high volatility of predictions may arise from 
nonlinear dynamics, and “bad system behavior” can only be explained with large 
amounts of data. The human brain does not perform well at storing such large 
amounts of data, and are better suited in pattern recognition by visual inputs 
(Simoes & Hidalgo, 2011), as the human brain is in constant search of known 
patterns, acting as an “association machine” (Chlupsa, 2017). For this reason, clear 
visual representations are used in models, coping with “economic complexity”, 
such as the “Atlas Of Economic Complexity” (Hausmann et al., 2014). When no 
visual clues are provided to understand economic complexity, decision-makers 
might be overwhelmed by complexity, and even expert knowledge might not 
suffice. It was shown for example that antitrust analysis has become too complex 
for judges to evaluate accurately, when expertise knowledge is missing, and while 
basic economic training helps in simple cases, this training failed to show 
significant positive influence in complex cases, leading to the conclusion that there 
exist antitrust cases, which are in fact too complex for generalist judges (Baye & 
Wright, 2011). 
Expert knowledge seems to be a necessity to successfully cope with problems 
concerning economic complexity. However, real world problems commonly are 
not well defined, can hardly be distinguished from their irrelevant environmental 
conditions and modelling such fuzzy problems in a way that makes them solvable 
often proves to be the true challenge (Davidson & Sternberg, 2003). This also relates 
to problems stemming from economic complexity, as the individual goals and 
interpretations of others are unknown and constantly changing, while this 
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information or lack thereof is ultimately able to influence the outcome of one’s 
decision. Just like economic complexity, individual agents or decision-makers can 
also be described as constantly evolving systems, called “cognitive systems”, which 
are constantly modeling their environment, focusing on “local aspects” 
representing barriers to the effective solution of a problem (Holland, Holyoak, 
Nisbett, Thagard, & Smoliar, 2008).  
It is then not a far-reaching assumption to define an economy in 
psychological terms. A market can be understood as a network of subjective 
instances serving as an input for strategies and volition in decision-making (Arthur, 
1995). Agents or cognitive systems make choices based on their currently valid 
beliefs, which are subjective and often unknown to others. These beliefs are 
constantly tested by the system, which itself it built from all agents’ subjective 
beliefs (Arthur, 1995).  
So, while the small island economy from the Gedankenexperiment does 
fulfill all mentioned attributes of “economic complexity”, which economic systems 
are considered as “complex” in reality? The complexity of an economic system also 
represents national production capabilities as non-tradable inputs (Hausmann & 
Hidalgo, 2010; Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009), which influence the country’s 
productivity, where an increase of complexity in a country’s production structure 
is positively related to its capabilities (Zhu & Li, 2017). According to Felipe et al. 
(2012) Japan, Germany, the U.S.A, France and other wealthy countries are 
considered countries with high complexity, while countries with relative low 
income per capita such as Cambodia, Papua New Guinea and Nigeria are 
considered to hold low complexity (Zhu & Li, 2017). 
While real life economies do not have to cope with changes in “rain 
frequencies” such as the small island economy, a country does have to cope with 
climate, technological, socio-economic and political change, also holding uncertain 
future scenarios; a “best-guess” what might happen, as performed by the three 
different belief-groups from the Gedankenexperiment, fails to be a good way to 
cope with such uncertainty, as in such decision-making domains, multiple possible 
paths lead to different future scenarios, whose occurrence probabilities are not 
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associated and probability ranking cannot be applied (Maier et al., 2016). It is then 
better to create some strategy, which performs well during multiple scenarios.  
However, the development of such a “stable” strategy isn’t easily constructed 
in complex economies, as belief alters decision-making. Whether or not a cognitive 
system considers some event being a random outcome or manmade, has an impact 
on the agent’s decision-making. When an event is considered random, agents stick 
with simple rules to optimize their strategy – when an event is thought of being 
manmade, agents try to figure out patterns to optimize (Schul, Mayo, Burnstein, & 
Yahalom, 2007). Agents might stick to their personal belief even though new 
information indicated that a deviation from their strategy might be beneficial, 
which is linked to several decision anomalies, such as the confirmation bias, inertia 
bias, or weighting bias. It can also be linked to “routine”. The three belief-groups 
from our Gedankenexperiment stick to their own routine, further strengthening 
their belief, possibly feeding their confirmation bias. It is known that strong routine 
enhances the preference of information that favors the routine, and makes 
information that contradicts one routine less favorable (Betsch, Haberstroh, 
Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler, 2001).  
Altogether, the simple story about an island tribe, and respectful homage to 
the famous “Lucas islands model” by Nobel Prize winning economist Robert 
Lucas, Jr. (Lucas, 1972), shed light on many important aspects regarding decision-
making and problem-solving. These aspects are to be explained in greater detail 
with their latest insights from scientific experiments in the following chapters. 
2.1 KEY ASPECTS FOR REAL ECONOMIC PROBLEM-SOLVING 
Many models attempt to describe, how humans engage in problem-solving. 
By modelling problem-solving, multiple questions arise: which instances of reality 
are seen by humans as problems and how can problems be categorized? How do 
humans define the boundaries of some problem and how can such boundaries be 
modelled? How can humans naturally engage in searching for solutions and which 
scientific insights describe such problem-solving attempts? In order to implement 
problem-solving into domains of real, economic decision-making, several key 
aspects are to be explained in the following. Namely, two major categories 
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describing problems in general, the definition and role of complexity regarding 
problem-solving, the definition and meaning of heuristics, and the definition and 
background of uncertainty. 
2.1.1 Well-defined problems 
In general, two types of categories describe problems that are to be solved: 
well- and ill-defined problems; this distinguishing generalization is effective, as all 
domains hold well- and ill-defined problems (Nye, Boyce, & Sottilare, 2016) and 
different cognitive areas are required for solving well- and ill-defined problems 
(Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995). 
Problems that can be broken down to a series of sub-problems, and also 
provide enough information about their goals, solution-path and obstacles, are 
considered well-defined problems; these problems can usually be solved using 
recursive algorithms (Davidson & Sternberg, 2003). 
The famous “Tower of Hanoi” problem is considered a “well-defined” 
problem (Davidson & Sternberg, 2003). It can either be solved perfectly using an 
iterative or recursive algorithm or by applying some strategy, consisting of several 
steps that will always solve the problem in the least number of steps. 
Multiple classifications exist in order to distinguish between well- and ill-
defined problems, as well- and ill-defined problems exist in a continuum (Le, Loll, 
& Pinkwart, 2013).  
2.1.2 Ill-defined problems 
Contrary to well-defined problems, recursive algorithms cannot be applied 
to solve such problems, as the problem cannot be modelled as some set of steps 
necessary to solve them; they lack information about some clear path to the solution 
or do not provide some statement about how the problem at hand can be solved 
(Davidson & Sternberg, 2003).  
From the perspective of a rookie facing some problem, this problem might 
seem to be “ill-defined” due to lack of experience. However, in such a case the 
30  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
problem is merely “undefined” and not “ill-defined” (Nye et al., 2016; Strunz, 
2019).  A person who has never played the well-defined game of “Tower of Hanoi” 
before, will begin to develop some strategy and optimizing it further, until the most 
efficient strategy is found. At this point, “Tower of Hanoi” is regarded as a well-
defined problem. This process is known as “learning”, and for this reason, applying 
the domain “learning” to successfully distinguish between well- and ill-defined 
problems is useful. 
When learning is applied to ill-defined problems, further categories are 
required. Ill-defined problems are regarded as “complex problems” and the 
attempt to solve them is regarded as “complex problem solving” (CPS) (Dörner & 
Funke, 2017). 
As described before, most problems in real life are “fuzzy” problems or lack 
relevant information that make them fall in the category of complex problems. Any 
complex problem is always a “ill-structured problem” (Grünig & Kühn, 2013), 
which can be understood analogous to an ill-defined problem. Multiple domains 
are then necessary to consider when trying to define some theory of “problem-
solving”, since an agent most likely faces some unknown, ill-defined or complex   
problem in economic reality: first, information might be interpreted differently by 
each agent, leading to heterogeneous problem perceptions. Second, rookies might 
lack some definitive “recipe” of action required to solve a problem. Third, even 
when some action is considered to be suitable, it is not yet clear, which intrinsic 
processes led to the decision-making itself. Fourth, if this process was successfully 
analyzed, it is unclear how an agent considered the action as positive or negative, 
as in “bringing the agent closer to the goal”. Last but not least, it is unclear how an 
agent would “find” a problem and “recognize” it as such; agents differ in their goal 
setting priorities and it is unclear why a certain path towards some goal is being 
chosen. As depicted in Figure 2 (Ohlsson, 2012, p. 122) all these five domains would 
have to be combined in order to picture “problem-solving” fully, described as 
“heuristic search”. The cognitive psychologists Newell and Simon stated that 
humans were able to solve unfamiliar problems by tentatively choosing different 
actions, mentally projecting their outcomes of the chosen action, followed by some 
evaluation, which is then used as a new input for their decision-making process, 
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such that they are able to alter their approach to solve a problem; Newell and Simon 
referred to this as “heuristic search” (Ohlsson, 2012).  
Complex-Problem-Solving builds upon the understanding that ill-defined 
(ill-structured) problems lead to a lack of information, unattainable from the outset 
on first sight, where uncertainty follows up. Complex problems do not require 
complex solutions, however, a “bias bias” might lead to the underestimation of the 
performance of simplicity, which outperforms under conditions of high 







2.1.3 Definitions of complexity 
“Complexity” in every-day language can describe problems that one regards 
as “difficult” to solve. In the economic domain task-difficulty and task-complexity 
are two different attributes: difficult problems are solved by incentivizing diverse 
problem-solving alternatives, while complexity is coped by institutions via 
selection criteria adjustment, different rates of variation and adjusting 
connectedness (Page, 2008). To make predictions about the future, economic 
models rely on assumptions about reality expressed by mathematical functions 
originating from theoretical physics, informatics or sociology. 
Figure 2: "The structure of a hypothetical theory of problem solving."  
[source: Ohlsson, 2012, p. 122]. 
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Whenever complexity of some entity such as a market, country, global 
economy or project is to be measured, the modeler first has to define the “system” 
boundaries, its instances and their relations, which together equal the “system” 
itself that is separated from its environment. Before even defining “complexity” 
itself, it has to be noted that the modeler might run into the “frame problem” 
defining a system. By defining entities (states) and their relations, it makes sense to 
choose from a set of things that are meaningful to describe the system. For example, 
defining the system “engine” results in a meaningful list of cogs, metal rods and 
other things that when being changed in their structure or behavior, will also 
change the engine itself. However, by defining a list of things that are changed, 
everything else is ignored and assumed to not change at all, regarded as the 
“commonsense law of inertia” (Kameramans & Schmits, 2004). While this 
assumption solves the “frame problem” for more common models, more 
sophisticated solutions have to be applied to actually solve the frame problem 
when cognitive agents are to be modeled, such as the “Thielscher’s Fluent 
Calculus”, for example when robots are required to face “non-determinism and 
uncertainty” (Kameramans & Schmits, 2004, p. 45).  
In other words, when the modeler is interested in defining some “system” 
that is scanning its environment for change, in order to adapt its behavior to novel 
circumstances, just like a cognitive agent, its “states” or “entities” and their 
relations are to be modelled as “fluent” states. Fluent states’ truth-values depend 
on the current context. Functions running on such fluent states are there adaptive. 
When a system is defined, its complexity can be measured. 
Complexity enjoys many definitions that vary amongst the scientific domain 
it is used in. “Complexity” was first mentioned in an 1948 article titled “Science 
and Complexity”, where it was stated that physical science was mostly interested 
in two-variable problems, and that life science regards such simplicity as not 
significant (Efatmaneshnik & Ryan, 2016). Today, the term “complexity” had been 
used in so many different variations and contexts that its meaning became unclear 
(Efatmaneshnik & Ryan, 2016). Efatmaneshnik and Ryan (2016) differentiate 
between objective and subjective complexity in their generic framework. They 
define objective complexity as the size of the minimum descriptions necessary to 
describe a system. Objective complexity is not dependent on any observer’s 
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perspective or viewpoint, but can be context and goal dependent. Subjective 
complexity on the other hand is dependent on the modeler’s choice of reference 
model. As depicted in Figure 3 (Efatmaneshnik & Ryan, 2016, p. 4) objective 
complexity is defined by context and by the modeler’s (observer’s) definition of the 
system. So, while it is independent of the subjective viewpoint of some modeler, it 
still is dependent on the modeler’s subjective definition of the observed “system”. 
 
 
The definition of the “system” and whatever the modeler subjectively 
regards as simple, both determine some “reference simplicity”. Complexity is then 
the distance and size from this “reference simplicity”. This generic framework by 
Efatmaneshnik and Ryan (2016) can be used for a variety of complexity measures, 
such as Statistical Complexity, Complexity in Engineered Systems, Complexity 
Measures for Graphs, Complexity of Repeating Patterns and can be used for 
evolving, dynamic models, which include learning agents. Distinguishing between 
objective and subjective complexity enables the modeler to include multiple 
Figure 3: A generic framework for measuring complexity  
[source: Efatmaneshnik & Ryan, 2016, p. 4]. 
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perspectives, whose reference simplicities naturally differ, leading to a “gap” 
between the agents’ views. Every reference point comes with an objective 
complexity constant and various subjective complexity measures, which are 
dependent on the agent'. 
As multiple cognitive agents will ultimately have different views on what 
defines (subjective) simplicity, they will inevitably have different viewpoints on the 
measure of complexity. This is where “complexity economics” sees reason to 
include these derivations into the conclusion of contracts. Complexity Economics 
states that multiple agents will disagree on the “reality” of a system after some 
written agreement or contract has been made. The agents then disagree on 
performance indicators, as indicated by  figure 4 (Nota & Aiello, 2014, p. 88). 
 
This deviation of perspectives occurs when “system boundaries” are set by 
more than one modeler. For this reason “corporate decision-makers need to reflect 
the company as part of an open system” (Jeschke & Mahnke, 2016, p. 73), where 
system and its environment are defined by some meaningful boundary 
(“Sinngrenze”), which is open to a set of other meaningful entities coming from 
heterogeneous perspectives, definitions and viewpoints, as long as some internal 
Figure 4: Deviation distance of two perspectives on the individually perceived 
reality of some project over time 
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selection rules are applied, where such entities can be approved or denied 
(Luhmann, 2012, p. 178). 
In the domain of corporate decisions, such selection rules should be defined 
neither too broadly nor too narrowly, so critical information is included and 
managerial focus is preserved  (Jeschke & Mahnke, 2016). As depictured in figure 
5, such system boundaries can be modelled by two dimensions: the range of the 
considered system constituents and the time horizon of system analysis (Jeschke & 
Mahnke, 2016, p. 74). 
 
Based upon such a selection rule, the complexity of a system can be 
categorized, e.g. by multiple non-correlative dimensions such as multiplicity, 
interdependency, diversity, dynamics (Jeschke & Mahnke, 2016) and 
imponderability (Jeschke, 2017). By analyzing the system’s complexity with this 5-
dimensional model, 32 distinguishable types of complexity describe different 
scenarios of decision-making complexity. For each type, different approaches for 
CPS or operations to reduce uncertainty are suggested by Jeschke (2017), such as 
clustering-analysis to reduce uncertainty from high multiplicity, cross-impact-
analysis to cope with interdependency, specialization to counter high diversity, 
Figure 5: System boundaries defined by 2-dimensional selection rule 
[source: Jeschke & Mahnke, 2016, p. 74]. 
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sound Business-Process-Management in order to stay above high dynamics, and 
risk-management to handle high imponderability.  
In the end, the reduction of uncertainty by heuristic processes can be assigned 
to all mentioned tasks in this sub-chapter. Heuristics are defined as conscious or 
unconscious processes that efficiently ignore information (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011). To define some system or in order to being able to talk about a 
system, it has to be instantiated by a meaningful boundary or Sinngrenze, which is 
performed by ignoring information, i.e. relying on selection rules. In order to 
measure system complexity, after the system was defined, the measurement of 
complexity is not only affected by objective complexity but also by subjective 
complexity, which – again – includes ignoring information, stemming from 
subjective simplicity, e.g. relying on expert knowledge. To categorize complexity, 
models such as the “MIDDI”-model (Jeschke, 2017) can be applied to produce 
multiple types of decision-making scenarios, so that suitable problem-solving 
operations can be used to reduce uncertainty in a context-specific manner, relying 
on approved and proficient methods; ultimately ignoring alternative approaches, 
and therefore information, in order to be capable of acting efficiently and 
effectively.  
The three tasks of defining a system, measuring the system’s complexity and 
categorizing its complexity all frame reality by ignoring information to balance the 
amount of relevant information and associated costs to manipulate this 
information. Heuristic decision-making is not applied in all decision-making 
scenarios mentioned in this sub-chapter, but is applied when a suitable model is 
developed (e.g. defining some system), when a model is adapted to context (e.g. 
measuring system complexity) and when models are linked (e.g. categorizing 
complexity), to frame limitless information in order to make cost-efficient or cost-
effective predictions. Therefore, to make capital favorable decisions, it is necessary 
for some agent to possess as much information as possible in order to frame it in a 
productive way. A game-theoretical analysis showed that it was favorable to 
possess information rather than to have access to it (Ravid, Roesler, & Szentes, 
2019), as agents must be incentivized to gather costly information, overlook 
information when its price is in equilibrium and because cheap information does 
not necessarily approximate full information. Ravid, Roesler and Szentes (2019) 
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strengthen the need for the design of information channels by which agents in a 
certain decision-making systems, such as a market, can learn, as knowing that 
certain information can be obtained is not the same as actually knowing this 
information (Ravid et al., 2019). 
2.1.4 Ignoring information 
While there exists debate on whether the concept of heuristic search was 
falsified, can be falsified at all by the Popperian manner or if it even was an 
empirical hypothesis (Ohlsson, 2012), the concept of heuristic search is still brought 
into context with “planning” in more current studies (Baier, Bacchus, & McIlraith, 
2007). Baier, Bacchus and McIlraith use a simplified “relaxed planning graph” that 
ignores information on negative effects. In other words, they compute a simplified 
model to reduce complexity to build a new model that processes costs to achieve a 
certain goal (Baier et al., 2007, p. 614). 
Analogous to modern approaches to model planning-paths using heuristic 
search, the original idea of heuristic search was to also consider humans as 
information processing entities, who simplify reality by ignoring information due 
to their biological limitation (Simon & Newell, 1971). Just like mentioned 
algorithms, many papers from the 70’s considered humans to conduct “heuristic 
processing”, defined as an efficient problem-solving method, suitable for difficult 
problems by ignoring certain solutions in the set of possible solutions. This 
restriction is based on certain evaluations of the problem structure (Payne, 1976). 
The most famous example on research regarding “heuristics” comes 
manifold from Kahneman and Tversky, who described three major heuristics, 
being “availability”, “representativeness” and “anchoring and 
adjustment”(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which were used in human decision-
making under uncertainty; “under uncertainty” refers to any decision-making 
process with the absence of known probabilities regarding events of the state-
space. Decisions can also be made “under risk”, where subjective or objective 
probabilities are provided. This basic differentiation dates back to 1921 and is still 
used to categorize decision-making scenarios (Knight, 1957). When a decision is 
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made “under certainty”, the consequence of each possible action is known 
(Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 2014). 
In other words, human decision making was and still is theorized to be 
influenced by belief on the likelihood of events, where subjective or objective 
probabilities are not provided. Linked to this set of heuristics, a list of “biases” was 
given by Kahneman and Tversky, which represent deviations from the normative 
rational theory, caused by error in memory retrieval or violations of basic laws of 
probability (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002).  
Kahneman’s and Tversky’s heuristics-and-biases program had been 
challenged and criticized by the famous psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer (Gigerenzer, 
1996). Gigerenzer (2011) states that heuristics are neither rational nor irrational. 
While heuristics can outperform statistical decision-making in complex 
environments, as rational models perform badly during uncertainty, caused by 
complexity (Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 2014), their accuracy depend on environmental 
circumstances. People are able to learn to choose adaptively from a collection of 
heuristics; he further states that it was necessary to develop simple decision-
making guidelines for complex environments and to connect the simple heuristics 
framework with other theoretical frameworks (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).  
Decision-making under uncertainty does not necessarily benefit from logic 
and statistics according to Artinger, et al. (2015). Their research showed that 
decisions made in complex and uncertainty environments actually benefit from 
simple heuristics, as they are less sensitive to chaotic environmental disturbances, 
such as variance in data, thus generating less error (Artinger, Petersen, Gigerenzer, 
& Weibler, 2015). An intuitive example, where a much simpler heuristic decision-
making rule outperformed a more complex model under uncertainty, is the 
“Simple hiatus rule vs. Pareto/NBD” model. Here, the complex model inhibits 
more information than the heuristic approach, but the heuristic approach resulted 
in better predictions (Samson & Gigerenzer, 2016). 
From these insights it can be derived that heuristic decision-making still plays 
an important role in modern approaches to cope with complexity. It not only seems 
to be natural for humans to use heuristics when making decisions under 
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uncertainty – such an approach can also outperform statistical and logical models 
in anticipating development, when being computed by machines. Anyhow, 
uncertainty is an important factor to consider when predicting complex behavior. 
A case study had shown that failure to include stochastic effects derived from 
uncertainty in models analyzing traffic led to prediction biases up to 200 % 
(Calvert, Taale, Snelder, & Hoogendoorn, 2018). Still, decision-making using 
heuristics is not a one-fits-all tool, outperforming statistical and logical 
computations in all circumstances. It rather presents itself as a skill that can be 
learned to overcome bias and reduce uncertainty to make predictions that can 
outperform chance when being surrounded by complexity. 
2.1.5 Uncertainty 
Living beings, such as cognitive systems or decision-making agents, can be 
considered as complex systems, where predicting their behavior might be of 
extreme challenge under uncertain or novel decision situations (Hernán et al., 
2015). In day to day life the neural system reacts to different levels of uncertainty 
in a complex way, and subjective utility theory fails to correctly model human 
behavior. According to the reduction of uncertainty hypothesis, the human brain 
might be biased towards data which reduces uncertainty (Onnis, Christiansen, 
Chater, & Gómez, 2002).  
In a purely formal, mathematical context required for simulation, uncertainty 
enjoys crisp definitions and even its own “Uncertainty Theory”, which has become 
a branch of mathematics (Liu, 2018). This thesis relies on the explanation of 
uncertainty being  
“any departure from the unachievable ideal of complete determinism”  
(Walker et al., 2003, p. 8). Risk and ambiguity are to be “limiting cases of a general 
system evaluating uncertainty”, where decision makers differ in 
preference/aversion of risk and ambiguity (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & 
Camerer, 2005).  
The overall meaning of uncertainty varies and depends on the scientific field 
and domain it is used in. However, uncertainty is part of organizational day-to-day 
reality (Schilke, Wiedenfels, Brettel, & Zucker, 2017). In enterprises for example, 
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uncertainty in decision-making is being dealt by Information Systems, such as 
Expert Systems, Enterprise Resource Planning and Supply Chain Management 
(Irani, Sharif, Kamal, & Love, 2014). Project management is dominated by models, 
which assume or build upon determinism (Padalkar & Gopinath, 2016), while it is 
known that real-world problems mostly have access to incomplete or approximate 
information, limiting the uncertainty reducing capabilities of even an idealized 
algorithm (Traub, Wasilkowski, Wozniakowski, Bartholdi, & Ford, 1985). With the 
rise of technological progress, partly stemming from quantum physics more than 
60 years ago, it was already considered to be “unscientific” to assume infinite 
accuracy in any measurement, and that inevitable errors must be included in any 
theory, as they are considered being part of the sense-making of an environment, 
making strict determinism in scientific prediction an impossibility (Brillouin, 1959). 
This perspective also translates to economic predictions, as uncertainty prevails 
even with lots of information provided (Walker et al., 2003). In meteorological 
science inevitable uncertainties in initial conditions and model equations led to a 
shift of predicting the most likely outcome to a distribution of probabilities, as well 
as to the understanding of the need to include and represent “doubt” in forecasts 
(Palmer, 2017). This new process of modelling predictions is also influenced by 
external third parties. Scientist need to withstand the pressure to predict in a more 
deterministic way than is justified by the given data, stemming from media 
attention (Palmer, 2017). 
The urge to avoid or work around the understanding of unavoidable 
uncertainty might stem from “intolerance of uncertainty”, which had been 
described as the “most fundamental, underlying variable of anxiety disorders”  
(Gosselin et al., 2008, p. 1428). “Uncertainty avoidance”, being intensely researched 
as a cultural factor to be considered by the works of Hofstede since the 70s, failed 
to show significance in a more current experiment, when being applied outside of 
the IBM study (Schmitz & Weber, 2014). On the contrary, studies still build upon 
the hypothesis that cultures express different levels of “uncertainty avoidance” 
(Hofstede, 2001) and succeeded in finding correlations, e.g. participation in 
decision-making (Jang, Shen, Allen, & Zhang, 2018). Nevertheless, when talking 
about problem-solving, “uncertainty” has to be considered: a model linking 
uncertainty and cognition has shown that despite complete certainty over some 
final stage of a decision-making process, happening in a vast cognitive space 
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representing complexity, uncertainty will not stop growing (Hadfi & Ito, 2013). To 
cope with the inevitable persistence of uncertainty in algorithms and heuristic 
problem-solving, it was suggested to translate “complex problem solving” to 
“finding ways of reducing uncertainty” (Osman, 2017).  
2.2 THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN DECISION-MAKING 
In order to understand “information” it might be meaningful to ask “How 
much information do I acquire, when I learn something new?”. According to the 
“Kullback-Leibler divergence” the amount of information gained depends on what 
the agent had believed before (Baez & Pollard, 2016). If the agent assumed a fair 
coin-toss, or 50 % chance of heads, it will gain one bit of information. When the 
agent expects a 25 % chance to see heads, it will gain two bits of information when 
head actually appears.  
This example helps defining “information”. Just as “uncertainty” and 
“complexity”, the term “information” is used in every-day language and in 
scientific contexts in many ways. The following chapters will show different 
perspectives and definitions of information, how information can lead to 
uncertainty and to what extend information influences 21st century decision-
making. 
2.2.1 Definitions of information 
Mentioned coin-toss example builds upon the Shannon and Weaver model, 
where the information content is expressed in “bits”. The amount of information 
(I) is computed by I = log2 n, with n being the number of different output values. 
This model can be seen as translating the coin-tossing process into bits, a process 
which receives as input some belief about the future and translates it to some 
output, expressed in bits by the Shannon model. From this perspective, information 
reveals something about the input and its linked process. However, information is 
not the process itself, neither the input nor the output per se – the output expressed 
in bits merely is information about the input (belief) and the process (coin-toss and 
model) (Losee, 1998). However, the Shannon and Weaver model is limited to 
functional terms.  
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In physics information is commonly described as the entropy of a system. 
When nothing is known about a certain system, its entropy equals the logarithm of 
the number of possible states. Whether or not the observer of a system has to be 
included into the description of information and whether the observer can be seen 
in isolation is still debated in physics to this day (Brukner, 2018). While the 
problems and methods used in quantum physics might seem be too far-fetched and 
abstract for day-to-day economic decision-making, the intellectual basis for 
developing models used in problem-solving is identical in the two fields of study. 
“Bayesian-inference” is used in the thought experiment described by Brukner 
(2018), which is also common in game-theory and neuroscientific models about the 
human mind and brain. Knowledge or belief about a certain system and knowledge 
about the knowledge of others is part of game-theoretical analysis, as described in 
“The Dirty Faces and the Sage” (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991, p. 547). 
Using the “Hierarchical Model of Information Transmission” more abstract 
notions such as human perceptions, observation, belief, knowledge, as well as the 
influence of errors, misinformation and bad data can be considered (Losee, 1998). 
Based on this model, a discipline independent definition of information was 
provided by the author Losee (1998), who defined information as some output 
coming from some process, where the output tells something about both the input 
and process from which it originated (Losee, 1998). 
This definition links the meaning of information to some process that might 
have an impact on the behavior of some agent being aware of the output of this 
process. An analogue definition describes information as “a stimulus which 
expands or amends the World View of the informed.” (Madden, 2004, p. 9), the 
stimulus being the impact following the perception of some signal, altering the 
agent’s “World View”. The introducing Gedankenexperiment about the tribe 
holding different belief-groups is also based on the latter definition. Whatever 
information is, it leads to constant updates about some agent’s world-view. When 
multiple agents are influencing each other’s decision-making, game-theoretical 
models come into play.  
In game-theory, information is considered “private information” when it is 
only obtainable by an individual agent, such as “a random thought or intrinsic 
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motives”. “Public information” refers to information, which is potentially 
obtainable by all agents, who are part of the “game” or decision-making frame. A 
typical assumption of game theory is that agents hold common knowledge about 
the given information structure of the game, and about the co-agents’ rationality. 
It is further assumed that agents do so by conducting complicated mathematical 
calculations, i.e. applying Bayes theorem without error when updating their beliefs 
(McKelvey & Page, 1990). McKelvey and Page (1990) show that this game-
theoretical assumption on human behavior is approximated by experienced 
subjects with 85 % efficiency and by inexperienced subjects with 69 % efficiency. 
The concept of the “Bayesian-Brain” is often considered by psychologists, 
neuroscientists and cognitivists. The model assumes that the human brain is 
constantly predicting possible events and deviations from what is expected, by 
performing Bayesian inferences, and in doing so, the brain is limited by the 
requirement to minimize costs stemming from error (Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019, 
p. 280). 
Hutchinson and Barrett (2019) hypothesize that mental events are not arising 
independently, but are always dependent on prior events. This hypothesis can be 
linked to the understanding of Durlauf (1998) that “history matters” for complex 
systems, such as cognitive agents. Opposing the more “simplistic model” of some 
cognitive agents receiving a “stimulus”, translating it by perceptive senses into 
some “response”, Hutchinson and Barrett (2019) offer a different model on both 
mind and brain, defining “information flow” from a novel psychological and 
neuroscientific view.  
As shown in figure 6 both mind and brain are in a constant fluent state. Each 
state consists of a non-linear, complex system of neuronal activities (green arrows) 
and feedback (purple arrow), which are to be separated in mind and brain 
activities. In short, neurons activate memory from which certain “maps” of 
strategies are derived. Just like a scientific hypothesis, neurons try strategies in 
accordance to this map, choosing paths which deemed useful in the past and are 
then corrected by feedback. In a way, the brain simulates strategies by predicting 
the future based upon past experiences, hence “Bayesian Brain”. When the distance 
between the chosen path and the correcting feedback is too great, this distance can 
be considered an “error” and the neuron can correct this error by altering its path, 
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i.e. correcting a prediction-error. When the chosen path equals the feedback, the 




In a certain way, the brain constantly predicts the future and is constantly 
corrected by the environmental feedback and more importantly: the human brain 
is also corrected by anticipated prediction-error, and therefore not exclusively by 
environmental feedback. Each combined mind- and brain-state can be considered 
a “screenshot” of the agent’s “World-View”. A complex, non-linear network of 
Figure 6:  Model of the human brain functionality as a fluent state 
[source: Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019, p. 283] 
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trial- and error, constantly working on reducing uncertainty by choosing strategies 
that fits the current context.  
2.2.2 Derivation of a definition for information 
These examples show that “information” can be described as a fluent process, 
which itself can be described by “packages”, such as bits and providing an 
evaluation of the agent’s “belief and reality distance”. Physics, informatics and 
neurosciences can be combined in order to better understand information and its 
influence on human decision-making. In the end, a clear definition of information 
cannot be given; however, this thesis relies on the definitions of information by 
Losee (1998) and Madden (2004), integrating them into the novel predictive 
processing-framework by Hutchinson and Barrett (2019). Losee (1998) believes that 
information can be expressed by some value. While this value itself is not 
information, the value is informative about the input and process from which it is 
derived. As an internal model or “World View” can be both altered by a stimulus 
and by the mere anticipation of a stimulus as shown by Hutchinson and Berrett 
(2019), information is not solely regarded as a stimulus as defined by Madden 
(2004). The predictive processing-framework (PPF) shows that each internal model 
is both input and process, so input and process cannot be clearly distinguished in 
PPF, as required by Losee (1998) to make sense of the information value. In 
accordance to PPF, a state is linked to a new state by a fluent transition process 
consisting of frequent updating of prediction and prediction-error distance, while 
this “linkage” also serves as the process. In PPF each state is both input and process 
or best described as fluent states. 
Building upon the core statements of Losee (1998) that information can be 
expressed by some informative value, of Madden (2004) that information alters the 
internal model of some cognitive system and of Hutchinson and Berrett (2019) that 
cognitive agents both react to external stimuli and stimulated anticipation, the 
following is derived:  
If each of these complex fluent states of some observer were grasped in 
isolation at time tn and labelled by some integer, indicating its order of experience 
and an information theoretical function was applied to receive an informative value 
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(e.g. based on log2), then – in theory – a string of these fluent states would be 
identical to the entire experiences and all possible prediction results of the 
observing agent at time tn. Information can then be regarded as a redundant 
function operating on itself, embedding an uncertainty value on possible outcomes, 
with this value being dependent on the agent’s experience (chain of information 
states) and its belief (prediction vs. prediction-error). 
2.2.3 Information perturbing events in behavioral experiments 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) close their work “Game Theory” with a 
remarkable insight. First, they explain that finite state space games are not 
outmatched by infinite-state-space models approximations, as the latter can have a 
very different set of equilibria. Second, uncertainty about another’s information can 
lead to state spaces that are even unaccountably infinite. Therefore, in real life 
economic decision-making, where uncertainty is inevitable and can only be 
reduced to zero by accepting some “deception potential”, a game-theoretical model 
will either have to cope with uncountable infinity or potentially unprecise and 
therefore unreliable approximations. Third, while in practical applications of game-
theoretical models finite state-spaces are used, their sensitivity to perturbations 
leading to entirely different outcomes  
“is another reason to think seriously about the robustness of one’s conclusions to the information 
structure of the game.”  
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991).  
In other words, human decision-making is hardly grasped and simulated by 
game-theoretical models, as “doubt”, mathematically expressed by perturbing 
some integer, can lead to entirely different outcomes. Even “heuristic approaches” 
are not immune to such perturbing events. Uncertainty or “doubt” stemming from 
deception or by how information is presented are important influencers for 
experiments in the field of behavioral economics and psychology. In the following, 
three major perturbing events will be briefly described: deception, the “frame 
effect” and the “order effect”. 
In short, while deception is commonly used in psychological experiments, 
deception is far less, if at all, accepted in the domain of economics (Krawczyk, 2019). 
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The “frame effect” describes how human decision-making is influenced by how 
different choice options are presented (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), whereas the 
“order effect” analyzes belief updating (Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011). Deception, 
“frame effects” and “order effects” can have an influence on the maintenance and 
refutation of some agent’s belief, which is a critical process in sequential decision-
making (Yoshida & Ishii, 2006). All three effects can be manipulated in order to 
experience different decision-making results or to “nudge” agents, e.g. using the 
“frame effect” to display information provided by a search engine’s result page in 
such a way that the agent’s choices can be improved (Benkert & Netzer, 2018) or 
using the “order effect” to make  agents perform riskier decisions (Aimone, Ball, & 
King-Casa, 2016). According to most economists, “deception” leads to noisy data 
and is considered unethical (Houser & McCabe, 2013), while no few psychologists 
saw deception as a way to produce useful results (Christensen, 1988). More recent 
research has shown that experimental economists’ aversion towards deception is 
justified (Ortmann & Hertwig, 2005), however, to this day no clear definition of 
deception exists nor agreement on when deception appears to be used in some 
experiment (Krawczyk, 2019).  
2.2.4 Making decisions in a VUCA world 
As mentioned before, most real world problems are ill-defined. Human 
agents solve problems by ignoring information (heuristics), which works well to 
reduce complexity and to solve problems under uncertainty. In order to 
successfully apply heuristic decision-making or ignore information effectively, 
information has to be collected first. Information was characterized in this thesis i) 
as modelled by fluent states, ii) as being linked to an informative value building 
upon information theory, iii) as being observer-dependent, iv) as a redundant 
function to alter uncertainty. In the final chapters it was noted that models, 
experiments and therefore decision-making outcomes are sensitive to information 
perturbing events caused by deception, the “order” or “framing” of information 
and that behavioral experiments disregard deception, as it leads to noisy data. All 
of these circumstances surrounding real economic problems and the complex role 
of information lead to the conclusion that today’s world inhibits characteristics, 
rendering reliable long-term predictions challenging. This conclusion is expressed 
by the term “VUCA-world”.  
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“VUCA” stands for “volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity” 
(Dörner & Funke, 2017, pp. 2–3) and is commonly used in economic contexts, 
referring to the unpredictable nature of today’s economic decision-making domain. 
Its four features are similar to the attributes of complex systems, complexity, 
connectivity, dynamics and goal conflicts (Dörner & Funke, 2017). The term VUCA 
has been used in a variety of contexts such as to describe modern battlefield- (Nindl 
et al., 2018), work- (Seow, Pan, & Koh, 2019) and decision-making-environments 
(Giones, Brem, & Berger, 2019). The VUCA acronym has been misused i.e. 
providing the impression that leadership was powerless to plan ahead and 
strategize (Bennett & Lemoine, 2014). On the contrary, the VUCA framework can 
help to strategize and plan ahead effectively, even when the decision-making 
environment is inhibiting features of a complex system.  
As shown in figure 7 (Green, Page, De’ath, Pei, & Lam, 2019, p. 2), two simple 
questions can be derived by the VUCA framework and consequently asked to 
categorize a complex system: “How well can you predict the results of your 
actions?” and “How much do you know about the situation?”.  
 
The contents of these two questions can be linked to “expert knowledge”. In 
their famous work “Human Problem Solving”, Simon & Newell (1971) found 
expert chess players to outperform novice chess players in recalling and 
reproducing the positions of chess pieces after 5 seconds viewing. Experts would 
Figure 7: Dimensions of complex systems  
[source: Green, Page, De’ath, Pei, & Lam, 2019, p. 2] 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 49 
remember and thus hold more knowledge about the chess game. Consequently, 
experts seem to outperform novices when it comes to the question “How much is 
known about the situation?”. Perceptual-Cognitive research has shown that expert 
surfers were more likely to predict waves as being too risky than amateur surfers 
(Furley & Dörr, 2016). Experts might then outperform novices in complex problem 
solving when answering “How well can results of actions be predicted?”. The 
overall question is then, how expert knowledge can be defined and whether or not 
expert knowledge helps in problem solving in a VUCA world. This question is to 
be answered in detail in the next chapter. 
2.3 EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND PROBLEM-SOLVING 
According to Zeleny (2005) information is only symbolic acting, whereas 
knowledge is true acting, which cannot be replaced by any amount of information. 
Information is seen by the author as a necessary ingredient, but insufficient recipe 
for effective volition (Zeleny, 2005). This is because codified knowledge became 
information, and information technology did not replace social interaction; it was 
necessary to transform information into effective action and not the other way 
around (Zeleny, 2005). The author further states that while there can be “too much 
information” there cannot be “too much knowledge”. These statements suit 
mentioned problems arising from information-based models with high degrees of 
complexity, ultimately producing uncertainty, instead of reducing it. Just like the 
model by Hutchinson and Barrett (2019) distinguished between mind and brain or 
modelling and acting, there exists an analogue distinction between information and 
knowledge. Knowledge relies on operative acts of measurable volition, rather than 
on words or letters (Zeleny, 2005).  
Just as knowledge is not captured by information systems by these claims, 
there exists perspectives on expertise not being captured by knowledge 
management systems: expertise was mainly the result of tens of thousands of hours 
of acting (Trevelyan, 2014). According to Trevelyan (2014) expertise has to pass 
three tests in order to be considered as such: First, expertise has to lead to constant 
sub-par performance. Second, expertise has to lead to volition or concrete 
outcomes. And third, expertise has to be measurable.  
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Therefore, action or volition seems to be the key factor combining 
“knowledge” and “expertise”. The resulting term of “Expert knowledge” is now to 
be defined in more detail, followed by a short description on expert knowledge 
being used as a resource, and how it is linked to learning. 
2.3.1 Definition of knowledge, expertise and expert knowledge   
Theoretical philosophy, building upon ancient Greek philosophy, defines 
“knowledge“ as  
“justified true belief, or true opinion combined with reason” 
(Hilpinen, 1970, p. 109). This abstract approach in defining “knowledge” leads to 
logical discussions, whether the information I1 of person A knowing some event p1, 
which includes some uncertainty c that this knowledge was wrong, and the 
information I2 of person A knowing that A himself knows that p1, was the same 
information (I1 == I2) or not (I1 <> I2), I2 also containing c. It also leads to “ad 
infinitum problems”, such as whether “A knowing A knowing A knowing … 
knowing p”, containing c, or paradox problems that there cannot exist knowledge 
since uncertainty c is always part of some information (Hilpinen, 1970).  
An adequate definition of “knowledge” for the business environment was 
found to be more suitable, when being modelled less abstract than by attempts 
stemming from “epistemology”. The meaning of “knowledge” is ought to be found 
in the domain of cognitive sciences (Bolisani & Bratianu, 2018). By defining some 
discrete system, such as “the static object of knowledge”, the “frame problem” 
would again arise. There also exist studies claiming that knowledge did not find its 
boundaries from the works of one single agent, but was the result of an intellectual 
collective, such that knowledge is considered “cognitive contact”, where 
assumptions about reality arise from acts of intellectual confrontation with others 
(Zagzebski, 2017). To provide a more business oriented definition and to overcome 
problems arising from the frame problem, when trying to model knowledge with 
discrete states, so called “fluid flows” are used, leading to the definition of 
knowledge as “stocks and flows” (Bolisani & Bratianu, 2018, p. 19). This definition 
applies for both explicit and tacit knowledge and has to be combined with 
paradigms from physics regarding “entropic uncertainties” (Bolisani & Bratianu, 
2018). This leads to the three “rational, emotional, and spiritual fields” defining 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 51 
knowledge (Bolisani & Bratianu, 2018, p. 24). The rational domain of knowledge is 
defined as being objective and explicit, outlined by language and logic. The 
emotional dimension of knowledge is subjective and context dependent, being a 
result of our body responses to the external environment. The spiritual field of 
knowledge regards ethics and values, which are essential in corporate decision 
making (Bolisani & Bratianu, 2018). 
Decades ago, scientific research in human problem-solving found that 
expertise requires large amounts of knowledge; the expert has experienced many 
relevant patterns of some decision-frame and these patterns serve as a guide 
towards relevant parts of knowledge efficiently (Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & 
Simon, 1980): This knowledge storages contain varieties of patterns helping with 
the problem interpretation and problem-solving, while at the same time providing 
essential and relevant clues (Larkin et al., 1980). Intuition is described by Larkin et 
al. (1980) as largely being some ability to use “pattern-indexed schemata”, 
distinguishing novices from experts in problem-solving. This broad definition of 
expertise links to the more recent understanding of “expert performance” reflecting 
high-level, circumstantial adaptation skills, resulting from long periods of 
experience and volition (Ericsson & Charness, 1994). Patterns leading to expertise 
are then automatically acquired in a confined area, where acting happens. Above-
average performance is then the result of this iterative process. Defining and 
selecting “experts” solely based on their years of experience, e.g. for Delphi panels, 
is a debated selection process, and collective performance in forecasting does not 
necessarily depend on there being more experienced experts in some decision-
making panel. In “Delphi decision-making groups” the total amount of expertise 
necessary remains uncertain (Baker, Lovell, & Harris, 2006). 
Based upon the definitions of knowledge and expertise, expert knowledge is 
obtained by constant iterative acting in a certain confined domain, where the agent 
adapts to experienced patterns becoming more efficient in solving problems in the 
chosen domain, altering rational, emotional and spiritual mental models fluently, 
and doing so in constant exchange with other people.  
Therefore, expert knowledge lives from acting. According to McBridge & 
Burgman (2012), expert knowledge is important for applied ecology and 
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conservation, as it inhibits complex dynamics, where action is required to reduce 
uncertainty. When empirical data is lacking, expert knowledge is commonly seen 
as the optimal source of information; expert knowledge is simply what agents 
know from practice, training, and experience, and manifests itself in effective 
recognition of context-relevant information and efficient problem solving (McBride 
& Burgman, 2012).  
2.3.2 Expert knowledge as a resource 
Making predictions in complex and non-linear decision-environments can 
benefit from expert knowledge, but is no guarantee for precise forecasts. Age and 
work experience do not necessarily predict performance, and expert knowledge is 
context sensitive and has to be embedded in a suitable decision-making domain 
and framework (McBride & Burgman, 2012). Engineers for example debated many 
decades, whether or not system design was an intuitive art-form or a scientific 
process, which had to be systemized; nowadays, engineers rely on a mixed bag of 
instruments and a more holistic viewpoint when it comes to design, including 
complexity management, workflows and cognitive systems (Kreimeyer, Lauer, 
Lindemann, & Heyman, 2006). While iterations of act results in learning, thus 
building expertise, such iterations have to be minimized in order to reduce costs, 
as described by the commonly used “Pahl and Beitz Systematic Approach” 
framework (Kannengiesser & Gero, 2017). Applications of lean and agile software 
development are growing (Tripp, Saltz, & Turk, 2018) and show that there exists 
an interest of embedding expert knowledge in more lightweight and flexible 
frameworks. This is done to reduce costs and in order to be able to react to 
unpredictable change efficiently (Saini, Arif, & Kulonda, 2017). In other words, in 
a complex environment, expert knowledge is handled as a resource to save capital, 
and to better handle uncertainties. This concept is used in “sustainable 
management” and referred to as “salutogenesis” (Müller-Christ, 2014), which 
describes that capital can be used in order to stay capable of acting and reacting to 
unforeseeable events. So even though expert knowledge does not necessarily result 
in optimal results, it is still considered an important factor when facing dynamical 
decision-environments and can be effectively included in modern frameworks that 
save capital, leading to more sustainable problem-solving solutions. 
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2.3.3 The role of learning 
According to Simon and Newell (1971), human decision-making consists of 
cognitive and environmental characteristics (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010). This is 
called the expertise approach, combining the understanding of expertise and 
decision-making. Campitelli & Gobet (2010) suggest that Simon’s expertise 
approach should be included into decision-making research: experiments should 
test for level of expertise and apply different environmental circumstances. 
Experiments should contain participants with different level of expertise, in order 
to show whether or not experts and novices show different levels of bias, as 
predicted by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), and when and why such cognitive 
illusions disappear, as stated by Gigerenzer (1996). According to the “Simon and 
colleagues’ approach”, different environmental circumstances should be applied  
(Campitelli & Gobet, 2010), such that domain specific expertise can be compared to 
other domains, in order to test whether or not environmental circumstances have 
an impact on decision-making, whether this impact correlated to expertise, and if 
the type of heuristics applied by participants actually changed. Campitelli & Gobet 
(2010) also suggest that computational models that fit data of human behavior in a 
multitude of domains are more meaningful than models, which analyze human 
behavior in more specific cases. 
Theories in behavioral economics are seeking generality, adding parameters 
incrementally, such that results or models can be easily compared to even more 
general models; even though adding behavioral assumptions to some models 
describing human behavior makes the model less tractable, behavioral models can  
outperform traditional ones in precision, when operating in domains of dynamics 
and strategic interaction (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004). Behavioral economics 
relies on field experiments, computer simulation and brain scans, and Camerer & 
Loewenstein (2004) describe behavioral economists as methodological eclectics, 
who make use of psychological insights (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004, p. 7), which 
distinguishes behavioral economics from experimental economics. “Behavioral 
Game Theory” generalizes the standard assumptions of game theory, using 
experimental evidence, and provides a model for “learning” in complex 
environments, even including neuroscientific evidence to support models about 
economic behavior (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004). 
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The authors Reisch & Zhao (2017) describe behavioral economics as a theory, 
which does not rely on the view of the consumer acting as a rational Homo 
oeconomicus, but displaying “bounded rationality”, as described by Kahneman 
(2003) and Simon (1955), where their deviations are predictable “errors”. 
Behavioral economics relies on the “information paradigm” in the sense that 
consumer behavior is incentivized by the information provided and by their 
learning progress in the form of preferences, biases and heuristic strategies; 
however, models building upon this understanding realized that even small 
incentives can have a big impact on decision-making (Reisch & Zhao, 2017). Key 
findings of behavioral economics include several biases and heuristics from 
prospect theory and mental account, and are used to design choice context; as 
consumers make decisions context-dependently, results by behavioral economic 
models can be used to nudge consumers (Reisch & Zhao, 2017).  
The influence of expert knowledge, the “expertise approach” of decision-
making research and behavioral economics find common ground in the domain of 
“learning”. While “expertise” was defined as an “extreme adaption”, “learning” 
too is linked to the concept of adaption, being defined as “ontogenetic adaption”, 
being observed change in behavior of an agent, which stems from making use of 
regularities surrounding the agent (De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013). 
To acquire a clear understanding about behavioral changes, it is recommended to 
rely on this functional definition of “learning”, and to acquire information about 
when exactly learning occurs, so that insights of cognitive nature can also be 
derived (De Houwer et al., 2013). Experiments should then control when learning 
occurs to effectively measure behavioral changes, stepping away from inefficient 
models, which understand learning as a “mental mechanism” (De Houwer et al., 
2013, p. 641). Experiments can be designed in such a way, as to include the 
“expertise approach”, behavioral economics and “expert knowledge” by this 
understanding of “learning”: the three concepts would meet common ground in 
software-based experiments, where controlled contextual changes increased the 
probability in behavioral changes, which can then be compared to novice and 
expert problem-solving performance, having either performed only a few or many 
iterations of the experiment before, including decades of insights on how biases 
and heuristics influence decision-making.  
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The next chapter will introduce the concept of learning, how it is related to 
measured behavioral changes, which are often influenced by biases and heuristics, 
and how individual agents can be understood as “disturbances”. 
2.4 AGENTS ACTING AS DISTURBANCES 
According to Erev and Roth (2014) mainstream behavioral economics 
attempts to find deviations from the rational model, offering descriptive models. 
The authors discuss human learning in order to find domains where people learn 
fast and maximize their expected return, to better understand how the structure of 
an economic environment influences behavior (Erev & Roth, 2014). Important 
insights regard feedback and its influence on decisions. When feedback is limited 
to the chosen option – that is, when consequences of discarded options are not 
provided to the agent – the behavioral impact of negative outcomes last longer than 
the impact of good outcomes. This is because bad outcomes reduce the probability 
of the agent trying to reevaluate the option (Erev & Roth, 2014). This can lead to a 
certain “attitude” towards options through such exploration, where invalid 
negative prejudices are hardly overcome (Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004). 
Exploration can be described as a requirement to obtain information during 
complex problem solving, since in such problem solving scenarios, information is 
hidden from the agents on the outset. As most real economic problems are complex 
or can be considered as problems under uncertainty, this chapter or in fact this 
thesis as a whole, will mainly consider problems under uncertainty. There exists a 
mathematical expression of the continuum from risk to uncertainty, coming from 
the “bias variance theory”, written as  
“total error = (bias)2 + variance + ε”,  
where “ε” equals noise. The meaning of this continuum is very intuitively 
explained by Gerd Gigerenzer in his introducing article “Taking Heuristics 
Seriously” to the whitepaper “The Behavioral Economics Guide 2016” (Samson & 
Gigerenzer, 2016). 
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As depicted in figure 8 the left person shows bias towards the bottom right, 
next to no variance, and overall superior performance as opposed to the right 
person, who shows no bias, high variance and a lower score. This intuitive example 
shows that error can stem from either bias or variance. Fine-tuned complex models, 
according to Mousavi & Gigerenzer (2014), lead to high variance when being 
applied to different samples, while heuristics with fixed parameters have no 
variance, but bias. Still, problems under risk are different from problems under 
uncertainty, and while uncertainty is part of many day-to-day situations in real life, 
uncertainty has to be reduced to a form of risk, in order to make calculations 
dealing with uncertainty compatible to risk calculations. (Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 
2014). Anyhow, this thesis wants to assemble more theoretical background mainly 
about problems under uncertainty, while not ignoring important aspects of 
problems under risk. 
The following sub-chapter will capture the importance of feedback, and its 
potential influence on following decisions during complex problem-solving under 
Figure 8: Bias vs. Variance  
[source: Samson & Gigerenzer, 2016, p. VIII] 
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uncertainty, where the agent has to explore, and possibly adapt to contextual 
changes. Following subchapters will specify the role of non-routine tasks, routine 
strength in decision-making, derive non-routine problem solving, providing a 
short summary of these insights by referring to “complexity economics”.  
2.4.1 The role of feedback in complex problems under uncertainty 
According to Van der Kleij, Feskens, & Eggen, 2015 there does not exist a 
generally accepted model on how learning is created by feedback, but there does 
exist some evidence regarding the positive relationship of feedback on learning 
during computerized experiments. However, Van der Kleij et al. (2015) also 
mention that these conclusions are not sufficient enough for explaining detailed 
relationships of feedback and learning, defining feedback as follows: “Winne and 
Butler (1994) suggested  
“feedback is information with which a learner can confirm, add to, overwrite, tune, or restructure 
information in memory, whether that information is domain knowledge, meta-cognitive knowledge, 
beliefs about self and tasks, or cognitive tactics and strategies” (p. 5740).”  
(Van der Kleij et al., 2015, pp. 2–3). The meta-analysis by Van der Kleij et al. (2015) 
considered 40 studies regarding the influence of item-based feedback on learning 
in a computer-based environment. “Item-based” feedback means that agents are 
granted immediate or delayed feedback on every item (Van der Kleij et al., 2015). 
Rich feedback led to more effective learning outcomes in “higher order learning” 
than “simple feedback”, which is defined as feedback only providing information 
about the correctness of some response. Simple feedback is considered to be 
effective for „lower order learning outcomes“ (p. 8). „Lower order learning” is 
restricted to recalling, recognizing and understanding concepts with no need to 
actually apply this knowledge. “Higher learning” requires the application of 
knowledge in novel domains, which is referred to as “transfer” (Van der Kleij et al., 
2015, p. 5). 
As people tend to think in short-sighted causal relations, commonly assume 
an effect to have a single cause and halt research for causes upon having found the 
first satisfying explanation, agents perceive only limited amounts of feedback to 
self-reinforce or self-correct strategies (Sterman, 2006). Time delays in feedback 
processes confound the agents’ ability to learn, resulting in decision makers to 
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perform corrections, even when enough corrective actions have already been taken 
“to restore equilibrium“ (Sterman, 2006, p. 508).  
According to Sterman (2006) “learning is a feedback process”, as depictured 
in figure 9, where both dynamics in a complex system and all learning depend on 
feedback. When deviations from expected states are perceived, agents perform 
actions from which they think will close the gap. Therefore, strategies are 
influenced by misperceptions of feedback, unscientific reasoning and biases. In 
order to learn under conditions of high uncertainty, such as learning under crisis, 
this “ expected states gap” is closed by pre-training, using virtual reality, learning 
by imitation, communication, information systems, past experiences and operating 
standards (Moynihan, 2008). It is assumed that knowledge gathered before facing 
a complex problem under uncertainty helps to better perform in its problem-
solving. While Moynihan (2008) stresses that ad-hoc learning during a problem 
under uncertainty is possible, novel routines should be explored before a network 
of agents is required to use them. 
In conclusion, all learning results from feedback, while learning outcomes are 
influenced by the quality of feedback. Simple learning outcomes already benefit 
from feedback solely indicating correctness of some response, while transfer 
requires more sophisticated feedback, i.e.  
“hints, additional information, extra study material, and an explanation of the correct answer.”  
(Van der Kleij et al., 2015, p. 4). In situations of high uncertainty where such 
additional information cannot be provided, prior knowledge or exploration for 
new routines can be helpful. The latter real-world problem in crisis management is 
commonly referred to as “non-routine problem solving”. The following sub-
chapter will introduce this concept in greater detail. 
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2.4.2 Novel problems, real-world problems, and non-routine tasks 
According to thorough experimental results stemming from the “bean fest 
paradigm”, where the relation of exploratory behavior and attitude formation was 
tested (Fazio et al., 2004), whether or not some novel decision alternative was 
considered good or bad – at least in a virtual world – is considered by agents in 
accordance to their weighting bias. Beans could be eaten or not, resulting in either 
positive or negative effects. Beans would differ in shape and pattern, and 
Figure 9: All learning is a feedback process 
[source: Sterman, 2006, p. 506]. 
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participants were able to defeat randomness by clustering the beans’ appearances, 
as shown in figure 10.  
 
The experiment attempted various conditions, such as providing feedback to 
all or only to the chosen bean, framing the experiment by granting points or 
subtracting life points. In the end, the game was always a performance-based 
experiment. When a novel alternative in form of some bean is faced by an agent in 
this experimental environment, where a problem under uncertainty with item-
based feedback is simulated, and the agents can learn from feedback (with feedback 
only provided to the chosen option), agents’ choice can partly be predicted by the 
common “negativity bias”. Participants who learned the positive and negative 
Figure 10: “Bean-Fest” causal structure  
[source: Fazio et al., 2015, p.107]. 
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decision alternatives (beans) equally well, tended towards a negative response, 
generally showing negativity bias towards novel beans (Fazio, Pietri, Rocklage, & 
Shook, 2015). Agents are influenced by the looks and resemblance of patterns to 
prior experiences (Fazio et al., 2015). Whether or not an agent had a larger tendency 
to classify a novel bean as a bad bean, than can be expected by the agent’s learning 
pattern, defines the “valence weighting bias”. It is regarded “as a fundamental 
personality characteristic”, as  
“Individuals’ valence weighting proclivities have proved relevant to sensitivity to interpersonal 
rejection, threat assessment, neophobia, decisions about risky alternatives, intentions to engage in 
novel risk behaviors, actual risk behavior, emotional reactivity to a failure experience, the expansion 
of friendship networks, and changes in depressive symptoms.”  
(Fazio et al., 2015, p. 117). Unfortunately, the authors Fazio et al. (2015) found the 
valence weighting bias to not be self-reportable by questionnaires. Also, their 
finding are limited to experiments, where decision alternatives give visual clues, so 
that the Bayesian brain finds fruitful potential to learning. However, the Bean-Fest 
experiment enables to simulate a decision-making environment, where each 
problem is novel and different and further shows that individual differences are 
key at the very core of problem solving.  
According to system theory, problems exist in real life – not only in science: 
reality reacts to problems by selection and problems are described as  
“real and effective catalysts of social life”  
(Luhmann, 2012, p. 173). Chapter 2 defined many aspects of real economic 
problems so far. Most problems in reality are ill-defined, lack a clear instruction on 
how to solve them, happen under uncertainty, are solved by humans via heuristics, 
are complex, need to be solved by acquiring information or knowledge, are 
disturbed by error such as bias, will usually be solved by many interdependent 
decisions, require experience and learning to be solved and are embedded in an 
opaque network of cause-effect relations, whose feedback signals are not easily 
being interpreted correctly by humans.  
Studies on learning from feedback in real world problems or economic 
problems in a complex environment are scarce. Keil et al. (2016) describe learning 
from performance feedback in complex environments, where outcomes are 
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observed with time-delay and where a multitude of actions are combined to 
generate outcome in different research and development stages of 98 large US 
pharmaceutical companies during 1993 to 2013 (Keil, Kostopoulos, Syrigos, & 
Meissner, 2016). Here, the authors focus on a real world “order effect” of 
information. Negative feedback, such as performance below aspirations, in an early 
development stage, are interpreted differently, leading to different actions than 
negative feedback in later development stages. In addition, Keil et al. (2016) 
distance themselves from classical models of experiential learning regarding 
positive feedback. They argue that performance above expectations creates a 
buffer, whose size favors higher chances of organizational risk-taking. An 
increasing tolerance of organizational risk-taking was described to favor search of 
novelties above aspirations, possibly leading to a shift of the company’s core project 
management (Keil et al., 2016). Organizational recession can also have a positive 
impact, as it conserves unexplored potential, nourishing firms during times of 
“uncontrolled exogenous adversity” (Levinthal & March, 1981, p. 309).  
Another core finding was that research should concentrate more on the 
relationship between cognitive biases and behavioral learning (Keil et al., 2016) and 
that interpretation of information of performance feedback plays an important role 
in experiential learning in complex processes. Performance feedback is interpreted 
differently and following action also depends on the “order effect” or stage of R&D 
process (W.-R. Chen & Miller, 2007), also in accordance to prospect theory (W. 
Chen, 2008). 
From these examples it can be concluded that real-world problems and their 
related decision-making processes are indeed dependent on both interpretation 
and order of feedback information. For this very reason, the three information 
disturbing effects “frame effect”, “order effect” and deception were mentioned 
earlier. Purposeful deception, such as lies, too commonly disturbs feedback 
information in real world problems and is referred to as “real world deception” 
(Fuller, Biros, & Delen, 2011).  
Due to the high levels of uncertainty in complex environments, pre-training, 
exploration and routines are essential in coping with real world problems, 
especially when time pressure does not incentivize investing in reflection time, 
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novel routines or finding new alternative paths. Such a complex decision-making 
environment with high time pressure is represented by challenges in hospital 
settings. To reduce costs, the concept of “shared decision-making” and consumer 
education was tested back in the year 2000 by use of software. Here, treatments 
were not only chosen by the physician in terms of clinical considerations, but the 
treatment choice was also influenced by consideration of the patient’s values and 
preferences (Holmes-Rovner et al., 2000). However, as the study showed, the 
program faced many problems, which can be collectively explained by the effects 
of “information interpretation”, personal bias, and problems stemming from initial 
hurdles of novel routines: physicians restricted treatments to patients who wanted 
additional information about the treatment, and who did not participate in the 
randomized study due to personal enthusiasm for the program, i.e. to avoid 
inducing bias by participating or physicians did not implement the new shared 
decision-making process as a routine. 
All three problems restricted the implementation of a new routine or in other 
words, made this task of implementing the non-routine, shared decision-making 
program a real-world problem and a tough challenge. Individual characteristics 
facing novelties, the uncertainties stemming from unknown causal relations by 
misinterpretation of information or order effects and lack of resources to pre-test 
some novel strategy, render handling non-routine tasks difficult. Despite the 
difficulties when attempting non-routine tasks, they are considered as being part 
of important “21st Century Skills” in order to cope with a VUCA world, where 
circumstances vary frequently, and its features are linked to performance in 
complex problem solving (Neubert, Mainert, Kretzschmar, & Greiff, 2015). 
In order to observe non-routine decision making and measure its related non-
routine problem solving performance in an environment that does not incentivize 
reflection time, i.e. reflecting on a problem when time is cost-assigned, Strunz & 
Chlupsa (2019) developed a valid application-test scenario in form of a web-
browser based online experiment. Its methods and findings are to be described in 
greater detail in sub-chapter 2.4.4 – in order to do so, problem solving and the role 
of routine are introduced in the following sub-chapter. 
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2.4.3 Problem solving search and routine strength 
“In everyday speech the term problem solving refers to activities that are novel and effortful.”,  
while not all tasks  
“feel like problem solving. Some activities, like solving a Tower of Hanoi problem (…) feel like 
problem solving, whereas other more routine activities, such as using a familiar computer application 
(…) do not. (…) Newell (1980) argued that the dimension of difference between routine problem 
solving and real problem solving is the amount of search involved. (…) Newell claimed that we 
transit smoothly into problem-solving search and indeed that much of human cognition is a mixture 
of routine problem solving and problem solving that involves search. This claim is realized in his 
Soar model of cognition (Newell, 1990)”  
(Anderson, 1993).  
When researching problem solving, the Tower of Hanoi task was one of the 
first experimental tools being used (Anderson, 1993), and still is applied in research 
today. Tower of Hanoi has also been used in the psychology of problem solving 
(Hinz, Kostov, Kneißl, Sürer, & Danek, 2009), in neuroscientific research (Ruiz-
Díaz, Hernández-González, Guevara, Amezcua, & Ågmo, 2012), in order to test for 
executive function and planning (Donnarumma, Maisto, & Pezzulo, 2016), for 
working memory (Numminen, Lehto, & Ruoppila, 2001), and is being used with 
children, adolescents, and adults from general and clinical samples (Robinson & 
Brewer, 2016). Tower of Hanoi (ToH) consists of simple rules, which are to be 
explained in greater detail in chapter 3. For now, as can be seen in figure 10, all that 
should be noted about the game is that it always consists of some “state”, such as a 
starting configuration of 5 disks being put on the left most peg. The player than has 
to apply some “operator” to transform one state into a new state, by e.g. moving a 
disk onto another rod. In accordance to J.R. Anderson (1993) a “problem space” is 
then defined by both “state” and “operator”. When all possible connections 
between states are modelled, by applying only valid operators, the entire state 
space represents the problem-space (Anderson, 1993). Whether humans hold a 
similar mental representation of this problem-space is still of interest to recent 
research and results show that the total time required to solve a ToH problem is 
proportional to its complexity; complexity is defined as the problem-space distance 
between the game’s start and goal state, as well as the complexity of solution and 
its associated computational costs (Donnarumma et al., 2016). As Donnarumma et 
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al. (2016) show, humans are having troubles to engage in counter-intuitive moves, 
which are considered as being more complex, as they require the agent to “look-
ahead” when playing ToH. The authors also link “subgoaling” to the possible 
mental representation of a problem-space, where the problem is divided into 
smaller portions, which have to be solved. The concept of “subgoals” is based upon 
scientific evidence that human behavior follows a hierarchical structure, where 
basic and simple actions are clustered into subtasks, which themselves can be 
combined for the achievement of high-order goals (Solway et al., 2014). According 
to Donnarumma et al. (2016), the subgoal concept can explain suboptimal 
decisions, during problems that require counterintuitive moves: humans have a 
tendency to simply draw a “direct path” from start to goal state by only being 
aware of the perceptual distance; the “subgoal” model forms an implicit metric 
from the problem space, and this implicit metric has a great impact on the decision-
making outcome.  Human problem solving or human search, is sensitive to its prior 
and often suboptimal mental, implicit representation. Implicit measures are 
considered as being useful for predicting behavior and analyzing change of mental 
problem representations (Blanton & Gawronski, 2019).   
Human problem solving is also sensitive to routines. Routine is defined as a  
“behavioral option that comes to mind as a solution”,  
which is not considered being some strategy but a  
“behavioral option that is most strongly associated with a specific decision situation”  
(Betsch et al., 2001, p. 24). According to Betsch et al. (2001), prior-belief effects 
stemming from high routine participants resulted in agents being reluctant to 
overcome routine, despite novel feedback suggesting a change of routine as being 
a lucrative option. Participants who experienced high success rates acting upon a 
certain strategy, and who then showed high routine, were adapting at slower rates. 
However, instant adaption with strong routine induced participants were found, 
when novel feedback could be understood or correctly interpreted by prior 
knowledge. In their second experiment Betsch et al. (2001) had shown that strong 
routine participants were falling for the confirmation bias, when tasks were framed 
as being similar, but were able to discard old strategies, when a task was being 
explicitly described as being novel. All in all, routine strength significantly 
influences decision-making, yielding confirmation biases in information 
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acquisitions, and being sensitive towards how tasks are framed. Still, confirmatory 
tendencies can be overcome when a task is being described as being novel. 
Adaption in recurring decision-making is being slowed by strongly induced 
routine and high values in routine strength correlates with the underestimation or 
negligence of feedback, which encourages overcoming routine, i.e. change in 
routine strategy (Betsch et al., 2001). 
Extrinsic incentives, such as financial rewards are generally assumed to 
influence human decision-making performance. McDaniel & Rutström (2001) 
compared two different theories regarding extrinsic reward, intrinsic reward and 
performance using a Tower of Hanoi experiment. While extrinsic reward can come 
in form of bonus pay, intrinsic reward was researched by observing monkeys 
solving mechanical puzzles repeatedly. The animals did so without extrinsic 
reward, such as food. Therefore, it was understood that there exist actions, which 
are motivated intrinsically and are performed for their “own sake”, independent of 
extrinsic incentives (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996, p. 1154).  
The first theory analyzed by McDaniel & Rutström (2001) is the psychological 
theory of “detrimental reward” effects. It was interpreted by the authors in two 
different ways: First, whether an increase in extrinsic reward lowered perception 
of attractiveness of the to-be-solved problem, leading to a reduction in intrinsic 
reward, followed by a decrease in effort, which led to worse performance overall. 
Second, whether an increase of extrinsic reward induced a distraction effect, 
leading to a reduction of productivity. The second theory and third hypothesis 
were named “costly rationality” theory, and stated that an increase in extrinsic 
reward led to an increase in effort and performance. Extrinsic reward was 
implemented as error-costs, which differed in the low- and high-cost treatment. 
Therefore, an increase in error-costs or an increase in penalty was interpreted as a 
decrease in external reward. In short, participants reported longer time-use when 
the penalty was increased. The authors interpreted the increase in time-use as high 
effort, and the increased penalty as a decrease in extrinsic reward, thus rejecting 
their first hypothesis (McDaniel & Rutström, 2001). McDaniel & Rutström also 
found the penalty effect to have an insignificant effect on performance; they 
observed lots of individual variation in performance, potentially dominating any 
treatment effect, which they found to be in-line with research – however, whether 
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individual variation was the true cause for treatment insignificance is described as 
being unclear (McDaniel & Rutström, 2001). The executive function, defined as  
“a combination of working memory and inhibition inhibitory processes” 
(Zook, Davalos, DeLosh, & Davis, 2004, p. 286), had been found to predict 
heterogeneous performance in Tower of Hanoi experiments. 
Betsch et al. (2001) used a “microworld simulation” to research the influence 
of routine strength. In order to measure complex problem solving, which includes 
non-routine problem solving, software-based methods either include mentioned 
microworlds or “minimal complex systems”. Different influencers on non-routine 
problem performance and their measurement procedures, as well as current 
scientific debate on their usefulness and how non-routine problem solving (NPS) 
can be measured, using a software-based “minimal complex system”, are explained 
in the following sub-chapters.  
2.4.4 NPS: adaptation, beliefs, response times and emotion 
In order to research human decision-making in dynamic and complex 
domains complex, computer-simulated scenarios where proposed, which are to 
shed light on details of agents performing complex problem solving (CPS) under 
uncertainty (Funke, 2014). Realistic, computer-simulated problems, including 
multiple changing and interdependent variables, also referred to as microworlds 
(Funke, 2014), require a certain order of actions to be performed, in order to 
efficiently and effectively solve them (Güss, Fadil, & Strohschneider, 2012). Due to 
the complexity of such problems, the decision-making agent cannot possibly 
retrieve all causal relations, and therefore has to optimize its strategies through 
heuristics – here, cultural differences were found. Difference in problem-solving 
were explained by differences stemming from strategic expertise, which 
themselves are based on heterogeneous cultural learning environments (Funke, 
2014). Significant differences in NPS performance by country origin, being India, 
US-America and Germany, were confirmed, but whether this difference was 
related to learning environment characteristics remained unclear (Strunz, 2019). 
While recent research on cultural influences in CPS were less clear (Güss, 
2011), and the influences of cultural uncertainty avoidance were conflicting at times 
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(Güss et al., 2012), strategy making remains a strong predictor in performance 
under CPS. This leads to the understanding that complex and knowledge-rich 
problems not only require the use of heuristic decision rules, but further 
strengthens the importance of general and domain specific knowledge (Funke, 
2014). Experts are found to spend more time exploring, showing higher 
adaptability and flexibility in their strategy making, which predicted performance 
(Güss, Devore Edelstein, Badibanga, & Bartow, 2017).  
Minimal complex systems are less complex and their causal structure can be 
obtained by strategies helping with precise causal analyses. For example, the “Vary 
One Thing At a Time” (VOTAT) strategy can be applied to the minimal complex 
system “MicroDYN”, with its causal structure being displayed in figure 11, to 
successfully obtain full information on structure and behavior of the problem 
(Funke, 2014, p. 2). There seem to be two schools of thought, when deciding 
whether or not performance in complex problem solving can be equally measured 
with less complex simulations or “minimal complex systems”. How to clearly 
define and perform “Complex Problem Solving” (CPS) experiments still is heavily 
debated (Greiff, Stadler, Sonnleitner, Wolff, & Martin, 2015; Funke, Fischer, & Holt, 
2017; Greiff, Stadler, Sonnleitner, Wolff, & Martin, 2017). Agreement on the 
question how to measure CPS performance exists in that participants have to 
overcome barriers that arise from opacity of relevant information and uncertainty 
about true causal relations governing the problem’s functionality (Strunz & 
Chlupsa, 2019). 
Two other important influencers on performance under CPS are 
environmental changes and learning of counterintuitive concepts. Both influencers 
have been mentioned before. Environmental conditions predict learning and 
maximization (Erev & Roth, 2014) can lead to confirmation bias and failure to adapt 
a strategy due to routine strengths (Betsch et al., 2001). According to evidence from 
CPS simulations, and as found in Strunz & Chlupsa (2019), environmental changes 
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only change participants’ behavior when those changes actually meddle with an 
agent’s strategy performance (Cañas, Quesada, Antolí, & Fajardo, 2003).  
 
As explained before, performing counterintuitive actions is troublesome for 
humans to do (Donnarumma et al., 2016). Even when environmental conditions 
have an impact on an agent’s strategy, overcoming its routine strategy might 
require counter-intuitive concepts or the realization that one is self-deceiving 
himself with a mental model, which is by definition always an incorrect 
representation of reality (Sterman, 2002). Learning and knowledge are described as 
being essential in order to cope with a change in routine, as described in a study 
coping with supply chain management (Scholten, Sharkey Scott, & Fynes, 2019). 
Scholten, Sharkey Scott & Fynes (2019) describe various types of learning and 
knowledge processes that are to be implemented in order to adapt operating 
routines towards uncertainties stemming from supply chain disruptions. One 
Figure 11: Causal structure of Minimal Complex System „MicroDYN“  
[source: Greiff et al. 2012, p. 192]. 
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aspect found to be of significant importance is to reflect on positive outcomes, in 
order to use the full potential of knowledge creation (Scholten et al., 2019). As 
described before, positive performance feedback can result in taking more risks 
(Keil et al., 2016), meaning that an oversimplification of some above average 
performance or a misinterpretation of its causal relation leading to the good 
performance, can result in too risky and costly actions by the decision-makers, who 
have not spent enough time reflecting on the feedback. However, as described in 
the former sub-chapter, implicit motives and bias that cannot be self-reported, such 
as valence weighting bias, deeply influence decision-making. Mathematics 
(Sidenvall, Jäder, & Sumpter, 2015) and education science (Chong, Shahrill, Putri, 
& Zulkardi, 2018) are also more and more concerned with non-routine tasks and 
problems, both fields coming to the conclusion that non-routine problem solving 
requires real world knowledge and is being influenced by individual beliefs: 
Whether a solution to a problem is simply imitated or constructed creatively 
depends on whether a student felt “secure” enough to do so, and less complex and 
wrong solutions were favored to the correct and more complex solution, when “it 
felt too complicated” (Sidenvall et al., 2015, p. 123). This not only applies to the 
behavior of students. Implicit motives influencing economic decision-making have 
been confirmed by neuronal evidence, however, this insight is still confronted with 
resistance in the field of business administration (Chlupsa, 2014).  
Beliefs and implicit processes can lead to bias in decision-situations, where 
the decision-maker is lacking information to make a decision based on former 
knowledge (Fazio et al., 2015). Following an inner “status-quo” or “inertia” bias, 
the decision-maker might prefer consistency over positive feedback (Alós-Ferrer, 
Hügelschäfer, & Li, 2016). In other words, the decision-maker might fail to 
overcome routine, despite feedback, while others overcome their bias and proceed 
with non-routine decisions, to effectively react to novel circumstances (Chlupsa & 
Strunz, 2019; Strunz, 2019; Strunz & Chlupsa, 2019).  
Thinking time as a resource, approximately measured as response time, can 
be helpful to overcome these biases. Response time is defined as the server-side 
time span between problem activation and client response (Rubinstein, 2007). 
Research looking at response times in an economic decision-making context, stems 
from brain studies and neuroeconomics, where brain activity is monitored e.g. via 
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resonance imaging (fMRI). Research regarding response time is also commonly 
used in psychology (Rubinstein, 2007). While there exists criticism that most 
neuroeconomic studies resulted in “unimpressive economics” (Harrison, 2008, p. 
41), some neuroscientific insights have guided behavioral economic research to this 
day. Cognitive processes coping with complexity, e.g., answering survey questions 
of different lengths, are linked to response times (Yan & Tourangeau, 2008), which 
are a well-researched indicator for overcoming decision biases (Alós-Ferrer, 
Garagnani, & Hügelschäfer, 2016). Response times have predictive power when 
decision-makers are facing strategic uncertainty (Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, & Rosa-
Garcia, 2018), e.g. decision-makers show longer response times when multiple 
options are seen as equally attractive (Krajbich, Oud, & Fehr, 2014). In order to 
deduce meaningful information from response times, an agent’s action has to be 
identified either as a cognitive action, as an instinctive action, or as a reasonless 
action. A reasonless action can be the results of some mental decision-making 
process with low or no logical reasoning (Rubinstein, 2007). Chapter 3.2.12 “Logic 
and Expected States” refers to this three-fold distinction later on. 
Performance in CPS stems from thinking time, but also from the agents’ 
ability to effectively “identify rules” governing a problem, gaining “rule 
knowledge” by understanding the problem’s internal causal relations (true rule 
knowledge) and “applying knowledge” by controlling the problem and achieving 
goals (Wüstenberg, Greiff, & Funke, 2012). 
Engaging in non-routine problem solving (NPS) is influenced by a multitude 
of factors. Very complex decision-making domains will favor heuristic search, 
while less complex domains will make it possible for the agent to engage in 
maximization (by algorithmic operators such as VOTAT), obtaining the true causal 
relations (true rule knowledge about structure and behavior of the domain). Both 
problem solutions can lead to positive feedback, from which routine can grow, and 
both solutions benefit from knowledge and learning. When environmental change 
leads to the routine becoming less favorable, individual valence weighting bias, 
power of routine, time pressure, beliefs and intrinsic metrics can either hinder or 
favor a change in strategy. In this case reflection time evidently is a good predictor 
in overcoming these mental hurdles. Less than 10 % of mixed-country participants, 
about 10 % of US-American participants, about 5 % of Indian and slightly more 
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than 20 % of German participants (Strunz, 2019; Strunz & Chlupsa, 2019) were able 
to overcome mental hurdles in the NPS experiment “Flag Run”, engaging in a 
change of strategy, built upon a mental model “closer” to the true rules governing 
the complex problem or in other words: obtaining true rules. Rules do not change 
throughout the “Flag Run” experiment. However, the starting levels of the 
experiment “Flag Run” were constructed in such a way that agents would be 
nudged into building a routine, based upon a wrong mental model of the causal 
relations. Agents were nudged into thinking that they were able to control the 
direction of some playing piece, where in fact the direction of the playing piece was 
always set by default towards “left”. As can be seen in figure 12, the distance from 
the playing piece to the goal field is “two steps”, when counting from going left, 
jumping edges, or when counting right, going to the goal field using the more 
intuitive and visible path. Therefore, the left- and right-hand distance to the goal 
field are identical. The problem space of “Flag Run” is simple and the true causal 
relations are even simpler than in most “Minimal Complex Systems”. However, 
not a single agent has proven from its behavior to having understood the true 
causal relations. The reason for this can only be speculated upon, however, Strunz 
& Chlupsa (2019) suspect that the implicit mental model of causally relating 
“direction buttons” and “controlling directions” is very strongly embedded, 
leading to a very high strength in routine. As the experiment was short, not enough 
time was given for most agents to find out all “hidden rules” governing the 
decision-making system’s structure and behavior. Strunz & Chlupsa (2019) also 
tested for a possible correlation between overcoming routine and self-reported 
levels in “Joyous Exploration”, which is part of the multi-dimensional emotion 
“Curiosity”. However, no relation between any of the 5 curiosity dimensions 
(Kashdan et al., 2018) and NPS performance was found. Participants who gained 
true rule knowledge did not report higher scores in “Joyous Exploration” and in 
fact, no correlation to any of the remaining 4 curiosity-dimension were found. The 
study did confirm that reflection time – that is thinking time measured as response 
time – did pay off.  
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Figure 12: Client-side view of “Flag Run” experiment  
[source: Strunz & Chlupsa, 2019, p. 116]. 
 
Participants consisted of Amazon Mechanical Turk freelancers (MTurks), 
who benefit financially from solving any task as fast as possible. Studies have 
shown that the main motivation of any MTurk was “compensation” (Lovett, 
Bajaba, Lovett, & Simmering, 2018), so that MTurks are suitable participants for 
experiments, where thinking time was associated with costs and is not incentivized 
(Strunz & Chlupsa, 2019). Noise from cultural differences in uncertainty avoidance, 
influenced by the cultural learning environment (Funke, 2014), all MTurks were 
expected, and differences in NPS performance by country-origin were indeed 
found (Strunz, 2019). 
In all “Flag Run” experiments, agents who started investing in reflection time 
where more likely to find true rule knowledge (Chlupsa & Strunz, 2019; Strunz, 
2019; Strunz & Chlupsa, 2019). This was true for all country origins. Agents who 
obtained true rule knowledge solved the overall experiment with less operators or 
“actions” and in a shorter timeframe, therefore being more efficient, even though 
having invested more time. Agents who obtained true rule knowledge showed less 
meaningless or random operators. Strunz & Chlupsa (2019) assume that these 
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agents outperformed in learning from uncertainty or learning from unexpected 
feedback:  
“While many researches and economists press the importance of skills that enhance adaption to 
changing conditions, it has to be understood that overcoming routine and its linked set of behavioral 
biases is not easily performed, and can probably only be done by a small fraction of leaders and 
employees, when there is not much time to reflect on the problem at hand”  
(p.122). 
While “Flag Run” is less complex in its causal structure than any Microworld 
experiment, and its causal structure is even simpler than most Minimal Complex 
Systems, “Flag Run” still is very knowledge-rich. Its hidden rules, making it a CPS 
task, have to be explored by overcoming a mental model, stemming from strong a-
priori routine, to simulate real economic problems, where decisions have to be 
made quickly and in a non-routine manner, to adapt to the ever-changing VUCA 
world. Agents had to use heuristics as in ignoring information learnt before and 
also had to adapt a strategy similar to an algorithmic procedure. “Flag Run” has 
learnt from the advantages of both worlds: the simplicity of Minimal Complex 
Systems and the necessity of knowledge-rich structures of Microworlds. As a NPS 
task, “Flag Run” builds upon the understanding of “All models are wrong” 
(Sterman, 2002), and that experiments building upon this simple rule will probably 
further confirm the realization “Complexity from Simplicity”, once beautifully 
shown by John Horton Conway’s “Game of Life”. Nature’s true complexity is 
simulated in “Flag Run”, as even simple structures can result in complex problems 
either due to our resistance in recognizing “being in error”, human overconfidence 
or due to the circumstance of life that with unavoidable uncertainty comes 
immanent potential of self-deception. Being overconfident was shown to be 
influenced by testosterone (Dalton & Ghosal, 2018), which can result in socially 
beneficial values such as reduction of anxiety or providing information. Being 
overconfident can also have negative consequences when it is mostly the result of 
self-deception, not carrying any psychological benefits – the social benefit from 
overconfidence mainly depends on the environment and private information 
(Schwardmann & Van der Weele, 2017).  
This brings the current sub-chapter to the final conclusion that uncertainty 
can only be fully reduced by self-deception. An agent can either invest in some 
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decision frame by communication, which is associated with costs, to reduce 
uncertainty with some risk-averse strategy. The agent can mentally nullify 
uncertainty by self-deception, risking potential follow-up costs, or in other words 
accepting “depiction potential” by building upon some mental “truth”. As this 
thesis remains upon the understanding that uncertainty cannot be fully 
“eradicated” and that “all models are wrong”, deception potential is understood as 
being immanent. A full recap of chapter 2.4 will follow in sub-chapter 2.4.5 
2.4.5 The human class: an unbounded set of strategies 
In order to neither fall for the “bias bias” (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2015), nor 
for unrealistic assumptions of agents always maximizing, the “middle ground” 
should not be ignored, as agents seem to be able to maximize under certain 
circumstances (Erev & Roth, 2014), while still forming biased attitudes (Fazio et al., 
2004, 2015; Rocklage & Fazio, 2014) towards problems by exploration, reducing 
uncertainty. Problems under uncertainty and risk are to be separated, whereas risk 
and uncertainty can be linked in a continuum (Samson & Gigerenzer, 2016), 
controlling both ends by learning from feedback (Van der Kleij et al., 2015). 
Feedback is easily misinterpreted, and all learning is a feedback process (Sterman, 
2006). In complex environments learning from feedback is also influenced by 
framing or interpreting information, the order of information coming from 
feedback (Keil et al., 2016) and real world deception (Fuller et al., 2011). Individual 
characteristics, fear of uncertainty or lack of resources (Chong et al., 2018; Holmes-
Rovner et al., 2000) render adaption to new conditions a challenge, due to routine 
strength (Betsch et al., 2001) and cognitive dissonance facing counter-intuitive 
problems (Donnarumma et al., 2016). In order to measure CPS which is linked to 
NPS (Neubert et al., 2015) it is important to realize that strategy change will only 
occur when change actually interferes with an agent’s strategy (Cañas, Quesada, 
Antolí, & Fajardo, 2003). Experiments should measure the critical success factor for 
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NPS, being experiential learning (Scholten et al., 2019), by looking at when 
behavioral changes occurs (De Houwer et al., 2013). For this reason, the 
experimenter can observe each performed action of all agents live, as shown in 
figure 13. 
 
Reflection time was found to be an effective predictor for overcoming 
“wrong” mental models (Strunz & Chlupsa, 2019), while this thesis remains upon 
the understanding that all mental models are wrong (Sterman, 2002), and that 
uncertainty can only be nullified by self-deception, which comes along with 
advantages and disadvantages (Schwardmann & Van der Weele, 2017). Therefore, 
deception potential is regarded as being immanent. For this reason, complexity can 
grow from very simple problem spaces, with “Flag Run” combining all advantages 
from both Microworlds and Minimal Complex Systems, when trying to measure 
whether or not some agent is able to find hidden information, and is able to adapt 
its strategy based upon novel knowledge under circumstances, where time is 
considered a resource. 
Combining all mentioned insights agents are seen analogue to disturbances, 
which are able to inhibit special features leading to outcomes that are more than 
just a nonconformity to some anticipated value. Agents are regarded as an 
“unbounded set of strategies”, producing perturbing deviations. As any model is 
wrong, no theory nor decision-making agent can ultimately nullify uncertainty 
Figure 13: Paticipant’s actions can be watched live via Curiosity IO backend  
[source: own source]. 
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(creating the bound of some set), and when it does, it can only do so by self-
deception (defining some set with a bound), meaning that some theory predicting 
human behavior will always be wrong, given the right circumstances (redefining 
the set’s boundary). Defining some model as being either “descriptive”, 
“normative” or “prescriptive” seems to avoid this problem at first hand, but 
whether this differentiation led to sustainable “normative” models, more efficient 
“descriptive” re-evaluations or more precise “prescriptions” is to be discussed in 
chapter 2.5. In mathematics, problems which arise from set theory, which are much 
alike the problems in trying to establish various “types” of decision-making 
categories for models (normative, descriptive, prescriptive etc.), are elegantly 
solved by introducing an “unbounded set”, better expressed as “class”: Getting rid 
of the more primitive “set theoretical” understanding, by basing mathematics on 
“category theory”. In this understanding, a “human class” is always placed “at the 
first position of any model”, and is then followed by whatever reality is framed by 
this very agent, with its interpretation of risk and/or uncertainty produced by some 
expert system. Framing reality is highly individualistic, dependent on beliefs, 
stemming from intrinsic motives and the attempt to combine models can always 
lead to unexpected disturbances, which are the result of the network of 
interdependent beliefs. The financial market, as mentioned before, was interpreted 
by W. Brian Arthur (1995) as such a network of interdependent beliefs. All of the 
above is expressed in “Complexity Economics”. Complexity economics does not 
assume an economy necessarily to be in equilibrium. Agents change their actions 
and strategies according to the outcome, which they collectively create. This will 
constantly favor change, to which they adapt their strategy anew. In a complex 
economy, agents’ strategies and beliefs are frequently tested, with the entire system 
being best described as a redundant, ever-changing function – analogue to the 
described definition of “information”. Therefore, complexity economics defines an 
economy not as something physically existing, but rather as a network of 
contingent states, being embedded in indeterminacy, where outcome is based upon 
interdependent sense-making, with the entire system necessarily being open to 
change (Arthur, 1999). 
Chapter 2.5 will focus on how agents’ decision making is altered in a network 
where they can assume feedback being either random, machine- or human-made, 
can communicate with or deceive others, perform in problem-solving when 
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communication is impossible. Putting the cart before the horse, chapter 2.5 will 
begin with a more precise definition of “model” and its linked categories from 
decision-making theory. 
2.5 A NETWORK OF INTERDEPENDENT BELIEFS 
Models in decision-making theory can be distinguished by three categories 
or types: normative, descriptive, and prescriptive. “The three-way distinction 
emerged clearly in the 1980s (Freeling, 1984; Baron, 1985; Bell et al., 1988) – all of 
whom wrote independently of each other), although various parts of it were 
implicit in the writing of Herbert Simon and many philosophers (such as J. S. Mill).“ 
(Baron, 2012).  
Descriptive models are interested in why agents decide as they do, while 
normative models try to describe how agents ideally behave, and prescriptive 
models are concerned in prescribing enhancing feature for a certain decision-
making process (Mandel, Navarrete, Dieckmann, & Nelson, 2019). 
According to Baron (2012), normative models do not have to be or even must 
not be justified by observations, as long as enough data was acquired by 
observation to clearly frame the normative model; less obvious normative models 
i.e. simple correspondence are justified due by philosophical or mathematical 
argument. 
Baron (2012) describes descriptive models as psychological theories, often 
explaining in cognitive ways how agents behave. These models include heuristics, 
strategies, and formal mathematical models. When observations depart from 
normative models, useful descriptive models can explain these departures, 
referring to such deviations in behavior as “bias” when such departure is 
systematic. 
Prescriptive models are defined by Baron (2012) as engineering models, 
originally thought of including mathematical tools to analyze decisions or being 
educational interventions, such as teaching agents various heuristics to exclude 
certain decision-making strategies that can lead to bias during certain 
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circumstances. Prescriptive models include the idea of nudging people for them to 
perform normatively better choices. 
It is argued that this three-fold distinction is necessary, and none of the three 
model types should be combined, so that judgements and decisions can be 
improved or at least preserved in their quality (Baron, 2012); in order to do so, it 
has to be understood what makes judgements “good”.  Baron (2012) suggests the  
introduction of such distinguishing categories regarding quality, so that data can 
be collected on the “goodness” of certain judgements, monitored, and tested for 
improvement potential (Baron, 2012). 
By the concept of “Judgment and decision making”, models are to be defined 
in order to improve judgements and decisions, have to be re-evaluated by the three-
fold criteria of a model, define what “good” judgements are and what 
circumstances alter them in a more positive or negative way. In this chapter, 
judgements in an interdependent network of beliefs are to be considered.  
Chapter 2.5.1 introduces the theoretical approach to multiplayer decision-
making and chapter 2.5.2 will focus on multiplayer experiments in behavioral 
economics. 
2.5.1 From game theory to behavioral game theory 
Game theory has not only become a fundamental economic tool for 
theoretical, but also empirical science (Fudenberg & Levine, 2016). Game Theory is 
looking at multiplayer decision-making scenarios, referred to as “games”, and is 
not only some abstract economical model. According to Fudenberg & Tirole (1991), 
game theory was for example applied in theoretical biology, considering animals 
as being agents, who follow a set of pure strategies. 
The most important aspect of game theory is that individual decisions and 
“games” are distinguished. While isolated agents are only concerned about 
uncertainties stemming from their surrounding environment, interdependent 
decisions by multiple agents being part of a common decision-making domain also 
have to consider uncertainties coming from their co-agents’ behavior, whose 
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behavior can potentially influence the actions of all agents (Fudenberg & Tirole, 
1991). Another key difference between individual decisions and games are “zero 
probabilities” or decision potential, which are irrelevant for decisions but are an 
intrinsic cornerstone for games (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). In order to make 
predictions about how a game will play out or change its path, “Nash-Equilibria” 
are used. Nash equilibria describe a certain path or recipe on how a game will 
unfold, and if all agents figured out this Nash equilibrium to be reached, no agent 
had any reason not to behave as described by the prescribed recipe. According to 
this logic, only a Nash equilibrium can be predicted by agents, and can be assumed 
to be predicted by co-agents. Any prediction that comes to the conclusion that an 
equilibrium other than a Nash equilibrium is reached, the agent or another co-agent 
has to perform a “mistake” or “error” (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). 
Fudenberg & Tirole (1991) follow up by stating that “errors”, such as 
“mistakes”, may likely occur, and in order to predict them requires the game 
theorists to know more about the outcome of the game than its participants. The 
authors state that “Nash equilibria” cannot be considered “good predictions” in all 
situations, as not all information is contained in the game theoretical model, such 
as individual experiences of the participants, which can be influenced by culture.  
The authors state that in order to define a complete theory, “error” can be 
regarded as a human-made mistake “with small probability”. Error can also find 
its origin in “Payoff Uncertainty”. The latter renders both modeller and player 
being unable to be fully certain about any “payoff” value, as suggested by 
“Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine” (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991, p. 467). Allowing small 
payoff uncertainty can have large effects. According to Fudenberg, Kreps and 
Levine no economically interesting situation is lacking payoff uncertainty, and 
thought-experiments excluding payoff uncertainty may not be reasonable. This is 
referred to as the “uncertainty problem”. How the cause for “error” is defined by a 
certain model to be the most likely cause, defines the best model for this specific set 
of data, however, even small causes have the power to shift an equilibrium 
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). 
With the introduction of constant uncertainty, common knowledge is 
defined, which not only includes payoff uncertainty, but also the initial uncertainty 
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of each agent about the game’s structure (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). This formal 
definition of knowledge leads to “technical and philosophical problems” 
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991, p. 547), some of which were already noted with 
reference to the “frame problem”. However, small changes (perturbations) in a 
game’s information structure (common knowledge in an informal sense) has the 
power to change an agent’s knowledge and therefore alters common knowledge, 
rendering an exact description of common knowledge to be fuzzy (Fudenberg & 
Tirole, 1991). A fuzzy common knowledge solution is the “almost common 
knowledge” concept by “Monderer and Samet (1989), which “requires players be 
“pretty sure” that their opponents are “pretty sure” about payoffs” later 
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991, p. 564).  
The authors show how Nash equilibria are changed entirely by perturbations 
in their information structure and that the sensitivity  
“of even the Nash-equilibrium set to low-probability infinite-state perturbations is another reason 
to think seriously about the robustness of one’s conclusions to the information structure of the game.”  
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991, p. 570). 
In more modern approaches of game theory, payoff uncertainty is usually 
always part of testing models for stability. To enhance game theory, several 
behavioral models where formed to establish “Behavioral Game Theory”, such as 
the cognitive hierarchy (CH) model, used to predict initial conditions in a repeated 
game, the quantal response equilibrium (QRE), where agents may perform small 
mistakes, maintaining correct belief about co-agents’ intentions, the Experience-
Weighted Attraction Learning (EWA), which predict a decision path as a function 
operating on initial conditions, and various learning models, which include the 
understanding of the learning progress of co-agents, strategic teaching and 
reputation-building, leading to games outside of equilibrium (Camerer & Ho, 
2015).  
The term “behavioral” is being described by economical, psychological and 
decision sciences roughly as “being about mental processes” (Gavetti, 2012, p. 267). 
Modern behavioral economics still study “noise” in coordination games, where 
agents deviate from their routine because of mistakes, wrong perceptions, inertia 
or trial-and-error (Mäs & Nax, 2016). Mäs & Nax (2016) constructed a complex 
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experiment, where agents played coordination games with multiple network 
partners, in games consisting of 20 subjects playing coordination games 150 times: 
The subjects were neither informed about the game’s causal structure nor about 
their co-agents’ types; agents were informed about their own payoff, the last 
round’s choice of their co-agents, but not about the payoff of their opponents. The 
experiment found 96 % of decisions to be myopic best responses, and being highly 
sensitive to their costs. 
Costs and feedback create boundaries which have to be overcome in order to 
maximize by learning. A study by Bayer & Chan (2007) researched the famous 
“Dirty-Faces” game by a laboratory experiment, where iterative thinking (“He 
knows, that I know, that He knows…”) is required in order follow common 
rationality. They authors arrived at the conclusion that a threshold exists between 
participants performing more than one and two or more meta-levels of iteration, 
due to the individuals being limited in their ability to apply such meta-cognitive 
thinking or because the agents considered higher order meta-level thinking to be 
useless, as their co-agents were expected to be unable to perform higher order 
meta-level thinking themselves (Bayer & Chan, 2007).  
The cognitive hierarchy (CH) model attempts to anticipate human behavior 
in one-shot games, building upon the number of meta-thinking levels a participant 
performs (Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2001). Agents who perform zero steps of 
thinking are considered behaving random, irrational or not strategically. With 
performing one level of iterated thinking, participants are considered to behave 
strategic. The CH model requires some estimate on how meta-level thinking is 
distributed amongst the participants. For this purpose, the efficient Poisson 
distribution is used, and participants’ heterogeneity is modelled into a thinking-
steps model, which calculates the initial probability of individual choice. The model 
was fitted to data from three studies with a 2558 subject-games (Camerer & Ho, 
2001). The thinking-steps model outperformed the quantal response equilibrium 
model, which assumed only one type per participant. The strength of the thinking-
steps model was considered to be its modelling of a multitude of types per 
participant, i.e. agent heterogeneity. The behavioral game theory model was 
compared to the classic Nash equilibrium predictions, where the thinking-model 
predictions were closer to data than Nash equilibrium predictions. The equilibrium 
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predictions by Nash equilibrium were mostly distributed amongst the limits, being 
either “0” or “1”. This is shown in figure 14 (Camerer & Ho, 2001). 
Still, game theoretical assumptions about common knowledge and 
rationality have not been shown to be followed by participants in interactive games 
in real life experiments, and common knowledge and rationality were disregarded 
as being a model for social interaction (Colman, 2003).  Drew Fudenberg and David 
K. Levine (2016) suggested to enhance game theory with learning theory by 
simulation, using belief-based learning models, maintaining simplicity, by 
embedding complex learning theory into game theory and establishing breadth by 
combining static game theory and dynamic learning theory (Fudenberg & Levine, 
2016). 
Figure 14: Behavioral game theory vs. game theory, experimental results 
[source: C. Camerer & Ho, 2001, p. 128] 
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Today, there also exist claims that game theorists wrongly assume the 
uncertainty problem to be solved by agents accumulating information, even going 
as far as stating that the game-theoretical object of rationality cannot be described 
with persisting uncertainty, rendering game theory to be “irrelevant and useless”, 
while the true challenge was to explain the existence of heterogeneous transactions 
and social interactions by accepting ever-remaining uncertainty (Syll, 2018). In 
another very critical article, the economist Berhard Guerrien (2018) quotes Andrew 
Schotter, a former Morgenstern student, to show that game theory has more fruitful 
potential in the domain of “cooperative”, instead of “non-cooperative” game 
theory. According to this quote by Schotter, von Neumann and Morgenstern were 
originally trying to break problems stemming from the infinite chain of meta-
thinking by introducing strategically interdependent situations that are 
independent of their expectation of their co-agent (Guerrien, 2018). Guerrien (2018) 
further states that game theoretical constraints concerning which information is 
available to participants, were unrealistic and never verified by experiments.   
In total, game theory marks an important backbone for behavioral economics, 
from which many fruitful concepts, realizations and ideas were born. Learning, as 
a feedback process, benefits from knowledge. As stated before, knowledge cannot 
be formalized by any instant, game theory included, because such a process would 
render it instantly as information instead. A formalization of knowledge results in 
paradoxes, ad infinitum problems and logical debates, similar to the problems of 
old-fashioned “set theory” or as explained by the “frame problem”. Therefore, 
game theory is constrained in its possibilities as is any other way to model reality: 
it offers normative models for efficient computations, can be used as a platform for 
useful explanations in form of descriptive models or used as a “language” to build 
decision-making enhancing predictive models. Game theory has also shown the 
importance of sensitivity to perturbations in any normative model that builds upon 
the concept of an information structure. To the understanding of the author, game 
theory does not claim having solved the uncertainty problem, at least not 
exceptionally. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), one of the golden standards of game 
theory, summing up the entirety of game theoretical insights until 1989 in one book, 
have claimed various times that models assuming perfect information or zero 
uncertainty are not even meaningful – even as a Gedankenexperiment.  
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The next sub-chapter will concentrate on a few examples of group behavior 
phenomena observed under experimental conditions and described by game 
theoretical normative models. 
2.5.2 Group behavior 
As stated before, this thesis is interested in group behavior changes, when 
being confronted with different types of information. Specifically, this thesis’ 
experiment simulates group decision making under uncertainty, where 
communication between agents is not possible. In order to describe scientific 
research in such a domain, several phenomena of group decision making where 
communication is possible are also listed, in order to exclude such behavioral 
instances further on.  
Decision problems including more than one decision maker are studied in 
the domain of group decision making (GDM) (G. Li, Kou, & Peng, 2018). Studies 
on GDM are usually considering how much communication is allowed and how 
the final outcome is created by group decision making (Tindale & Winget, 2019). 
Several insights from GDM are listed by Tindale & Winget (2019):  groups holding 
members of high expertise on the task at hand can improve overall group 
performance; individual motivation for the whole group to perform “accurate 
decisions” has a positive impact on group performance; groups can perform well 
without communication; communication will decrease group performance in 
situations where members are “less than wise”; shared group bias on the decision 
environment will “exacerbate” these biases (p. 28). When communication between 
agents is possible, imitation and herding behavior are popular examples of group 
behavior. 
Imitation and innovation have been described as the “dual engines of cultural 
learning” (Legare & Nielsen, 2015). It is known that humans imitate each other 
during social interactions, which positively influences action comprehension such 
as improving language comprehension (Adank, Hagoort, & Bekkering, 2010). Even 
emotions can be “imitated” in form of emotional contagion, which can improve 
perceptions of task performance (Barsade, 2002). “Imitate-the-best” and “imitate-
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the-majority” has been found to speed up individual learning under uncertainty 
(Garcia-Retamero, Takezawa, & Gigerenzer, 2009). 
In a software based experiment it was found that groups were able to find 
novel solutions to problems that would have been missed by individuals, since 
interpersonal imitation shifts the group towards the urge to find more promising 
solutions; however, the size of the group can have significant and nonlinear impact 
on the groups behavior and performance using imitation (Wisdom & Goldstone, 
2011). 
Next to imitation, the herding effect is especially relevant for analysis in 
crowd psychology, where irrationality can arise from group behavior, 
accumulating deception potential, leading to such phenomena like “exploding 
market bubbles”, which is also referred to as “information cascades” (Samson & 
Gigerenzer, 2016, p. 109). Herding describes individual agents to imitate group 
behavior as a whole, rather than following own strategies (Hwang & Salmon, 2004). 
It has been shown by game theoretical analysis that time and frequency of public 
information can impact the collective learning process, and that public information 
can help a herd to overcome a wrong belief and inefficient paths (Bohren, 2014). 
Neuroscientific models suggest that social alignment is mediated by a system that 
monitors misalignment and rewards actions leading back to alignment (Shamay-
Tsoory, Saporta, Marton-Alper, & Gvirts, 2019). For this purpose, information is 
required. In international markets, herding was found to depend on the level of 
information transparency (Choi & Skiba, 2015). 
When communication between agents is not possible, due to costs, security, 
technical problems or language barriers, coordination and cooperation without 
communication in some problem-space can be performed by “focal” real life 
decision influencers or prominent solutions, referred to as “focal points” or 
“Schelling points” (Zuckerman, Kraus, & Rosenschein, 2011). They are  defined as 
“a point of convergence of expectations or beliefs without communication” (Teng, 
2018, p. 250). Such Schelling points were proposed as equilibrium refinements of 
the Nash equilibrium, where the ideal game theoretical strategy has to both 
consider actions of cooperation and coordination of potential conflict  (Teng, 2018). 
Experiments found groups to outperform individuals in coordination games with 
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focal points, when individual interests of the group were compatible and cognitive 
input was helpful for controlling the coordination problem (Sitzia & Zheng, 2019); 
groups report worse levels of coordination when interests are not aligned. In 
coordination games, groups are also more sensitive to salience (Sitzia & Zheng, 
2019). 
Group planning behavior differs from individual planning behavior in 
decision environments governed by either objective risk or subjective risk, the latter 
being referred to as “ambiguity” (Carbone, Georgalos, & Infante, 2019). In their 
study, Carbone, Georgalos & Infante (2019) focused on sequential group decision 
making behavior reacting to novel information. In the objective risk treatment, 
participants were informed about the statistical chances of their income, i.e. agents 
were informed about the amount of balls being hidden in urns, such that agents 
could manifest a realistic mental model of the experiment’s creation of risk. During 
the subjective risk treatment, no such information was provided to the participants. 
While individuals and groups were found to “substantially” deviate from the 
optimal, theoretical strategy, facing a stochastic and dynamic problem, individuals 
outperformed groups under objective risk, whereas groups outperformed 
individuals under subjective risk (Carbone et al., 2019).  Furthermore, both group 
and individual were found to make myopic decisions under objective and 
subjective risk (Carbone et al., 2019). When tested for planning, groups were closer 
to rationality under ambiguity, creating more welfare (Carbone et al., 2019). The 
study comes to the conclusion that there exists a non-neutral attitude towards 
ambiguity (Carbone et al., 2019), which affects trust decisions. A negative attitude 
towards ambiguity correlated with a more negative attitude towards trusting 
options, while agents who considered themselves as trustworthy, were more likely 
to trust other agents  (C. Li, Turmunkh, & Wakker, 2019). Therefore, subjective 
belief about others can have a crucial influence in group decision making. It is 
suggested to not model subjective belief simply as subjective probability 
(Andersen, Fountain, Harrison, & Rutström, 2014), as risk attitudes of individual 
agents have to be carefully considered first (Andersen et al., 2014). How to model 
subjective belief is described as an open question, and agents may not only hold a 
traditional type of aversion towards risk, but also towards uncertainty, when 
decisions are made in a domain being governed by subjective instead of objective 
uncertainties (Andersen et al., 2014). 
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A good example on individual behavior towards uncertainty comes from 
random group matching procedures. Multiplayer experiments which match 
participants randomly, can result in the participants feeling to be treated unfairly, 
when their partners behave suboptimal towards them. This was in fact experienced 
during pre-tests of the thesis’ experiment. Ballinger, Hudson, Karkoviata, & Wilcox 
(2011) claim that “working memory capacity” (WMC) mediates the ability of 
participants to react to such situations with more or less sovereignty, with WMC 
working as a mental buffer (Ballinger et al., 2011). WMC also supposedly predicts 
performance on how agents can adapt their “depth of reasoning” throughout 
experiments with growing structural complexity (Ballinger et al., 2011; Strunz, 
2019).  
Improved performance by groups compared to individual decision-making 
is commonly achieved by interpersonal communication (Charness, Cooper, & 
Grossman, 2015). When subjects work together via computer interfaces, 
communication costs can counterintuitively enhance group performance; while 
higher costs in communication reduces message quantity, they enhance message 
quality in groups, so that groups facing communication costs outperform 
individuals significantly (Charness et al., 2015). However, in cases when 
communication likely introduces error, more communication is not always better 
than less. In such cases, assigning costs to communication enhances performance 
(Charness et al., 2015).  
Group decision making under uncertainty profits from communication, as 
shared information will increase decision quality, when information is sufficiently 
processed by the group; when shared information is insufficiently processed, 
groups tend to be overconfident in their decision making (Sniezek, 1992). Social 
factors such as face-to-face discussions and the goal to reach consensus are 
described to influence group confidence (Sniezek, 1992).  
Experimental research about the influence of expertise and information in 
GDM under uncertainty in an environment, where no communication is possible, 
is scarce. Such a domain could be thought of multiple agents working with a 
personal computer, making decisions by investing in a certain market, where each 
agent does not know its co-agents. Still, all of the agents’ decisions are 
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interdependent and all agents will collectively see the same market results. 
Uncertainties might arise from different sources, such as uncertainty about the 
number of co-agents, causal relationship of group invest and market results or 
whether own action is of effective relevance. Uncertainties can stem from doubt, 
e.g. by asking the question whether there was an optimal group strategy, if such a 
strategy could actually be achieved and if maximization was possible with limited 
information about the causal relations. In general, two kinds of uncertainties in 
group decision making are considered: environmental and social uncertainty 
(Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988).  
It has been shown that communication highly reduces environmental and 
social uncertainties “by enhancing group coordination and performance” (Messick 
et al., 1988, p. 678). Furthermore, it was experimentally shown that agents are risk-
averse regarding environmental uncertainty, are less influenced by social 
uncertainty, while individual risk aversion was not influenced by communication 
at all (Messick et al., 1988). 
Individual experience, such as proficiency, also mediates how external 
information is interpreted and which measures are ultimately taken, as shown by 
disaster risk reduction decision-making: risk expressed by numbers or by verbal 
clues differed in their impact, while its impact also depended on whether or not an 
agent was a scientist or not, as scientists had more experience with risk expressed 
via numerical probabilities (Doyle, McClure, Paton, & Johnston, 2014). However, 
verbal clues were consistently found to be regarded as more ambiguous than 
numerical terms (Doyle et al., 2014). In addition, probabilities were found to be 
commonly misinterpreted by the participants (Doyle et al., 2014). 
In summary, GDM under uncertainty without the ability to communicate 
with other agents will be influenced by individual expertise regarding 
performance, due to routine strength and their interpretation of information. The 
lack of communication does not necessarily lead to worse group performance, 
which depends on the collective status of “wise” decision making, the decision-
domain’s resistance to error-perturbation, and individual motivation to let the 
group make accurate decisions. Biases stemming from communication such as 
social influences, herd behavior, imitation, collective bias and overconfidence can 
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be excluded. Prominent solutions or Schelling points can be expected, when all 
agents have had similar “single-player” experience and expertise. Ideally, working 
memory capacity is measured in such an experiment in order to understand 
individual stress resistance to “unfair” group constellations. The individual types 
of risk-aversion should not be influenced by the lack of communication. In the 
example of GDM under uncertainty, risk is seen as the individual attempt to try a 
strategy which deviates from a strategy that has been shown to be effective in the 
past. As participants in GDM have shown to be less risk averse towards social 
uncertainty, and are more risk averse to environmental uncertainty, information 
that is interpreted by an agent as there being good reason to belief that other agents 
are influencing the game, will more likely lead to deviation from the former 
“effective” strategy than with information that is interpreted by an agent as there 
being good reason to belief that random or uncontrollable instances are influencing 
the game.
 
3 GENERAL RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In order to formulate specific research objectives, this chapter condenses 
insights from the theoretical background, deriving key objectives that are to be 
analyzed empirically. Following the “Engaged Scholarship Diamond Model”, 
designed to close the theory-practice gap (Ntounis & Parker, 2017) the four 
domains “Theory Building”, “Problem Formulation”, “Problem Solving” and 
“Research Design” are to be fulfilled in any preferred order by the researcher (Van 
de Ven, 2007). This thesis’ conclusion serves as “Problem Solving” and will bridge 
real world problems (“Reality”) and empirical results from empirical research 
(“Solution”). Heading from reality to theory, problem formulation included 
potential rise in complexity by globalization and the limitations of humans 
performing complex problem-solving. Information and expert knowledge were 
then identified by theory as being critical influencers in individual and group 
decision-making. The following first sub-chapter sums up key findings of the 
theoretical background. The resulting model, which is linked to some solution via 
the experimental research design, is to be explained in the second sub-chapter. A 
brief framework of a suitable experiment is provided in the third sub-chapter. 
Figure 15: The Engaged Scholarship Diamond Model by Van de Ven (2007)  
[source: Ntounis & Parker, 2017, p. 353]. 
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3.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
Besides limitations in financial resources, change and human resources were 
described as being the fundamental problems for interconnected institutions, 
engaged in complex problems of global proportions. In order to better cope with 
unpredictable change, expert knowledge is increasingly embedded in decision-
making processes. Routine-strength can inhibit decision-makers to adapt to change 
effectively, while knowledge and feedback interpretation are influencing success 
in overcoming routine. Expertise is formed by many iterations of acting in a certain 
domain with heterogeneous feedback coming from this domain, and is therefore a 
learning process, as all learning is a feedback process. The environment of such a 
domain is a predictor for maximization and learning itself, and can also lead to bias 
and to self-deception building upon illogical or even logical mental models. This 
can either make adaption to a novel, more efficient and effective strategy harder or 
easier. Experiments have shown that environmental conditions only influence a 
change in an agent’s strategy, when feedback or the agent’s interpretation of 
feedback confirms that the new environmental conditions lead to a performance 
downswing, when the routine strategy is not altered. Environmental conditions 
generally lead to different behavior when being formulated as being either man-
made or its source being stochastic. Social or man-made change leads to agents 
trying to optimize via pattern recognition, whereas stochastic change leads to 
agents trying maximization via logical rationale. Risk, being expressed as either 
verbal or numerical probabilities are being interpreted differently, depending on 
the agent’s knowledge – however, humans tend to not behave optimal when 
probabilities are provided. Groups and individuals behave differently facing 
problems under uncertainty, also depending on whether or not groups are able to 
communicate within. Group performance is also influenced by its member’s 
expertise and performance, while individual expertise is hard to predict reliably 
via knowledge span, e.g. years of experience.  
Two major aspects are then to be researched: the impact of public information 
and expertise on group decision-making, when facing a problem under 
uncertainty. Public information will either be communicated actively via text 
messages, which are actively announced via pop-up notifications or passively via 
visual clues. In both cases, public information is therefore considered change. There 
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will also be a case, where change is neither announced actively, nor passively, and 
agents will have to figure out change themselves via feedback interpretation. 
Change will either impede strategy performance or not. The dependent variables 
will not only focus on decision-making performance but also behavior, and 
therefore strategy changes or accordingly strategy persistence. In no case will an 
agent be deceived by public information, a distinguishing aspect of the model for 
empirical research from psychological attempts including deception. 
3.2 MODEL FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
In order to test the influence of expert knowledge or expertise, the experiment 
has to be designed in such a way for participants being able to maximize in a 
domain, where feedback is part of a stable, well-defined problem. Participants can 
then use their optimal strategy in a second well-defined domain including little 
change, and then adopt their strategy in an ill-defined but metastable domain, with 
lots of change hidden from them, where the strategy from the well-defined domain 
still leads to maximization. During the well-defined stages, all agents act alone in 
isolation. In the ill-defined stages, agents will act as a group. The experiment will 
be based on the thoroughly researched puzzle game “Tower of Hanoi”. The 
multiplayer version of “Tower of Hanoi” is designed by a deterministic 64-state 
algorithm, which ensures that every agent of a group has influence over the 
outcome, but does not necessarily impact the outcome. The algorithm does not 
change during the ill-defined stages. Also, without communication, no participant 
can gain full control over the outcome. Therefore, even if the true rules governing 
the experiment during the multiplayer version are known, the outcome of some 
action remains unknown, making these stages ill-defined. However, a group can 
outperform randomness by sticking to the ideal strategy from the well-defined 
stages. Finally, the metastable, ill-defined domain will inhibit little change at some 
point, which vastly changes the inner dynamics and feedback becomes “chaotic” 
with high certainty. In theory however, all stages, including well-defined and ill-
defined stages, can be solved in the same number of moves. Feedback itself will 
remain stable, i.e. logical from some strategic perspective during the well-defined 
domain. If the strategy is not altered in the well-defined domain after little change 
was introduced, performance will be worse, and feedback will remain logical from 
some strategic perspective. Feedback will remain seemingly logical from some 
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strategic perspective during the metastable and ill-defined domain, but can also 
become chaotic from the perspective of some strategic perspective if some agents 
behaved “less than wise”. Feedback will be chaotic with high certainty during the 
instable and ill-defined stages. This might lead to participants interpreting chaotic 
feedback as being purely random, and any action being equally bad, leading to a 
state of mind as being “indifferent”. This can lead to agents acting blindly in 
accordance to their routine strategy or seemingly random. Feedback and therefore 
interpretation itself is then used as the defining “atoms” of the system, in 
accordance to some system being described by its system-states as “instable”, 
“indifferent”, “stable” and “metastable” (Jeschke & Mahnke, 2013). Figure 17 lists 




Passive change is performed by visual clues, being the “goal rod” of the 
“Tower of Hanoi” stages. Agents will have to solve Tower of Hanoi three times in 
a row with the rightmost rod being the goal rod, and then three times in a row with 
the center rod being the goal rod. The change will not be “actively” communicated, 
but will be communicated “passively” by visual clues, which are corrected for 
color-blind people, i.e. not only by color but also by non-announced text. During 
the well-defined stages, expertise in solving Tower of Hanoi will be measured. The 
passive change is considered as non-social environmental change. Participants who 
are not immediately aware of the goal rod change will perform worse. After a 
certain number of well-defined stages, participants will face ill-defined stages, 
where the “Tower of Hanoi” game is in fact a multiplayer-version. Different types 
of public information, also including no public information are tested in various 
information conditions. Again, the goal rod will be changed after the same amount 
Figure 16: Considered system states: instable, indifferent, stable, metastable  
[source: Jeschke & Mahnke, 2013, p. 17]. 
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of stages as in the well-defined stages. Throughout the entire ill-defined stages, the 
same hidden rules apply. This experimental setup is further specified in table 1. 
 Before (passive) change After (passive) change 
Well-defined  
(single-player) 
Stable system, logical 
feedback. 










leading to indifference.  
Table 1: Model for empirical research: system conditions of online experiment 
[source: own source] 
3.3 EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In order to measure the impact of public information and expertise, various 
information conditions and various forms of logic models have to be categorized. 
In other words, various information conditions and strategies have to be 
considered. Even well-defined problems of reality can usually be solved in more 
than one way. In order to enable two forms of logic being valid during the well-
defined Tower of Hanoi game, the disks can “jump edges” just like in the “Flag 
Run” experiments. Therefore, even the well-defined stages can be solved in more 
than one way of thinking. Also, the direction cannot be influenced by the direction 
buttons during the ill-defined stages of the multiplayer version of Tower of Hanoi. 
As assumed by Strunz & Chlupsa (2019), direction buttons attract a deep intrinsic 
motive to be part of an agent’s strategy, being ideal for testing non-routine 
problem-solving performance. In addition, the disks also jump edges during the 
ill-defined stages, and are collectively controlled by all agents of one group. Three 
agents per group were chosen, however, the number of agents per group can be 
chosen arbitrarily in accordance with the algorithm.  
In summary, the experiment will research the following general research 
objectives: i) the impact of active public information about change on group 
problem-solving behavior, when such change does not have an influence on 
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strategy performance, ii) the impact of passive public information about change on 
group problem-solving behavior, when such change does have an influence on 
strategy performance, iii) the impact of various forms of active public information, 
e.g. social change or stochastic change, on agents changing their routine strategy, 
iv) the impact of active public information about hidden rules on agents changing 
their routine strategy, v) the influence of individual expertise stemming from well-
defined learning environments in ill-defined problem-solving domains regarding 
overcoming routine strategy and overall performance.  
The experiment measuring these general research objectives is explained in 
the following chapter, after which the specific research questions and hypotheses 
are listed.
 
4 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
The experiment consisted of three parts: the login-stage, the experiment and 
an after-survey. The experiment starts with 6 single-player Tower of Hanoi games 
to enable learning and to induce routine, referred to as “individual decision-
making expertise in routine-strategy”. The single-player rounds are followed by 6 
three-player Tower of Hanoi games, where the first three multiplayer-games can 
be solved perfectly by the agents when sticking to the single player strategy.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part describes the software 
used to measure behavior changes in a complex problem-solving game. As two 
different versions of the software existed, emphasis on software development 
process will be laid upon and an overview of the evolutionary process of the 
experiment is described. The second part describes the participants of the study – 
details about their background, and where they were recruited from are provided. 
The third part will explain what participants had to do during the experiment, how 
data was collected and in which order the experiment was structured.  
4.1 DEVELOPMENT AND MATERIALS 
Two different software versions of the experiment exist. The first version was 
programmed with “zTree”,   
“a software package for developing and carrying out economic experiments.”  
(Fischbacher, 2007, p. 172). The software running on zTree was developed in 
cooperation with a local German IT company. The second version was developed 
from scrap with same company and embedded in an also self-developed 
framework for behavioral experiments called “Curiosity IO”.  
4.1.1 Software development process 
Development processes for both software versions oriented themselves at a 
combination of the classic “Waterfall” software development process and “scrum”, 
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using “Waterfall” as a framework, and embedding e.g. the face-to-face meetings 
suggested by scrum.  
The software development method scrum  
“assumes that the systems development process is an unpredictable, complicated process that can 
only be roughly described as an overall progression.” 
(Schwaber, 1997, p. 1).  “Water-Scrum-Fall” is a hybrid approach, where “Hybrid 
Agile methods are a reality in most Agile implementations” (West, 2011, p. 9) and 
the “Water-Scrum-Fall” approach offers a “simple set of principles, working 
practices, and roles for teams to execute (…) and guidance on team organization 
and transparency” (West, 2011, p. 11), while not excluding traditional development 
milestones. Here the “hybrid method in which traditional and agile approaches are 
combined seemingly provides the “win-win” situation.” (Theocharis, Kuhrmann, 
Münch, & Diebold, 2015, p. 13). The simple figure 17 from West et al. (2011) 
precisely shows the software development process for both experiments. After an 
extensive meeting (“Water”), the IT company developed the software via scrum, 
with weekly meetings (“Scrum”), and offered support with bug-fixing, and 
performance testing (“Fall”) (West, 2011, p. 10). The development of Curiosity IO 
relied less on weekly meetings however and face-to-face meetings were no longer 
recorded in written form. 
Figure 17: Software development process Water-Scrum-Fall  
[source: West, 2011, p. 10]. 
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All milestones of the software development process are being listed in 
chronological order in the appendix table “Software Development Milestones” (see 
annex 1). 
4.1.2 Legacy version of experiment 
While an experiment using the zTree program had been conducted and data 
was collected, both program and data were not used. Instead, Curiosity IO was 
developed, with an identical experiment, and its resulting data had been used for 
evaluation. The software development process of the zTree experiment, its 
application and the reasoning process for abolishing this program and its data will 
be described, before coming to Curiosity IO and its results. As this “failed” 
experiment led to new insights and improvement ideas concerning Curiosity IO, it 
is a fundamental cornerstone of the entire theoretical and practical process. As this 
legacy experiment was conducted in the historic “Hopfenpost” building in Munich, 
the experiment is referred to as the “Hopfenpost experiment”. The Hopfenpost 
experiment will first be described, followed by critical analysis and its problems, 
ultimately leading to the decision to dismiss the experiment. Software 
documentation of the zTree software is attached in the appendix (see annex 1). 
The first experiment was conducted with the zTree software version from 18th 
to 22th of June 2018 in a rented room located in the historic “Hopfenpost” Munich. 
This experiment was conducted “offline” with 264 participants, recruited by two 
hired companies. The only requirement for all participants was being fluent in 
German. Before, a website was created, attracting potential college participants 
with prizes and participation fees. However, this approach deemed to be 
ineffective to recruit participants. The two companies recruited 169 female, and 95 
male participants for the experiment, with no further restrictions on the 
participants, such as graduation degrees, age or monthly income. Due to technical 
difficulties 210 data sets remain useful for analysis. During the five-day timespan, 
experiments had been conducted from 10am to 5:30pm in four groups, in one room, 
using 18 rented laptops, a 28-port switch, and 3 backup laptops. Due to hot 
weather, participants had access to water throughout the experiment. Fees were 
handed out in cash to each participant after the experiment. 
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Figure 18 shows the process of the Hopfenpost experiment, which was 
conducted via the zTree version of the Tower of Hanoi game. Players were first 
instructed to take a seat, and to self-report age and sex. Providing an email address 
was optional, and only necessary, if one was interested in winning a prize. Every 
experiment was assigned to either group 1 or group 2. Every group’s experiment 
consisted of 4 stages. Before the first stage, participants were orally informed about 
their task. They had to solve several rounds of “Tower of Hanoi”, iteratively answer 
a questionnaire, and were told about how to correctly use GUI elements in order to 
do so. They were not deceived by any wrong statement. In the first stage, both 
groups started with the regular one-player version of ToH, followed by a 
questionnaire, in order to self-report data on perceived stress (Cohen & 
Williamson, 1988) and self-reported uncertainty (Clampitt & Williams, 2000). 
Minor changes were made to both questionnaires to adapt their content to the 
experiment’s context, e.g. replacing “months” by “rounds”. The questionnaires 
were also translated into German and participants were instructed to use the 
German versions. These two questionnaires were answered after every stage. The 
second stage started with three rounds of three-player version Tower of Hanoi. 
Three rounds of three-player version Tower of Hanoi, being referred to as “Tower 
of Europe”, is being played three times in a row as well during stages three and 
four. The global information between both groups differed in stage two. Global 
information was always provided orally, and in German. The first group was 
informed about the fact that they were now sharing control with two other people 
in this room. The second group did not receive any other information, other than 
there now being a “Please wait.” screen popping up after each input, as output 
calculation differs. In stage three, the first group was told that the directional 
buttons did not and will not influence the game at all and in fact, had no influence 
at all during the past three games, and only change color when being pressed. The 
second group in stage three was now provided the same information as group 1 
during stage two – that they are sharing control with two others in their room. The 
final stage four offered no new information to group 1 but did provide group 2 
with the insight about the “dummy-effect” of the directional buttons, just like 
group 1 during stage three. 
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The experiment produced more than 400 .csv files of data about the 
participant’s choices made and self-reported items. However, the experiment was 
flawed for many reasons, which are now to be explained. 
4.1.3 Problems with legacy experiment 
Throughout the experiment, participants were able to communicate with 
each other. While the participants were instructed to remain silent, vocal signals 
such as sighing and moaning, eye contact and clicking sounds could not be 
avoided, and their potential influence on the data cannot be estimated. Another 
problem was the high effort in dealing with raw data. As the individual data sets 
are not linked to the individual seat ID written on each paper, where participants 
self-reported age and sex, but to the zTree ID, many references would have to be 
made by hand first. When zTree IDs were “shuffled” in order to randomize groups, 
it had to be written down by hand, who-is-who. In order to being able to truthfully 
report back to the companies who hired the participants and how many actually 
arrived, the self-reporting part about sex and age using paper was also done in 
order to know, from which company the individual participant was recruited from, 
as both companies offered different wages. Therefore, the experiment was not fully 
automated in order to have solid evidence “in paper form”.  
Figure 18: Process model of the legacy “Hopfenpost” experiment 
[source: own source] 
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Another problem was that zTree is not a very suitable software for GUI heavy 
experiments. While it is astonishing that a single player and multiplayer Tower of 
Hanoi game can be programmed using zTree’s rudimentary architecture, it is not 
graphically convincing. Furthermore, zTree does not offer redundant functions, so 
that the entire game was programmed with one huge iterative function. This led to 
the first backup notebook, which ran on an HDD drive, to calculate multiple inputs 
from more than 9 participants so slowly that participants started complaining, and 
with more than 10 participants, the entire experiment crashed. A notebook, running 
on an SSD, had to be used in order to run the experiment with enough efficiency.  
During the experiment the actions of each participants could not be 
monitored. Therefore, the participants had to be monitored by walking behind 
them, in order to being able to see their computer screens. This was sometimes 
necessary when participants reported problems with mouse-control, accidentally 
closed the application or other problems which laid outside of experimental 
relevance. However, when walking past participants back, some of them reported 
that being a huge issue and that they will probably behave differently, when being 
observed from behind. Participants who took a long time to finish the single player 
version game also reported orally that the presence of others who finished the game 
faster, made them feel uncomfortable, altering their cognitive stability to the worse. 
Due to zTree’s software restrictions, and security concerns, not all inputs 
could be saved, such as individual presses and clicks on the directional buttons. A 
group could have solved a stage with only seven actions, but with hundreds of 
inputs, the latter not being saved, distorting information. 
Since global information was reported orally, no recordings of each non-
automated part of the experiment exist, and the participants were not isolated, the 
experiment is hard to defend against accusations of “use of deception”, modeler 
bias, and noise from communication between participants. In addition, technical 
problems and bugs resulted in biased data. When a game-group was only 
containing one or two participants instead of the required three, the software 
would show unusual behavior, which even crashed the entire experiment. While 
the latter only happened once, it could have happened every time, when an 
experiment did not include a number of participants dividable by three. 
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The questionnaires were slightly changed and translated into German. 
Therefore, it was not clear whether these questionnaires still validly measured self-
reported stress and uncertainty. The latter survey’s quality is debatable, as the 
study is a rather unknown proceedings manuscript.  
The “offline” participant acquisition and entire experimental process was 
very resource demanding. Due to this reason, and all mentioned problems above, 
an “online” version of “Tower of Europe” – that is the three-player version of 
Tower of Hanoi – was developed. While in the beginning the software “oTree” was 
considered, which is an “online software for implementing interactive experiments 
in the laboratory” (D. L. Chen, Schonger, & Wickens, 2016, p. 88), which runs on 
any web-browser without any application requisites, again “oTree” was found to 
lack graphical requirements, and modern software development language.  
4.1.4 Curiosity IO – structure and functionality 
Software development of Curiosity IO started in November 2018, and was 
mainly finished August 2019. The software framework contains a number of classic 
game theoretical experiments such as “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, “Battle of the Sexes”, 
“Nash Bargaining Game”, “Optional Prisoner Dilemma”, “Public Goods”, “Trust 
Game”, “Ultimatum Game”, “Dictators Game”, “Public Goods (3 Player)”. It also 
contains “Flag Run”(Strunz & Chlupsa, 2019), “Dynamic Flag Run”, and “Tower 
of Hanoi”. Extensive bug-testing and prototype testing of the two main 
experiments, being “Flag Run” and “Tower of Hanoi”, had taken place. Since the 
18th January 2019, multiple pre-tests and experiments were conducted. Using the 
“Flag Run” und “Dynamic Flag Run” game, 13 sessions with 1.459 participants 
from “Amazon Mechanical Turk” in total were performed, as well as 4 “Tower of 
Hanoi” sessions with a total of 150 participants – prior to the main experiment. Raw 
data of all experiments remain saved, and a selection of raw data can instantly be 
exported in .csv file format. Most screenshots of the software are added to the 
electronic appendix, and is referred to as “e-appendix” in the following. 
Curiosity IO is a framework for online behavior experiments, which can be 
run on any device and web-browser. Participants can login to an experiment-
session by entering the URL https://www.curiosity-data.com. Participants then 
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have to type in the experiment’s “Session Code” (see e-appendix 
chapter3_1_participant_login). When an experiment-session is “open”, and the 
participant has entered the correct “Session Code”, the participant will 
automatically begin with the experiment. What comes next, e.g. a label for the 
participant to provide age and sex, a questionnaire or game theoretical experiment 
depends on how the experiment was designed by the experimenter. 
Experimenters can reach the admin panel via https://admin.curiosity-
data.com. It is password protected (see e-appendix 
chapter3_2_experimenter_login). After entering the correct password, the main 
menu of Curiosity IO is unlocked. It consists of three panels: “Sessions – Create and 
analyze test runs”, “Level Editor – Create and edit level configurations” and 
“Survey Editor – Create and edit surveys” (see e-appendix chapter3_3_main-
menu).  
Choosing “Sessions” leads to a list of all performed experiments (see e-
appendix chapter3_4_gamesessions). The list displays the experiment’s name, type 
of experiment, date, number of users, and the session code.  Pressing the red “X” 
icon on the top right will lead back to the main menu. Choosing the icon “New 
Session” will open up the “Create Session” screen (see e-appendix 
chapter3_5_session).  
The “Create Session” popup offers various options to design a session. Entire 
“experiments” are referred to as “sessions”. It can be closed with the red “X” icon, 
a “Cancel” button, and a session can be created pressing a “Save” button. In the 
first two empty text fields, a “Session Name” and a “Player Password”, formerly 
referred to as “Session Code” is to be entered. A checkbox enables the experimenter 
to activate or disable the panel, which enforces the participant to self-report their 
sex and age, before being able to start with a session. Each session can consist of 
three parts: a pre-survey, an experiment and an after-survey. Pre- and after-survey 
are questionnaires, which can be designed in the “Survey Editor”. Experiments 
include all listed game-theoretical experiments, as well as “Flag Run”, “Dynamic 
Flag Run” and “Tower of Hanoi”. All these experiments can be chosen from the 
dropdown menu “Select Game”. A session can also consist only of surveys – in this 
case “No Game” has to be chosen. 
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Depending on the chosen experiment, various options are now enabled, 
disabled or added. The two dropdown menus “Select Pre Survey” and “Select Post 
Survey” are always enabled, and list all pre-defined questionnaires created via the 
“Survey Editor”. When the experiments “Flag Run” or “Dynamic Flag Run” are 
selected, the dropdown menu “Select Level Configuration” is enabled, and lists all 
pre-defined level configurations created via the “Level Editor”. When the 
experiment “Tower of Hanoi” is chosen, multiple elements are added: a button 
“Add TOH Configuration”, three empty text-fields named “Single-Player Timer”, 
“Multi-Player Timer”, “Give-Up Timer” and a checkbox labelled “Bot” (see e-
appendix chapter3_11_createsession_2). Selecting “Add TOH Configuration” 
opens makes the “TOH CONFIG” popup appear (see e-appendix 
chapter3_12_tohconfig_1). 
The “TOH CONFIG” popup can be closed with the red “X” icon, a “Cancel” 
button, and a “Tower of Hanoi” procedure can be created pressing the “Save” 
button. Such a procedure has to consist of at least one group. Each group can 
experience a different procedure. Participants will be put into groups (experiment-
group) automatically, without being explicitly informed, by the group number. 
This will explained later in greater detail. “Add Group” adds a new group, which 
can be deleted by pressing the “Delete” icon or edited by clicking on its entry label 
(see e-appendix chapter3_13_tohconfig_2). When editing a group, consisting of at 
least one “game”, a list of its games are displayed (see e-appendix 
chapter3_14_tohconfig_3). The group “edit” menu can be closed with the red “X” 
icon, a “Cancel” button, and a group procedure can be created pressing the “Save” 
button. One game is always filled in by default. The edit list contains information 
about the game ID, number of discs used (min. 3 to max. 10), starting state, goal 
state, single- or three-player, and whether or not help-text and popup are used. 
Each “Tower of Hanoi” game consists of three rods. While there exist ToH 
experiments with more than three rods, Curiosity IO does not offer more than three 
for the time being. “Add Game” adds a new game, which can be deleted by 
pressing the “Delete” icon or edited by clicking on its entry label. When editing a 
game, popup menus and text fields can be used to alter number of discs, start state, 
goal state, single- or three-player, and whether a popup should be visible (see e-
appendix chapter3_15_tohconfig_3). Help-text and popup-text can be entered via 
the empty text-fields. When a popup is active, it has to be closed by the participant, 
106  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
in order to engage with the experiment. This can be used in order to announce help-
text changes or report other important information to the participant. 
Going back to the “Create Session” menu, various timers can be set. The 
“Single-Player Timer” is the amount of time in minutes each participant is provided 
to solve a Single-Player ToH game. The timer is displayed to the participant during 
the game, even on the popup. When the timer reaches 0, the next level is 
automatically started. The “Multi-Player Timer” is the analogue time for each 
participant to solve the three-player version of “Tower of Hanoi”, also referred to 
as “Tower of Europe” (ToE). The ToE timer starts after each participant has 
provided an input. The “Give-Up Timer” is the number of minutes after which a 
“Give-Up” button appears during ToE. Since each ToE game requires three 
participants, these three players are called a “game-group”. When the “Give-Up” 
button is being pressed by any participant of a game-group, the experiment for the 
entire game-group ends. When the bot checkbox is marked, it will activate the “bot-
system”. For the bot-system to work, “Start Wait” or “In Game Wait” have to be 
filled with an integer. When the ToH experiment comes with ToE games, game-
groups of three players are required.  
Considering an experiment has only one experiment-group: When 
participants join such an experiment, they have to wait until two other participants 
have joined. Those three participants are then put automatically in one game-
group, when this experiment has only one experiment-group. This game-group is 
then automatically assigned to the first experiment-group. The next three 
participants who joined will be assigned to the second game-group. This game-
group will automatically join the next experiment-group, if such an experiment-
group exists. “Start Wait” indicates the number of minutes a player has to wait 
before bots will fill the game-group with either one or two bots. This feature was 
implemented so that MTurks do not have to wait too long, in order to still offer 
ethical pay.  
Considering an experiment has more than one experiment-group: When 
participants join such an experiment, they will join, in successive order, each 
experiment-group.  
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“In Game Wait” is the number of minutes a player has to wait before bots 
will fill the game-group with either one or two bots during the game. This feature 
was implemented so that participants of a game-group could still end the 
experiment, when a game-group co-player disconnected. This is a good alternative 
to the more rigid “Give-Up” button concept, as it still allows to produce decision-
making data of the entire experiment.  
Bots only solve ToE games. Each bot is a simple algorithm using a “random-
function”. A “random-function” is usually “pseudo-random” as it uses various 
uncorrelated signals of a computer to produce e.g. a random integer. In this case, 
using this random-function, the algorithm chooses with a 50 %-pseudo-random 
chance the small disk or with a 50 %-pseudo-random chance the middle/large sized 
disk. When ToH or ToE is played with three rods, only the small or any other disk 
can be moved. Therefore, it is always a binary choice, with only three exceptions: 
when all disks are placed on one rod, only the small disk can be moved. After 
having “chosen” either small or middle/large sized disk, the algorithm chooses by 
50 %-pseudo-random chances whether or not a disk’s moving distance is either 1 
or 2 spaces. As there are only three rods, and disks cannot be moved 0 or 3 spaces, 
this also is a binary choice. How these two binary choices by three agents lead to a 
single output in ToE will be explained later. 
A click on a listed experiment in the “Sessions” menu opens the session 
overview (see e-appendix chapter3_5_session). The session overview lists all 
participants. Each session overview displays four icons on the top right of the 
screen. The leftmost icon triggers an experiment as being “active”. While 
participants are able to log in to an “inactive” session, and start with a pre-survey 
(when the session is set to “open”, see below), they will be faced with a waiting 
screen when reaching an actual experiment, such as “Tower of Hanoi”. Only when 
an experiment is set to “active” will the actual experiment start. Therefore, the 
“active” button does not influence pre-surveys, but only experiments. Once active, 
an experiment cannot be set to “inactive”. After the leftmost icon, the second icon 
from the left “opens” or “closes” are session with a single click. When an 
experiment is “closed”, participants can not join a session by entering their session 
code. The “Proceed” button at the “Join Session” screen will simple not work. When 
an experiment is “open”, participants are able to join the session by enter their 
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session code, and can begin e.g. with a pre-survey. When a session is both “active” 
and “open”, participants can come and join the experiment, without the 
experimenter having to manually open and close the experiment. This feature has 
been implemented when experiments have to be conducted over the course of days 
and using e.g. Amazon Mechanical Turk, where participants might come from 
different time zones. When experiments are performed with people sitting in one 
room, the “active” feature is useful, so that participants all start with the 
experiment simultaneously after having filled out the questionnaire. In order to 
make sure that no further participants can join an experiment, it can be “locked”. 
The two buttons combined features are explained in table 2 (own source) for better 
understanding. 
active/inactive button locked/unlocked button effect 
inactive locked Default state. No 
participant can join 
session. No already 
joined participant can 
start with experiment. 
inactive unlocked Participants can join 
session, and start with 
pre-survey. No 
participant can start 
with experiment. 
active unlocked Participants can join 
session. Participants can 
start with experiment. 
active locked No participant can join 
session. Already joined 
participants can start 
with experiment. 
Table 2: All permutations of lock and play buttons with effect explanation 
The third icon opens the “Game Session” options menu or “Session 
Configuration”. Depending on the experiment, the options menu might differ. The 
following will explain the option menu as it appears, when a “Tower of Hanoi” 
experiment is chosen (see e-appendix chapter3_16_sessionconfiguration). The 
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“Session Configuration” can be closed via the red “X” or the “Cancel” button. 
“Restart Session” will make each participant start over from the very beginning of 
the entire session, e.g. participants have to re-do their pre-survey. Data created is 
saved server-side, but cannot be downloaded via the options menu any longer (see 
below “Download Level Data or “Download Survey”). “Kick all and restart 
Session” will have the same effect as “Restart Session”, but all participants will 
have to rejoin the session via the “Join Session” screen. “Clone Session” will make 
create an identical copy of a session in the “Game Sessions” list. The new session 
will appear with the original session name followed by “_clone”. This comes in 
handy, when a session is complex and takes much time to create. This way multiple 
clones with e.g. slightly altered timer times can be tested, before a main experiment 
is conducted. In order to do so, a session can be edited. This can be done via “Edit 
Session” in the “Session Configuration” menu. A session cannot be edited as soon 
as it was set “active”. When an experimenter wants to edit an already “active” 
session, the session can be cloned first, and then edited. Any session can be deleted 
by pressing “Delete Session”. A popup will then ask “Are you sure you want to 
delete this session?”. In order to remove the session from the “Game Sessions” list, 
this action has to be confirmed by pressing “Proceed”. Choosing “Download Level 
Data” will download a .csv file with the experiment’s raw data, which differs from 
game to game. When a “Tower of Hanoi” session included ToH and ToE, a single- 
and multiplayer .csv will separate raw data from one-player and three-player 
games. “Download Survey” will download a .csv file with the sessions’ 
questionnaire raw data, which differs according to surveys’ structure and content. 
During an experiment, each participant can be monitored “live”. The “Game 
Session” overview displays the participant ID, the current level or stage the 
participant is in, the total playing time, and the playing time in the current stage. 
Clicking on a listed participant during or after the experiment, will display three 
different icons (see e-appendix chapter3_6_session-user-options). Choosing the 
leftmost icon displays survey answers, which can also be monitored “live” during 
the experiment (see e-appendix chapter3_7_user-options_1). The center icon opens 
the experiment monitoring tool, where each input of the participant during the 
experiment is listed, and can also be observed “live” during the experiment (see e-
appendix chapter3_8_user-options_2). The rightmost icon removes a participant 
from the experiment. The session overview also displays an icon “AddBotGroup” 
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when the experiment is of type “Tower of Hanoi” (see e-appendix 
chapter3_9_session-bot). A “bot” is a simple algorithm, which randomly chooses 
inputs, as explained before. Clicking this icon adds a group of three bots, which 
will solve any ToE game. This feature was added to receive data about how many 
steps are required to solve “Tower of Europe” when the agents acts randomly.  
This concludes the main menu’s “Sessions” part. The “Level editor” is only 
used for “Flag Run” and “Dynamic Flag Run” games. Since this thesis builds upon 
raw data from the experiment “Tower of Hanoi”, this main menu option is skipped. 
The next main menu option is the “Survey Editor”. Choosing “Survey Editor” 
leads to a list of all created surveys (see e-appendix chapter3_17_surveylist). The 
list displays the survey’s name, date of creation, last date being modified and last 
date being used.  Pressing the red “X” icon on the top right will lead back to the 
main menu. Choosing the icon “New Survey” will open up the “Survey Editor” 
screen (see e-appendix chapter3_18_surveyeditor_1).  
The “Survey Editor” can be closed via the red “X” or being closed and saved 
via the “Save” button. By default, a single question already exists. Each question is 
listed in the “Survey Editor”. Each question can be assigned to a group. Groups can 
be created, edited and deleted by clicking the “Groups” button. The “Groups” 
feature has yet only be tested with the “Dynamic Flag Run” game, and will not be 
explained in further detail. The listed questions can be ordered with the grey arrow 
buttons, and can be deleted with the trash-bin button. Pressing “New Questions” 
adds a new question. A question can be designed with right-hand side features. A 
question can be of type “One Choice”, “Multiple Choice”, “Scale” or “Free Text”.  
Each question of type “One Choice” and “Multiple Choice” can be 
formulated via a text-field and can consist of multiple answers. Pressing “New 
Answer” will make a text field appear, where the answer can be formulated. Order 
of answers can be rearranged via two direction buttons. Special features to an 
answer can be added. Those features have yet only be used in the “Dynamic Flag 
Run” game, and its description is to be skipped here. An answer can also be deleted 
via the trash-bin symbol. 
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Questions of type “Scale” only have one answer. Its lower and upper end, 
with according description, can be modified via text-fields. An example would be 
“very low, 1, 10, very high” (see e-appendix chapter3_19_surveyeditor_2). 
Questions of type “Free Text” will automatically provide a text-field for each 
participant.  
This concludes the main menu’s “Survey Editor” part and the entire options 
available to the experimenter via Curiosity IO admin panel. In the following, a 
“Tower of Hanoi” experiment from the perspective of a participant is shown, in 
order to discuss their features and functionality. 
4.1.5 “Tower of Hanoi” example session 
The session consists of a pre-survey, a “Tower of Hanoi” experiment and an 
after-survey. The experiment consists of one experiment-group, consisting of one 
game-group with one human agent and two bot. The experiment will have two 
games. One classic single-player ToH game and the three-player version (ToE).  
In detail, the pre-survey and after-survey are identical questionnaires 
consisting of one “One Choice” question with two possible answers and are created 
using the “Survey Editor” (see e-appendix chapter3_25_phdexample_6). The 
sessions’ experiment (see e-appendix chapter3_20_phdexample_1 and 
chapter3_21_phdexample_2) is called “PhD Thesis Example Session” with session 
code “phd”. Sex and age is chosen to be a mandatory choice for each participant. 
ToH and ToE timers are set to 1 minute. The bot was activated, and its activation 
or waiting time set to 1 minute before the experiment, and set to 1 minute during 
the experiment. The described surveys, named “Done_Before”, are chosen to be 
pre- and after-surveys. There is only one experiment-group (see e-appendix 
chapter3_26_phdexample_7). The experiment-group holds two games, with three 
discs, starting rod being the leftmost rod (Start == 1). The goal rod of the ToH game 
is set to be the middle rod (Goal == 2), and the goal rod of the ToE game is set to be 
the right rod (Goal == 3). Both games have a help text and a popup (see e-appendix 
chapter3_22_phdexample_3). Help-texts and popup context were set to be different 
for this example (see e-appendix chapter3_23_phdexample_4 and 
chapter3_24_phdexample_5). 
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The session is set to be “inactive” and “open”. The participant types in the 
session code “phd” to join the session (see e-appendix chapter3_27_joinsession). 
After that the participant provides sex and age (see e-appendix 
chapter3_28_joinsession) and is immediately brought to the pre-survey after 
submitting these details (see e-appendix chapter3_29_phdexample_10). Upon 
having provided an answer, the participant is now facing the “waiting screen” (see 
e-appendix chapter3_30_phdexample_11), as the session’s experiment is set to 
“inactive”. The experimenter sets the experiment to “active”, which also 
automatically “closes” the session (see e-appendix chapter3_31_phdexample_12). 
The participant is still only seeing the “waiting screen”, since two more participants 
have to join in order to form one game-group. The “Tower of Hanoi” experiment 
groups participants at the very beginning, even before a ToH game, when at least 
one ToE game is part of the experiment. Thus, it is defined from the beginning, who 
will face who in the second ToE game. After 1 minute a bot called “10000” joins the 
game-group. After another minute a second bot called “10001” joins the game-
group (see e-appendix chapter3_32_phdexample_13). At this moment, three agents 
are part of the game-group, starting the experiment immediately. The participant 
no longer sees the “waiting screen” but is looking at the instructions popup, with 
the text “This is the popup.”, a popup “OK” button to close the popup, the timer 
displayed on the popup, and the “helptext label” next to the popup (see e-appendix 
chapter3_33_phdexample_14). After closing the popup by pressing “OK”, the 
participant can see the actual “Tower of Hanoi” game: a caption titled “Tower of 
Hanoi”, with the timer now displayed below, three rods placed on platforms, a red 
marked goal rod with “Goal” written below to also address colorblind participants, 
and the three disks on the left rod in start-state setup (see e-appendix 
chapter3_34_phdexample_15). The participant has to press the small disk in order 
to make the “Steps” buttons, “Direction” buttons and “GO” button appear (see e-
appendix chapter3_35_phdexample_16). After having chosen number of steps and 
direction, the participant can confirm the selection made by pressing “GO”, upon 
which the resulting state will be displayed. When the participant manages to solve 
the game by positioning the three disks onto the goal rod or when the timer runs 
out, the “Level Completed” screen is displayed (see e-appendix 
chapter3_36_phdexample_17). This screen can be skipped by pressing “Next 
Level” – however the screen is automatically skipped when the participant reached 
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the “Level Completed” screen not by solving the game but because the timer ran 
out. After the ToH game the participant now looks at the ToE game, with an 
instructions popup “This is the second popup”, a “OK” button to close the popup 
and the “helptext label” with “This is the helptext label with different information 
now.” written on it (see e-appendix chapter3_37_phdexample_18). No timer is 
displayed, since the timer starts after all three agents of the same game-group have 
to provide an input first during a ToE game. This is done as agents of the same 
game-group might have to wait for their co-agents to reach the ToE game; e.g. when 
two agents are still playing the first ToH game and the third agent has already 
reached the second game (ToE), and provides an input selection (disk/number of 
steps/direction, and pressing “GO”), this agent will face the “Waiting Screen”, until 
all members of the same game-group have provided an input selection. After 
closing the popup, the participant can choose an input just like in the first game. 
This time, the goal rod is the very right one (see e-appendix 
chapter3_38_phdexample_19). After confirming disk, steps and direction selection, 
the timer starts (see e-appendix chapter3_39_phdexample_20). The output is the 
product of the one human and of the two bot agents input selections. After the ToE 
stage, no “Next Level” screen is displayed, as it was the final game. Instead, the 
after-survey is shown, which in this example, is identical to the pre-survey (see e-
appendix chapter3_40_phdexample_21). When completing the after-survey, the 
“Thank You” screen with the participant ID is displayed (see e-appendix 
chapter3_41_phdexample_22). MTurks for example are instructed to provide the 
experimenter with this ID, so that the experimenter can check whether or not the 
MTurk has actually finished the session. 
This concludes the example experiment. In the next sub-chapter, data output 
is described and explained. 
4.1.6 Example session data output 
Using the options icon in the “Game Session” menu, and pressing 
“Download Level Data” and “Download Survey” several .csv files are downloaded 
(see e-appendix chapter3_42_phdexample_23): 
“PhD_Thesis_Example_Session_single_player” (ToH.csv), which contains raw 
data about all ToH games that were part of the “Tower of Hanoi” experiment. 
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“PhD_Thesis_Example_Session_three_player” (ToE.csv), which contains raw data 
about all ToE games that were part of the “Tower of Hanoi” experiment. 
“PhD_Thesis_Example_Session_survey” (Survey.csv), which contains raw data 
about all surveys that were part of the session. For more efficient statistical analysis 
of the thesis specific hypotheses, two additional .csv files were added after having 
conducted the main experiment. Tables explaining their variables are added to the 
appendix, being referred to as “Master.csv” and “Progress.csv” (see annex 5 and 
annex 6). The content of Progress.csv and Master.csv is not explained in further 
detail in this chapter, as their content is explained by the description of 
independent and dependent variables. 
Survey.csv lists several raw data (see e-appendix 
chapter3_43_phdexample_24), all summed up and explained in the according table 
in the appendix (see annex 2). All types of raw data being saved in Survey.csv, an 
explanation of its meaning, and how the raw data looks like in the example 
Survey.csv output file. 
ToH.csv lists several raw data all summed up and explained in the according 
table in the appendix (see annex 3). The table lists all types of raw data being saved 
in ToH.csv, an explanation of its meaning, and how the raw data looks like in the 
example ToH.csv output file. Some raw data will be explained in greater detail in 
the following sub-chapter. 
ToE.csv lists several raw data all summed up and explained in the according 
table in the appendix (see annex 4). The table lists all types of raw data being saved 
in ToE.csv, an explanation of its meaning, and how the raw data looks like in the 
example ToE.csv output file.  Long raw data names were cut to save table space. 
Some raw data will be explained in greater detail in the following sub-chapter. 
Tables in the appendix (see annex 2-6) show all raw data being exported to 
.csv format. The next sub-chapter will explain listed data in more detail, such as 
how data is created – this is supported by data examples derived from the Curiosity 
IO example session described in the former chapters. 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN 115 
4.1.7 Response time and input   
Response time creation differs for human and bot agents. While response 
times for bot agents are simulated, as their input order is randomly assigned, 
response times by humans are always server-dependent. Due to technical issues 
response times are not reliable enough to make precise statistical analyses. 
Response times are therefore disregarded. 
4.1.8 States derived from state-space 
Data such as “start_state” in ToH.csv and ToE.csv require a state-space of the 
experiment. When including operators, the state-space between ToH and ToE 
differs, as the former only requires a single action to produce an operator, and the 
latter requires three actions to produce an operator. However, the resulting output 
states of ToE are identical; if the three actions which produce an operator in ToE 
are ignored or modelled as being “intrinsic” to the operator, ToH and ToE state 
spaces are isomorphic.  
Figure 19 shows the state-space of both ToH and ToE (Knoblock, 2000, p. 3), 
with integers added to each knot. It consists of 27 knots, representing all possible 
states, which are visually represented in the “Tower of Hanoi” experiment. It also 
contains directed, double-headed graphs, representing all possible transitions 
between states by the according operator. At 24 knots three different operators 
exist. This is not the case in all possible “start” states (not to be confused with 
start_state), which are states 1, 8 and 15. Here, only two operators exist. From each 
state there exists a path of seven operators leading to states 1, 8 and 15. Since only 
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these three states can be set to goal states, there always exists an ideal path of seven 
operators towards the goal state. 
 
4.1.9 Move states 
In ToE.csv the “move_state” data is an integer from 1 to 64 referring to all 
possible three-player action combinations leading to an operator (see e-appendix 
chapter3_Algorithm-States_new_appendix_44). An action consists of a chosen disk 
and number of steps. Chosen direction is only important when assigning a certain 
type of logic, which will be explained in a later sub-chapter. 
 In states 1, 8 and 15 only the small disk can be chosen. In any other state, 
agents can either choose the small disk or one of the remaining larger disks. With 
three rods, there is not state where an agent can choose between more than two 
Figure 19: Tower of Hanoi state space model with their according integers 
[source: Knoblock, 2000, p. 3, red integers added by author] 
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disks in total. Therefore, each agent is confronted with a binary choice when 
deciding which disk to move – exceptions are state 1, 8, and 15. Each agents can 
choose between 1 or 2 steps, at any state, making it a binary choice. Therefore, an 
individual action can be described by two symbols. “S” representing “Small Disk”, 
“M” representing “Medium or Large Disk”, 1 representing “One Step” and 2 
representing “Two Steps”. Any operator consists of three actions. The operator 
being referred to by “move_state” 1 is “S1, S1, S1”, meaning that all three agents 
have chosen to move the small disk one step. Another example would be 
“move_state” 55, with actions “M1, S2, M2”. Here, the first action selection was 
“Move medium or large disk one space”, the second action selection was “Move 
small disk two spaces”, and the third action selection was “Move medium or large 
disk two spaces”.  
4.1.10 Operator output function 
Each set of three actions lead to one specific operator (see e-appendix 
chapter3_Algorithm-States_new_appendix_44). The idea of ToE was that each 
agent held control over the game, and that the direction buttons were not 
influencing the game at all. The order of information or the order of actions matters 
for calculating the operator. It was important that no participant would be able to 
gain advantage over others, meaning that the algorithm was implemented in such 
a way that no agent would be able to gain more control than other players. This 
was achieved by restricting communication. As the order of information matters, 
no agent can be sure at which position its action will be listed. The algorithm was 
also built in such a way that it can be used for more complex games or state-spaces 
than “Tower of Hanoi”, e.g. a 4-rod version of “Tower of Hanoi”. The ruleset for 
the algorithm is derived from a meta-logic and adjusted to the experiment’s degree 
of complexity. How the algorithm (function) determines the operator (output) by 
three actions (input) is now explained. 
Three inputs are received, e.g. “S1, M2, S2” listed here in chronological order. 
Only the first two inputs are regarded, and only checked for “choice of disk”, e.g. 
in this case “S, M”. By doing so “The Decider” and “Direction-Deciders” are 
obtained. The Decider’s action indicates which disk is being moved and how far it 
is being moved. Table 3 (own source) shows all possible permutations. 
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Possible “choice of disk” 
input (first two, by time) 
Resulting “Decider” action Resulting “Direction-
Decider” actions 
S, S 2nd action committed 1st & 3rd action com. 
S, M 1st action committed 2nd & 3rd action com. 
M, S 3rd action committed 1st & 2nd action com. 
M, M 2nd action committed 1st & 3rd action com. 
Table 3: All possible input combinations leading to resulting „direction-deciders“. 
 
By example, the input “S1, M2, S2” leads to “S1” being the “Decider” action, 
meaning that the small disk will be moved one space. Now, the direction has to be 
obtained. In order to do so, inputs by the “Direction-Deciders” have to be regarded. 
Direction-Deciders are the two agents who are both not the “Decider”, e.g. in this 
example, the 2nd and 3rd actions are Direction-Decider actions, as the 1st action is 
regarded as Decider action. By doing so, each agents has an influence on the game, 
with nearly eliminating the chance of any agent using a strategy to always be the 
Decider or always be the Direction-Decider, also never holding “full power” over 
disk-, steps- and direction-selection. 
In order to define in which direction a disk moves, the two Direction-Decider 
inputs are regarded. Now the inputs are only checked for “choice of steps”, in this 
example “M2, S2” are the Direction-Decider inputs, and the two inputs checked are 
“2, 2”. The Direction-Deciders’ actions indirectly indicate in which direction the 
disk is moved, as the Decider’s Choice of Range is also considered. Table 4 (own 
source) shows all possible permutations that decide the direction of the disk.  
By mentioned example, Direction-Deciders input “2, 2” and Deciders input 
“1” leads to the direction of the disk being “left”. The resulting operator equals 
“move_state” 29, where the Small Disk is being moved 1 step to the left. 
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Possible “choice of 
steps” input by 
Direction-Deciders 
Possible “choice of 
steps” input by Decider 
Resulting direction 
11 1 left 
2 right 
12 1 right 
2 left 
21 1 right 
2 left 
22 1 left 
2 right 
Table 4: All possible input combinations of direction-deciders leading to direction 
of disk   
The algorithm to determine the operator is purposefully more complex than 
required to fairly share control, in order to being used for more complex state-
spaces as well. Since an operator can lead to an illegal state, such as a bigger disk 
lying on top of a smaller disk, the next sub-chapter will explain, how an operator 
leads to the resulting output state, which can be observed by the agents. For this, a 
more fundamental definition of a “Tower of Hanoi” game is provided, and 
differences in handling illegal moves in a ToH and ToE game are shown. 
4.1.11 State output function 
When designing the ToE game, several choices had to made, how closely 
related ToE should be to ToH. The core idea designing ToE was to “still play a 
Tower of Hanoi” game. Therefore, the core rules that make a game a “Tower of 
Hanoi game” had to be defined. Those “axioms” of ToH are: 
- A move is a state, which differs from the last state 
- No state may show a larger disk lying on a smaller disk 
- The game consists of three rods 
The first axiom leads to the impossibility to move a disk and bring it back to 
the original position. The second axiom never allows a move resulting in some 
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state, where a bigger disk lies on top of a smaller disk. The third axiom limits the 
games complexity and state-space greatly. 
In addition to these axioms, each agents of ToE was supposed to have an 
influence on the game, and this control should be fairly distributed. However, in 
some situations playing ToE, individual, legal moves, can result in collective illegal 
moves. In the ToH game what defines an illegal move differs from a ToE game, 
since in the latter the direction-buttons do not influence the game, and the game is 
played alone.  
During a ToH game, pressing the “GO” button with number of steps but not 
direction being chosen, results in a “No Direction” error message (see e-appendix 
chapter3_45_nodirection_error). During a ToH game, trying to move a bigger disk 
onto a smaller disk results in a “Wrong Move” error message (see e-appendix 
chapter3_46_wrongmove_error). 
During a ToE game, pressing the “GO” button with number of steps but not 
direction being chosen, does not result in an error message. This is because such an 
error message can be regarded as deception. As the direction buttons do not 
influence the game, such an error message would state that the direction buttons 
have to be selected, implicitly saying that they actually do influence the game. 
Therefore, no such error message will pop up when no direction buttons are 
chosen. During a ToE game, when the resulting operator, consisting of three 
individual actions, would result in an illegal move, axiom number two would be 
violated. Following the meta-logic of the algorithm, such an operator will be 
“corrected”. Ignoring the more complex meta-logic, the resulting solution is that a 
“M” disk will simply “follow its direction” until a rod is being reached, where it 
can be placed. This must not be the original rod, as this would violate axiom one. 
Therefore, there does not exist any error message for this case. This approach differs 
from the legacy zTree version, where in one instance such an error message was 
displayed to the ToE agents – however, this was due to a wrong implementation of 
the algorithm; another reason for discarding the legacy experiment. 
In both ToH and ToE games, disks can jump edges. In other words, when the 
small disk is moved two steps to the right, the resulting state will always equal if 
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the disk was moved one step to the left. For example, when starting the game (ToH 
and ToE) in state 1, an operator equal to “S2 right” will result in state 2 just as an 
operator equal to “S1 left”. No error message, for both ToH and ToE will popup, 
when a disk is moved “out-of-bounds”. In other words, there are “no borders” 
between the left rod and the right rod, as the graphical representation of the “Tower 
of Hanoi” experiment might suggest. This feature was introduced to make the ToH 
more similar to the ToE game, as the latter requires there to be “no borders” in 
order to make the algorithm work. A similar ruleset was used in the “Flag Run” 
game, as this experiments rests on the same meta-logic. 
An example showing the correction of an illegal move during a ToE game is 
provided in the following. For instance, consider state 17 is reached and the goal 
rod was the center rod. The ideal ToH operator would be “M1 right” or “M2 left” 
applying “no borders” logic. During a ToE game, all three agents could use their 
single player logic and choose “M1, M1, M1”, which is “move_state” 43, and results 
in the middle disk being moved one step to the left. The middle disk would jump 
edges from the left rod and land on the right rod, counting as “one step to the left”. 
This would result in an illegal state, as the small disks rests on the right rod. The 
medium sized disk therefore goes left one more step, landing on the center rod, 
where it may “legally” be positioned. This results in state 16, ultimately desired by 
the three agents. Therefore, the middle or large sized disks will always land on the 
only legal spot, when being chosen. This is not because the algorithm was designed 
in that way, but because the “playing field”, being just three rods, is so limited that 
it may look this way. The third axiom works in favor for the agents. This is because 
when all three agents agree on one disk being moved, such as “Sx1, Sx2, Sx3” or 
“Mx1, Mx2, Mx3”, the disk agreed upon will always be moved. If that chosen disk 
has to be selected in order to follow the most efficient path, and if that disk was a 
medium or large sized disk, it will always result in the ideal state, disregarding the 
choice of steps. This is the reason why sticking to the ToH logic during a ToE game, 
will outperform randomness, as will be explained later. 
Individual inputs can differ from the collective operator, as being shown in 
the following example. Consider state 14 being reached, the center rod being the 
goal rod. The ideal single player solution would be “S1 right” or “S2 left” applying 
the “no borders” logic. During a ToE game, all three agents could use their single 
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player logic and choose “S1, S1, S1”, assuming no one had figured out that disks 
jump edges. This action input equals “move_state” 1, and results in the small disk 
being moved one step to the left. The small disk would jump edges from the left 
rod and land on the right rod, counting as “one step to the left”. This would result 
in state 16, which was probably neither desired nor expected by the three agents. 
It is clear by the two former examples that during a ToE game, several 
“logical” perspectives exist and that a ToE operator does not necessarily equal what 
an agent expected to happen. Whether or not an individual action equals some logic 
or whether or not the individual action results in some expected state is also 
expressed by raw data. The following sub-chapter will explain logic and expected 
state data. 
4.1.12 Logic and expected states 
The “Flag Run” experiment had shown that participants developed different 
strategies, all stemming from a different logic, but all effective strategies relied on 
having obtained “true rules” governing the game (Strunz & Chlupsa, 2019). During 
the “Flag Run” game, some participants even came up with effective strategies not 
anticipated by the experimenters; still, they also had to build their strategy upon 
having figured out a “true rule”. Such a “true rule” was that during the “Flag Run” 
game, the game-piece can jump edges or that the direction buttons did not 
influence the game at all. These two “true rules” are also implemented in the 
“Tower of Hanoi” experiment. During a ToH or ToE experiment, the disks can 
jump edges and the ToE game is not influenced by the direction buttons. Another 
“true rule” for ToE is that the disk, steps and direction are decided by all three 
agents as a collective, calculated by a complex algorithm, making it very unlikely 
or even impossible for one individual agent to control the game alone. However, 
participants can beat randomness by sticking to the ToH logic, as three actions that 
agree on a disk will result in this disk being moved.  
Given the two examples from the former sub-chapter, it has already been 
described that different “logical” approaches can be identified, by which 
participants act. As the results of the “Flag Run” experiment had shown, most 
participants who effectively solved the NRP stick with a single form of logic, as 
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soon as feedback confirms this logic to be effective. Again, consider state 14 being 
reached, the center rod being the goal rod. The ideal single player solution would 
be “S1 right” or “S2 left” applying the “no borders” logic. When no agent had 
figured out during the ToH game that pieces “jump edges” and that there was “no 
borders” between the left and right rod, the “S2 left” solution might seem illogical. 
This is because the agent is only locally informed and is missing information about 
the true nature of the game, analogue to the island Gedankenexperiment. This 
might lead to all agents providing inputs “S1, S1, S1”, direction “right”, leading to 
state 16, which is unfavorable. However, it might just be that one agent had figured 
out the “no border” logic, applying “S2”, direction “left”. If the agents were able to 
inspect their co-agents’ inputs, the two remaining agents would find “S2”, direction 
“left” as being an illogical move. As a reminder, during a ToE game, the directions 
chosen by the players does not have any effect whatsoever. Assuming one agent 
chooses “S2”, and two agents choose “S1”, depending on the order of information, 
three different “move_states” are possible: move_state 2 (“S2, S1, S1”) moves the 
small disk one step to the right, leading to the desired goal state 15; move_state 5 
(“S1, S2, S1”) moves the small disk two steps to the right, leading to the unfavorable 
state 16; move_state 17 (“S1, S1, S2”) moves the small disk one step to the right, 
leading to the desired goal state 15.  
Assuming move_state 2 and 17 occurred, could lead to a confirmation of a 
locally logical, but globally illogical strategy. The two agents who had chosen input 
“S1”, direction “right”, who had not figured out the true rule of “disks jumping 
edges” would find the input “S2”, direction “left”, as being an illogical input. From 
the perspective of the single agent, who used the “no border” strategy, both inputs 
are logical solutions. However, all logics are globally imperfect as the direction of 
disks cannot be influenced by pressing the direction buttons. This example shows 
the analogy to the island Gedankenexperiment. Depending on the individual 
experience, individual logics are applied, which can be either confirmed or denied 
by environmental conditions. However, since the agents decide collectively, 
negative feedback cannot be assigned to a wrong strategy with certainty. Group 
performance still can benefit from the “traditional strategy”, being acquired in the 
first ToH game, since agreement on the optimal disk outperforms randomness. 
While the rules of the game do not change, the goal rod’s position, simulating an 
environmental condition, can have a major influence on the strategy’s performance. 
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A game-group can solve a ToE game optimally in 7 moves by applying the most 
intuitive “border” ToH logic, when the goal rod is the right rod (goal ==3). Since 
agents cannot communicate, even having obtained the excel sheet with all 64 input 
permutations, agents could not control the game fully, as they had to communicate 
their input order. With the goal rod being the center rod, the most intuitive 
“border” ToH logic will fail to solve the game in 7 moves, and would lead to – 
probably – unfavorable and unexpected results. This environmental condition 
(goal ==2) will have an impact on any strategy’s performance. Depending on the 
game setup, feedback, valence weighting bias, routine strength, logic applied and 
intrinsic motives, a human agent will alter its strategy or remain using the strategy. 
It is therefore important to cover as many “logics” as possible, in order to make 
sense of the agent’s strategy, and to measure if an input lead to an “expected” 
output state. 
All different logic models and “expected” output states are saved as a 
Boolean in ToH.csv and ToE.csv (see e-appendix 
chapter3_dir_or_nodir_states_appendix_47 and 
chapter3_exp_states_appendix_48). With their necessity being explained, the 
following will explain which models of logic are saved, how they are created and 
how “expected” and “unexpected” states are distinguished.  
During a single player ToH game, two different “logic models” are being 
measured. These two logic models are saved in ToH.csv as a Boolean with “logic” 
and “no_border_logic”. When the Boolean of the according “logic model” equals 
1, the action is regarded as being equal to this “logic model”. When the Boolean 
equals 0, the action is regarded as not being equal to this “logic model”. 
In ToH an action is saved as being equal to “logic”, with Boolean equal to 1, 
when the output state follows the ideal path, without the disk “jumping edges”. 
This path depends on “start” and “goal” rod position, “start_state”, “input” and 
“direction”. In ToH an action is saved as being equal to “no_border_logic”, with 
Boolean equal to 1, when the output state follows the ideal path, with the disk 
“jumping edges”. The ideal path is the path were the goal is being reached in 7 
moves. When the playing piece deviates from the ideal path, both “logic models” 
assign a Boolean of 0. When the “start_state” is a state, which is the result of such a 
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deviation, the following move is given a Boolean of 1, when it follows the ideal 
parh again. The latter is to be shown by example in the following. All possible 
configurations that lead to “logic” or “no_border_logic” are listed in the electronic 
appendix (see e-appendix chapter3_dir_or_nodir_states_appendix_47).  
For instance, consider a ToH game with the starting rod being the left rod, 
the goal rod being the right rod and three disks. In this case, the ideal path would 
lead to “state” 2, and the ideal operator for “logic == 1” would be “S2 right”, and 
the ideal operator for “no_border_logic == 1” would be “S1 left”. Studies about 
“Tower of Hanoi” performance showed that the first move is often the move, 
deviating from the ideal path the most. Assuming the agent deviates from the ideal 
path at the first move, choosing action “S1 right”. State 9 is reached and Booleans 
for both “logic models” are then assigned a value of 0. The ideal path would now 
lead to “state” 2, and the ideal operator for “logic == 1” would be “S1 right”. 
Assuming the agent chooses to correct its deviation by “S1 right”, state 2 is reached 
and a Boolean of 1 is assigned to “logic”, even though the “start_state” was outside 
of the original ideal path. A Boolean of 0 is assigned to “no_border_logic”, since 
the disk did not jump edges. 
During a three player ToE game, where the direction buttons do not influence 
the disks, several different “logic models” are being measured. Players can also 
choose to confirm an input without having pressed a direction button – being saved 
as “n” or “none”.  ToE logic models are saved in ToE.csv with a Boolean assigned 
to them. When the Boolean of the according “logic model” equals 1, the action is 
regarded as being equal to this “logic model”. When the Boolean equals 0, the 
action is regarded as not being equal to this “logic model”. 
The ToE “logic models” are: “framed_logic”, distinguished by “dir”, “nodir” 
and “ideal”; “no_border”, distinguished by “dir”, “nodir”, and “ideal”. Each “logic 
model” evaluates individual actions, and not the collective operator. Written in 
front of each “logic model” attribute, “first_player”, “second_player” or 
“third_player” refer to which agent’s action is considered. 
The logic model “frame_logic” with “dir”, short for “direction”, is 
isomorphic to ToH “logic”. When participants play one or multiple games of ToH, 
126  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
routine strength by feedback leads to human agents probably “carrying” the single 
player ToH logic into the three player ToE domain. 
A Boolean of 1 is assigned to “framed_logic” with “nodir”, short for “no 
direction”, when an action equals “framed_logic_dir”, disregarding direction. For 
example, consider a ToE game with the starting rod being the left rod, the goal rod 
being the right rod and three disks. In this case, the ideal path would lead to “state” 
2, and the action for “framed_logic_dir == 1” would be “S2 right”, and the action 
for “framed_logic_nodir == 1” would be “S2 left” or “S2 right” or “S2 none”. This 
logic is measured because during the legacy experiment, participants had orally 
reported to the experimenter that they kept on pressing direction buttons, even 
though they were informed that they did not influence the game. They remained 
pressing the direction buttons arbitrarily, either always or frequently, without 
using “framed_logic_dir”. They reported to do so to “stay in rhythm” or “out of 
routine” or “because they did not feel like ignoring the direction buttons 
altogether”. 
A Boolean of 1 is assigned to “framed_logic” with “ideal”, when an action 
equals “framed_logic_dir”, and direction “none” is chosen. For example, consider 
a ToE game with the starting rod being the left rod, the goal rod being the right rod 
and three disks. In this case, the ideal path would lead to “state” 2, and the action 
for “framed_logic_dir == 1” would be “S2 right”, and the action for 
“framed_logic_ideal == 1” would be “S2 none”. This logic is measured to identify 
players, who stick with the “framed_logic” but regarded the direction buttons as 
being useless. 
The three remaining “logic models” are analogous to the three mentioned 
“logic models”, however, they identify players who make the disk “jump edges”. 
All three versions of “no_border logic models” were introduced to identify players, 
who had obtained the “true rule” that “disks jump edges”. 
Assuming a ToE game with the starting rod being the left rod, the goal rod 
being the right rod and three disks. In this case, the ideal path would lead to “state” 
2, and the action for “no_border_dir == 1” would be “S1 left”, the action for 
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“no_border_nodir ==1” would be “S1 left” or “S1 right” or “S1 none”, and the action 
for “no_border_ideal ==1” would be “S1 none”. 
The following table 5 (own source) will list all mentioned examples of ToE 
“logic models”. 
ToE, with starting rod being left rod, goal rod being right rod, first move. 
Individual input Logic model Boolean  
























Table 5: All possible input combinations resulting in according logic category 
booleans 
  
With models of logic explained, i.e. how they are created, saved and for 
which purpose they were introduced, “expected” and “unexpected” states are to 
be discussed in the following. 
In a ToE game unexpected outputs can occur. For this reason, ToE.csv assigns 
a Boolean to each individual agent’s action, depending on the output state, 
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indicating whether (1) or not (0) the individual action lead to the expected outcome. 
This measurement was introduced to obtain data about individual decision-
making correlating with feedback or in other words, to obtain information about 
whether or not participants alter their strategy when they “do not see what they 
expected” or stick to a strategy when they “do see what they expected”. In order to 
make an assumption about, whether or not some output state was expected by a 
participant, several data attributes have to be known: start_state, output state, 
input, and direction. A data sheet lists all possible configurations (see e-appendix 
chapter3_exp_states_appendix_48). 
Several “expectation models” exist, with each assigned a Boolean: 
FL_exp_dir, short for “framed logic expectation considering direction”; 
FL_exp_ideal, short for “framed logic expectation not considering direction”; 
NB_exp_dir, short for “no borders logic expectation considering direction” and 
NB_exp_ideal, short for “no border logic expectation not considering direction”. 
For instance, consider a ToE game with the starting state being equal to state 
1, as modelled in the state-space (see figure 20). Some game-group operator results 
in the output state equal to state 2, as modelled in the state-space. An input equal 
to “S2 right” leads to Boolean 1 being assigned to “FL_exp_dir”. An input equal to 
“S2 none” leads to Boolean 1 being assigned to “FL_exp_ideal”. Both “expectation 
models” assume the “framed logic model”. When the “no border logical model” is 
assumed, two other “expectation models” are distinguished. Considering the same 
example start and output state by some game-group operator, an input equal to 
“S1 left” leads to Boolean 1 being assigned to “NB_exp_dir”. An input equal to “S1 
none” leads to Boolean 1 being assigned to “NB_exp_ideal”.  
How logic models and expectation models are to be interpreted depends on 
many factors. To reduce complexity, a heuristic approach is being taken: it is 
assumed that every input is being chosen deliberately. Therefore, with “expected 
models”, there does not exist an “exp_nodir” distinction. This, of course, excludes 
errors and deviations stemming from misclicking or non-deliberate inputs. It also 
makes data of “expectation models” meaningless, when the participant expected 
“nothing” or just “randomly” provided inputs. It is assumed such deviations occur 
rare enough, so that their number have a neglectable impact on the overall 
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experiment. However, when a participant shows many “framed_logic_nodir” 
actions, and next to no “dir” or “ideal” data, it can be assumed that data of 
“expectation models” will not be very meaningful, as they assume the direction to 
be selected with purpose.  
Building upon Rubinstein (2007) an action can be considered “reasonless”, 
when response times are short, and also by analyzing the actions’ logic and 
expected states, i.e. a set of actions that jump between different logic states, and has 
an expected state outcome similar to the randomizer bot results, can efficiently 
regarded as being “reasonless”. An action can be considered “instinctive” when 
response time are short, and e.g. both logic and expected states show that the agent 
still sticks with the single-player logic routine, being “framed” by its own mental 
model. While Rubinstein (2007) categorized actions intuitively, this thesis follows 
Rubinstein’s suggestion and base the categorization of actions between cognitive, 
instinctive and reasonless with “on other sources of information”, being the logic 
and expected states data (Rubinstein, 2007, p. 1258). This also reduces the risk to 
falsely interpret agent deviations from optimal behavior, e.g. by simple misklicking 
as non-standard preferences (Cason & Plott, 2014). 
This concludes all logic and expected states models. With all raw data and 
their creation explained, the next sub-chapter will focus on the participants, who 
conducted the main experiment. 
4.2 PARTICIPANTS 
180 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (MTurk) were recruited via “Amazon 
Mechanical Turk”, where online freelancers can be hired for various tasks, such as 
online questionnaires and experiments. From these 180 participants, data of 87 
MTurks could be used for statistical analysis. As indicated in Strunz & Chlupsa 
(2019), MTurks “are commonly recruited for behavioral experiments due to AMT’s 
workers pool size, low costs and being able to produce high-quality data fast 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011)“ (p. 114). Freelancers recruited via this 
platform show comparable bias and heuristic behavior as participants recruited by 
more traditional methods (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). MTurks are 
mainly motivated monetary compensation (Lovett et al., 2018), such that realistic 
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working conditions can be simulated with these participants, where thinking-time 
is associated with costs.  
There exist possible cultural influence on complex problem solving and 
adaptive decision making (Güss, 2011; Güss et al., 2012) – differences which are 
supposed to stem from different learning environments (Funke, 2014). Highly 
significant differences in non-routine problem solving performance and response 
times by country origin have been measured comparing 290 Indian, 262 US-
American and 51 German participants via the “Flag Run” experiment (Strunz, 
2019). For this reason, all 180 MTurks were restricted to US American MTurks. In 
order to ensure that MTurks were actually human and not automatically working 
machines, so called “bots”, approval rating, reflecting the MTurk’s „repution“ was 
set to “high levels” to ensure high quality data. High levels of MTurk reputation 
are defined to be the case with an approval rating above 95 % (Peer, Vosgerau, & 
Acquisti, 2013). When a task, referred to as “HIT” is opened to US American 
freelancers with a mandatory HIT approval rate of higher than 95 %, 11.126 
freelancers were “captured” in a study from 2015 (Stewart et al., 2015) and a more 
recent study stated there being 12.000 MTurk freelancers on average (Difallah, 
Filatova, & Ipeirotis, 2018). However, according to Difallah, Filatova & Ipeirotis 
(2018), these numbers are extreme underestimates due to variation. When 
correcting for propensities at least 100.000 to 200.000 freelancers are actively 
working. 
Even though no differences in NPS performance were measured regarding 
sex, and only low correlation regarding age were found in Strunz & Chlupsa (2019), 
age and sex was again asked for during the login-stage, as the reflective cognitive 
state was described as being influenced by age (Liebherr, Schiebener, Averbeck, & 
Brand, 2017) and as female participants have shown to change to a better strategy 
less efficiently in experiments under feedback (Casal, DellaValle, Mittone, & 
Soraperra, 2017). 
As MTurks’ behavior vary over the course of a 24hour day, with participants 
behaving less reflective on the weekends (Arechar, Kraft-Todd, & Rand, 2017), the 
final study was conducted on a regular working day, being the 6th of December. 
According to an online tracker showing hourly demographics of AMT Workers 
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(Difallah et al., 2018; Paolacci et al., 2010), the most recent data available at the time 
when the experiment was conducted, showed variation of US American freelancers 
throughout the entire month of September 2019 ranging between 52.58 % and 85.42 
%. The the majority of MTurks consisted of US Americans. Regarding sex, 49.04 % 
female and 50.96 % male US American MTurks participated from September 1st 
2019 to September 30th 2019 according to the online tracker (Paolacci et al., 2010), 
indicating well balanced monthly sex distribution. Dates for December, when the 
experiment was conducted, were not available at the time of research. 
Age distribution over workdays, being Monday to Friday, from the 1st of 
September 2019 to 30th of September 2019 retrieved from the online tracking tool 
(Paolacci et al., 2010) are listed in Table 6.  
Year of Birth  Percentage Age (as of 10/2019) 
2000-2010 1,268 % 9-18 
1990-2000 34,232 % 19-28 
1980-1990 36,87 % 29-38 
1970-1980 14,758 % 39-48 
1960-1970 9,46 % 49-48 
1950-1960 2,604 % 59-58 
1940-1950 0,598 % 69-78 
1910-1940 0,21 % 79-108 
Table 6: Year of Birth distribution of MTurks on workdays Mo-Fr, from 01.09.2019 
to 30.09.2019. 
[source: data acquired via online tracking tool by Paolacci et al., 2010] 
 
MTurk demographics from 2018 (Difallah et al., 2018) reported 55 % of US 
female participants and 45 % of US male participants. Household income for US 
MTurks were found to be below the average of the US population: with the US 
household median being “$57K” and the US MTurks household median being 
“around $47K”, and “while 26.5% of US households make more than $100K per 
year, for MTurk workers this percentage falls at 12.5%.” (Difallah et al., 2018, p. 4).  
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From 87 MTurks 29 self-reported being female and 58 self-reported being 
male, with an average of 33.16 years for both sexes.  
Actively monitoring the MTurk forums is recommended by researchers, in 
order to find out whether or not a HIT was discussed amongst the MTurks, which 
could have a negative influence on the experiment’s data quality (Cheung, Burns, 
Sinclair, & Sliter, 2017). When a pre-test of the main experiment was performed, 
minor information about the experiment was found to be shared online. A single 
participant rated the experiment as “fair” but also stated the disadvantage that one 
of his partner’s bad performance made her wait longer than necessary. Information 
being shared online cannot be avoided. For this reason, an after-survey was 
included, asking participants, whether or not they had already participated in this 
experiment before.  
As most participants are informed about playing in a group anyways, 
information being shared online was observed to be very limited, and as certainly 
not all MTurks are actively monitoring the MTurk forums, treatment diffusion 
effects are regarded as potentially low. For this reason, more transparency was 
regarded to outweigh its potential negative side-effects, and an official profile on 
“TurkerView” was created, where MTurks are able to retrieve information about 
the experimenter’s former payments, communication, number of rejections, 
approval response times, and number of blocked participants.  
As studies have found 40 % of MTurks working with “Amazon Mechanical 
Turk” as their primary job, the practical recommendation to act as “reputable 
employers” was followed (Brawley & Pury, 2016, p. 542), and more than 45 USD 
per hour was paid to MTurks on average over the course of 26 HITs. Since “unfair 
wages, and inaccurately listed time requirements were among the top five worst 
Requester behaviors” (Brawley & Pury, 2016, p. 542), calculating MTurks average 
pay was always aimed way above US minimum wage, when experience in early 
experiments was missing. For this reason, the high average hourly pay was 
achieved. 
In conclusion, from 180 participants, data of 87 US American MTurks was 
randomly selected from an online pool of potential participants. How many 
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MTurks can ultimately be reached is debated and dependent on the model used to 
approximate it. According to literature, certainly more than 11-thousand 
freelancers via “Amazon Mechanical Turk” were reached, and numbers could 
extent to more than 100-thousand. In order to being able to rely on the most recent 
statistical results, data from September 2019 was used to determine US female/male 
distribution, and age during working days.  
4.3 PROCEDURE  
Participants were provided with in-depth instructions and a text field, where 
the according participants ID was supposed to be entered, as shown in Figure 20. 
Upon having clicked on “(Click to expand)” each participant was provided 
with the following instructions: 
 
Survey Instructions reading time: 2-3 minutes. Trouble Shooting section included. 
Make sure to read. 
Complete an online experiment consisting of 12 levels of Tower of 
Hanoi. Instructions are included ingame. Bonus pay for best 10 %. 
=When experiment lasts longer than 51 minutes, submit with Worker ID and time 
played, you will be approved if you did not idle on purpose.= 
Go to https://www.curiosity-data.com/ and enter 1992 as "Session Code". 
Figure 20: MTurk client side view of HIT 
[source: own source]. 
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Please provide us with your sex and age. You will be given an ID at the end. 
Enter this ID as your Surveycode. Do not provide me with your worker ID. 
This experiment may easily last longer than 30 minutes. Do not start this HIT 
when you do not have enough time. 
You may have to wait up to 10min at the beginning. 
You may have to wait up to 14min during the experiment. 
Do not leave the game unattended. If you are kicked due to inactivity, I will under 
no circumstances approve your work. 
Check the information box on the left of your screen during the game. Its contents 
may change and are important. 
Make sure to leave this window open as you complete the survey. When you 
are finished, you will return to this page to paste the ID into the box. Not your worker 
ID.  
About me: 
I am registered on TurkerView (Ulrich Strunz), if you want to leave a rating. 
You can easily reach me via email, I will answer. 
My experiments are unique. Thanks for helping me out. 
Compensation: 
In case you are unable to submit in time, I offer compensation in some cases. My 
time is limited. I am also human. Please be patient in this case, I am working with 
hundreds of MTurks simultaneously, alone. Leave me a reminder Email in case you did 
not receive funds. Screenshots help, so you can prove your progress. 
=When experiment lasts longer than 51 minutes, submit with Worker ID and time 
played, you will be approved if you did not idle on purpose.= 
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Please do not spam me with multiple emails, I will listen to your explanations in 
case something went wrong. 
Survey: 
There is a pre-survey included. Please make sure to answer it. I need to know if 
you are from USA. 
There is an after-survey included. Please make sure to answer it. I need to know 
if you have played this experiment before. 
Experiment: 
Using a tablet or notebook will be ideal. Mobile phones might have a too small 
screen to display all information properly. 
The experiment is not bugged. It has been tested with more than 200 participants 
by now. I have no influence over the setup you are using. Old hardware or missing 
drivers may result in bad latency. Check the trouble shooting section for more details. 
Trouble-Shooting: 
!!! Some MTurks experience problems when using Google Chrome since 
its last update. Clearing your cache might be necessary before starting the game. 
!!! 
The game has been tested with Chrome, IE, Firefox, Yandex Browsers. No 
trouble was experienced. 
In case you accidentally close your browser, just come back. Your experiment 
progress will be saved. 
  
Several Turkers reported a problem with the publish button not working. This is 
an AMT specific problem. The best option is to: 
136  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
1) Inform me via Email when an error occurs. 
2) Wait. Sometimes the button will function after 5 min of waiting time. 
  
In case the proceed button does not work: 
1) Make sure you have typed in 1992 as session code. 
2) Make sure to have chosen your SEX using the drop-down menu and have 
provided us with your AGE using integers. 
3) Since the latest Chrome update, some unsolvable (from my side) issues were 
reported, when using this Web-Browser. 
 After going to https://www.curiosity-data.com/, participants had to self-
report their sex and age. After a valid input they could start the experiment by 
clicking the “Proceed” button. The entire experiment consisted of a Tower of 
Hanoi/Tower of Europe experiment, and an after-survey. The experiment came 
with five different information conditions, represented by five experiment groups. 
The participant was assigned to one of the five experiment groups automatically 
by login order, as explained in the former chapter. Participants were also assigned 
automatically to game groups by login order, each game group consisting of three 
players, as explained in the former chapter. Each information condition 
(experiment group) consisted of 13 games or levels. The first 7 games were single 
player games. The last 6 games were multiplayer games. The first game was added 
to give players enough time to read popup and help-text information, and data 
collected during the first game was not used for analysis. The first game was 
considered as a buffer level. The second popup showed up at game 8. The goal rod 
changed during the single player and multiplayer games. Each game was played 
with three rods, referred to as either left, center or right rod. During the first four 
single player games (buffer level included) the goal rod was set to be the right rod. 
During the last three single player games, the goal rod was set to be the center rod. 
The first three multiplayer games were played with the right rod being the goal 
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rod, while the last three multiplayer games set the goal rod to be the center rod. All 
games in all information conditions were played with three disks. Figure 21 (own 
source) shows the entire setup.  
For each single player game, a timer of 2 minutes was preset. When the timer 
ran out a level was automatically ended, skipping to a “Level Completed” screen, 
which was also automatically closed after 1 second, having shown the next game 
screen. The single player timer automatically started as soon as the game screen 
was shown.  
For each multiplayer game a timer of 3 minutes was preset. When the timer 
ran out a level was automatically ended, skipping to a “Level Completed” screen, 
which was also automatically closed after 1 second, having shown the next game 
screen. If the last game 13 was skipped in such a way, the after-survey was 
automatically displayed. 
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When a game group was not filled with three participants before the 
experiment started, a waiting screen appeared. After 5min of timeframe an 
automated bot participant was added to the group. If for some reason a player left 
a game group during the game, and Curiosity IO registered this player as being 
disconnected, a bot was added to the group after 10min. This feature was 
implemented for ethical reasons, so that MTurks were still able to solve the 
experiment in time. When a game group was filled with three agents, the actual 
experiment started with the first game level. 
The first level called “Game 0” includes a popup with the following message: 
 
Figure 21: Administrator perspective of entire experimental setup using Curiosity 
IO framework 
[source: own source]. 
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“--- Do not worry about the timer. Take your time to read the following! 
--- 
Your task is to solve 12 games of Tower of Hanoi. 
6 training games, and then 6 performance games. An additional game 
(this game) is added, so you can read these instructions. 
For each game a timer will be displayed. When the timer reaches zero, 
the next game will automatically start. 
Try to solve each level in as few steps as possible. The best 10 % of all 
participants will win a 2.00 USD bonus (only if you provide me with the ID 
displayed at the end of the experiment, do NOT provide me with your 
worker ID). 
Your performance will not be measured during the first 6 practice 
games. 
Your performance will be measured during the 6 performance games.  
Important:  
1) During performance games, the timer will start AFTER your first 
move. So you can take your time reading pop-up information. 
2) Pay close attention to the instructions on the left-hand side as they 
might change. A pop-up will be displayed when additional information is 
added to the instructions, to make sure you notice the change. 
3) Every piece of information displayed is true. You can trust all written 
information.” 
Instructions displayed on the left side included the following text: 
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“Instruction Game 0 
(no performance measured) 
The objective of the puzzle is to move the entire stack to the indicated 
goal rod, either center or right rod, obeying the following simple rules: 
Only one disk can be moved at a time. 
Each move consists of taking the upper disk from one of the stacks and 
placing it on top of another stack or on an empty rod. 
No larger disk may be placed on top of a smaller disk. 
Click on the disk you want to move first. Drag-and-Drop does not 
work. After that, you will have to figure out the rest for yourself.  
With 3 disks, the puzzle can be solved in 7 moves. 
Additional information: 
No additional information so far.” 
The instruction text did not change throughout the first 7 games, except in 
the integer referring to the current level being played. 
A second popup appeared in all five conditions with starting of game 8, and 
instruction texts differed amongst conditions. All instruction texts were altered as 
follows: 
“Performance Game 7 (performance is measured)“, 
therefore, participants were informed about that their performance was now 
evaluated during the coming levels. 
Instructions texts then differed amongst the five conditions (experiment 
groups, EG) in the “Additional Information:” part. The second popups differed 
from the first popup by stating “You are now starting with 6 performance games.” 
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and with exception of experiment group 1, the second popup also contained the 
warning phrase “Attention! Additional information was added to the instructions. 
Make sure to read!”.  This warning was implemented in order to make sure that 
participants actually read the additional information. The additional information 
contents were written in capital letters to induce disfluency, in order to enhance 
chances of “promoting more comprehensive consideration of opposing views”, as 
disfluency in writing style has been proven to disrupt confirmation bias 
(Hernandez & Preston, 2013, p. 178).  
Instruction text content is summarized in the following table 7.  
EG Game 8 instruction text “Additional Information:” Warning 
1 “No additional information.” No. 
2 “YOU ARE PLAYING IN A TEAM OF THREE HUMANS 
DURING THE NEXT 6 GAMES. YOU ALL HAVE 
INFLUENCE ON THE MOVEMENT OF THE DISCS AND 
SHARE CONTROL OVER THE GAME ACCORDING TO 
HIDDEN RULES. THE RULES DO NOT CHANGE DURING 
THE NEXT 6 GAMES.” 
Yes. 
3 “YOU ARE PLAYING IN A TEAM OF THREE HUMANS 
DURING THE NEXT 6 GAMES. YOU ALL HAVE 
INFLUENCE ON THE MOVEMENT OF THE DISCS AND 
SHARE CONTROL OVER THE GAME ACCORDING TO 
HIDDEN RULES. THE RULES DO NOT CHANGE DURING 
THE NEXT 6 GAMES. 
SINCE YOU CANNOT COMMUNICATE WITH EACH 
OTHER, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY FOR YOU TO FIND OUT 
THESE RULES.” 
Yes. 
4 “YOU ARE PLAYING IN A TEAM OF THREE HUMANS 
DURING THE NEXT 6 GAMES. YOU ALL HAVE 
INFLUENCE ON THE MOVEMENT OF THE DISCS AND 
SHARE CONTROL OVER THE GAME ACCORDING TO 
HIDDEN RULES. THE RULES DO NOT CHANGE DURING 
THE NEXT 6 GAMES. 
Yes. 
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DURING THE NEXT 6 GAMES THE DIRECTIONAL 
BUTTONS DO NOT INFLUENCE THE GAME AT ALL. ALL 
THEY DO IS CHANGE COLOR WHEN BEING PRESSED.” 
5 “YOU ARE PLAYING IN A TEAM OF THREE HUMANS 
DURING THE NEXT 6 GAMES. YOU ALL HAVE 
INFLUENCE ON THE MOVEMENT OF THE DISCS AND 
SHARE CONTROL OVER THE GAME ACCORDING TO 
HIDDEN RULES. THE RULES DO NOT CHANGE DURING 
THE NEXT 6 GAMES. 
SINCE YOU CANNOT COMMUNICATE WITH EACH 
OTHER, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY FOR YOU TO FIND OUT 
THESE RULES. 
DURING THE NEXT 6 GAMES THE DIRECTIONAL 
BUTTONS DO NOT INFLUENCE THE GAME AT ALL. ALL 
THEY DO IS CHANGE COLOR WHEN BEING PRESSED.” 
Yes. 
Table 7: Instruction texts for according information conditions in „ill-defined“ 
stages 
[source: own source].  
 
With game level 8 being reached, participants played 6 rounds of Tower of 
Europe, in identical manner as explained in the former chapter. Each experiment 
group contained different additional information, defining the five different 
information conditions, which are to be explained in the following. 
The first information condition (EG: 1) did not contain any further 
information. Participants were not informed about the fact that they did now share 
control with two more agents. This information conditions is now referred to as 
“no information condition” (N-IC). 
The second information condition (EG: 2) informed participants about them 
sharing control during all 6 performance games with two other agents in 
accordance to hidden rules, which will not change. This information condition is 
now referred to as “GDM information condition” (G-IC). 
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The third information condition (EG: 3) informed participants about them 
sharing control during all 6 performance games with two other agents in 
accordance to hidden rules, which will not change. Participants also received the 
“discouraging” information that due to a lack of communication potential these 
hidden rules will likely remain hidden. This information condition is now referred 
to as “disillusioning information condition” (D-IC). 
The fourth information condition (EG: 4) informed participants about them 
sharing control during all 6 performance games with two other agents in 
accordance to hidden rules, which will not change. Participants also received the 
information about the directional buttons not having any function besides 
changing color when being pressed. This information condition is now referred to 
as “routine information condition” (R-IC). 
The fifth information condition (EG: 5) contained all additional information 
from G-IC, D-IC, R-IC. This information condition is now referred to as “combined 
information condition” (C-IC). 
Additional information content was displayed throughout all ToE games, 
and did not disappear or alter its contents at any moment. 
Having solved all 6 ToE games, participants had to answer an after-survey, 
simply asking “Have you done the experiment "Flag Run" before?”, which 
participants were able to answer by either choosing “Yes” or “No”, after which the 
experiment ended, and participants were provided with their ID.  
The following chapter will derive hypotheses, list dependent and 
independent variables and how data was treated. 
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5 SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The experiment’s purpose was to create a decision-making domain related to 
a VUCA domain – where agents had to solve a complex problem – and to analyze 
how their behavior changed when provided different global information. Another 
major aspect of the experiment was to “train” the agents first in decision-making 
in isolation (routine-strategy), followed by randomly grouping them into a “game” 
of three agents afterwards. The agents were unable to communicate, did not receive 
information about the former actions of their co-agents, but were always able to 
collectively see the outcome of their shared control over the game. The following 
research questions are to be answered: 
1) Does public information about environmental change (“You are 
sharing control with humans!”) favor change of routine-strategy, when such new 
environmental conditions do not influence the routine-strategy’s performance? 
2) Does influence of environmental change (Middle rod is goal rod.) on 
routine-strategy’s performance favor change of routine-strategy? 
3) Will deviation distance from routine-strategy depend on the type of 
public information, i.e. information about man-made uncertainty will lead to 
higher deviation from routine-strategy than from unspecified uncertainty (no 
further public information)? 
4) Will public information about hidden rules favor overcoming parts 
of the routine-strategy? 
5) Is group performance in the complex problem-solving game 
dependent on individual decision-making expertise in routine-strategy, when the 
routine-strategy statistically benefits the group’s performance in the game where 
no communication is possible? 
5.1 DERIVATION OF HYPOTHESES 
The first research question of this thesis asks, whether information provided 
in G-IC, D-IC, R-IC and C-IC influences participants in changing their strategy 
during ToE games 8, 9, and 10, which they used to solve the ToH games. ToE games 
146  ULRICH G. STRUNZ 
8, 9, and 10, can be solved with certainty in seven steps, when all game group agents 
stick to the framed logic, and can be solved with high probability in seven steps, 
when all game group agents mostly stick to the framed logic. Therefore, sticking 
with the framed logic during the first three ToE games will solve the GDM problem 
under uncertainty efficiently. As experimental results showed that individual 
strategies are only altered by environmental change, if such change had an 
influence on the strategy’s performance, it was assumed that when participants had 
proven “framed logic” routine and ToH expertise, participants of such a game 
group will unlikely change their strategy.  
The participants “routine” was derived from the proportion of either 
“Framed Logic” or “No Border Logic” level-solving moves or actions. An action 
solving a ToH game is by definition always either solved via a “Framed Logic” or 
“No Border Logic” action, and can never be both. When neither a “Framed Logic” 
nor “No Border Logic” action solved a level, it was because the timer ran out. If a 
player listed more “Framed Logic” (F-L) or more “No Border Logic” (NB-L) values 
at actions, which solved a ToH level, the according logic was assumed to be the 
routine strategy. When a participant listed an equal proportion of F-L and NB-L 
actions that solved ToH levels, the routine strategy was regarded as unclear and 
therefore reported as “mixed” (Mx-L). 
ToH expertise of each individual was expressed by an index, and was the 
result of the participant performance during ToH games 2 to 7.  
ToH expert knowledge levels or ToH expertise was measured by looking at 
different parameters from ToH levels 2 to 7: 
- How many ToH levels were solved? 
- Did participants solve at least one ToH game in 7 steps? 
- What was the least number of steps required in any ToH game? 
- How many ToH games were solved with 7 steps? 
- How many steps in total were required to solve the ToH games? 
Ideally, if an agent solved all six ToH levels (excluding the first game) in 7 
steps using F-L, this agent would have proven the highest amount of expertise, and 
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would have shown the F-L to be the routine-strategy. If an agent solved all ToH 
levels in 7 steps using NB-L, this agent would also have proven the highest amount 
of expertise, and would have shown the NB-L to be the routine-strategy. 
Expertise in F-L routine was expected to have the side-effect that game 
groups with high levels of F-L expert knowledge would solve the first three ToE 
levels with higher efficiency. The ToE rules were therefore not expected to affect 
strategy performance that stem from a framed strategy routine. ToE rules were 
however expected to influence strategy performance that stem from a no border 
strategy routine. Information about routine strategy and expertise levels was saved 
for each participant. Table 8 (own source) shows all data mentioned above by 
example, to express routine strategy used, and according expertise. 
Information Value 
Strategy proportion F-L (6) NB-L (0) 
Routine strategy (F-L/NB-L/Mx-L) F-L 
Number of failed ToH games 0 
Least number of steps required 7 
Number of 7-steps games 2 
Steps in total 60 
Table 8: Results of example experiment for explanation, part 1. 
In order to create expertise categories, a pretest with 30 participants, all US-
American MTurks, was conducted, using the identical setup as being used in the 
main experiment. Three participants had idled throughout the entire experiment, 
and were not considered. The remaining 27 US-American MTurks’ results 
regarding routine strategy used, and expertise are summarized in table 9 (own 
source). 
Average values of strategy proportion regard 189 solving actions from 1623 
in total. From 189 actions by 27 participants, only 4 NB-L actions solved a game, 
performed by three distinct players. By definition all 27 players were using F-L as 
their routine strategy. 
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17 out of 27 participants completed all ToH games in time, not failing a single 
game. 8 out of 27 participants failed at one ToH game, by not completing it in time. 
Two out of 27 participants failed at three ToH games, by not completing them in 
time. 
24 out of 27 participants completed at least one ToH game in 7 steps. Three 
out of 27 participants failed to solve at least one ToH game in 7 steps, having 
required 8, 9, and 10 steps during their best games. 
Information (n = 27) Value (on average) 
Strategy proportion, average F-L (5.33) NB-L (0.15) 
Routine strategy (F-L/NB-L/Mx-L) all used F-L 
Number of failed ToH games, average 0.59 
Least number of steps required, average 7.22 
Number of 7-steps games, average 2.81 
Steps in total, average, n = 17 53.53 
Table 9: Results of example experiment for explanation, part 2. 
 
Results regarding the amount of achieved 7-steps games are listed in the 
following table 10 (own source), 15 out of 27 participants achieved between three 
and 6 perfect 7-steps ToH games. Only one out of 27 participants managed to solve 
all ToH games with 7 actions. 
When participants who failed to solve at least one ToH game are excluded, 
the remaining 17 participants required 53.53 actions in total to solve all 6 ToH 
games. It took the two participants who failed to compete at least one ToH game in 
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Table 10: Results of example experiment for explanation, part 3. 
No participant who solved either 5 or 6 ToH games with 7 actions failed to 
solve a single ToH game. Only one participant who solved 4 ToH games with 7 
actions failed to solve at least one ToH game. Two participants who solved three 
ToH games with 7 actions failed to solve at least one ToH game. Five participants 
who solved two ToH games with 7 actions failed to solve at least one ToH game. 
Two participants who solved either none or just one ToH game with 7 actions failed 
to solve at least one ToH game. No participant who required 60 or more steps in 
total to solve all ToH games managed to solve more than two games with just 7 
actions. 
From these results, three expertise categories are established using the 
number of ToH games solved in 7 steps and number of failed ToH games. The 
highest expert rank is assigned to participants, solving 4 or more ToH games with 
7 actions, not having failed more than one ToH game. The medium expert rank is 
assigned to participants solving two or three ToH games with 7 actions, not having 
failed more than 1 ToH game. The low expert rank is assigned to participants 
solving none or one ToH game with 7 actions.   
By this definition all 27 out of 27 participants were assigned the routine 
strategy “F-L”. 10 out of 27 participants from the pretest were assigned an expert 
rank of “high”, 10 out of 27 participants were assigned a “medium” expertise, and 
7 out of 27 participants were assigned “low” expertise. 
The 7 low expertise (L) participants collectively failed to solve 8 ToH games 
in total. The 10 medium expertise (M) participants collectively failed to solve 5 ToH 
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games in total. The 10 high expertise (H) participants collectively failed to solve 
only one ToH game. From these 27 participants only 15 produced valuable data, as 
12 participants were either part of a bot-agent game group, disconnected or were 
part of a game group with players who idled throughout the single player phase. 
From these five game groups, two game groups were in the G-IC, two were in the 
D-IC, and one group in the R-IC. The according expertise levels are listed in table 
12 (own source).  
From the small pretest alone, only 50 % of data could be used for analysis. 
Therefore, a rather large number of participants was expected to be required for 
the main experiment. It was estimated that for more than 180 game groups per 
condition, about 6000 human agents were required. Accordingly, 300 participants 
were expected to produce 10 game groups per condition. Even with 6000 human 
agents, analyzes would have still been limited by many factors, being discussed in 
chapter 5.  
As participants will be assigned to a bot agent after 5 minutes of waiting time 
due to ethical reasons, a game group that contained a bot-agent and was part of 
any other information condition other than N-IC was considered as a “deception” 
condition. This is because participants of such game groups were informed about 
playing with “human agents”. Therefore, game groups having bot-agents in any 
information condition other than N-IC were considered “deceptive” and were 
excluded fully from data analysis. In order to enhance chances of filling game 
groups with human agents, the main experiment was divided into several parts, 
with each part collecting US-American MTurks at different day times.  
Due to the pretest results group expertise levels were expected to be mixed; 
from five game groups, four showed distinct levels of group expertise. Ten 
different group expertise levels are possible, rated as “1” for “L, L, L” and “10” for 
“H, H, H”. Group expertise was expected to be normally distributed, confirming 
experimental studies that while repetition leads to better strategy use, each 
participant differs greatly in their individual ability to learn ToH rules (Janssen, De 
Mey, Egger, & Witteman, 2010). 
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The group expertise level is calculated by individual expertise levels. The 
order, by which the expertise group ratings are listed, favors “group quality over 
individual quality”. In other words, a group consisting of 2 L experts and 1 H expert 
ranks lower in group expertise than a group with 1 L expert and 2 M experts. Table 
11 shows all possible group expertise rankings resulting from individual expertise. 
Individual expertise levels in group Resulting group expertise 
L, L, L 1 
L, L, M  2 
L, L, H  3 
L, M, M 4 
L, M, H 5 
M, M, M 6 
M, M, H 7 
L, H, H 8 
M, H, H 9 
H, H, H 10 
Table 11: Group expertise rated as an integer in order from individual expertise 
levels 
[source: own source]. 
 
Another order of preference that should be noted was L, H, H (8) over M, M, 
H (7). From a set theoretical viewpoint L, H was preferred over M, M. However, 
M, M, M (6) was preferred over L, M, H (5), where in this context M, M was 
preferred over L, H.  Therefore, from a purely logical viewpoint, a contradiction 
exits. The reason why M, M, M was preferred over L, M, H is because of consistency 
of skill in this group, as one single participant, who behaved “less than wise” was 
able to derail an entire group strategy. This might seem to be a weak argument then 
for the preference of group expertise 8 over 7, however, to acquire expertise level 
H requires very high precision in ToH decision-making. A group with expertise 
level 8 consists of two highly skilled experts, rendering the possibility of “less than 
wise behavior” of one single participant less likely. Of course, the order of group 
expertise still is debatable, but thorough thought was certainly put into its creation. 
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Participant IDs Expertise Levels IC 
4, 5, 6 M, M, L (4) D-IC 
7, 8, 9 H, L, L (3) R-IC 
16, 17, 18 M, H, H (9) G-IC 
31, 32, 33 L, M, H  (5) G-IC 
34, 35, 36 L, H, M (5) D-IC 
Table 12: Results of example experiment for explanation, part 4. 
Coming back to the first research question, several variables were identified. 
Public information is either lacking in the N-IC or comes in four distinct forms in 
the G-IC, D-IC, R-IC or C-IC. Environmental conditions are all such circumstances 
that lie outside of the agent’s control. Interpretations are not regarded as being part 
of the environmental conditions, even when “wrong interpretations” are facilitated 
by environmental conditions, as explained by two examples: as participants of the 
N-IC are not informed about playing with other agents, it is expected that 
participants of the N-IC interpreted outcomes that deviated from their expectation 
stemming from “error”, such as software bugs, glitches, randomizing variables, 
wrong inputs, and not due to human influences; as participants of the G-IC are not 
informed about there being next to chance of obtaining the true hidden rules, it is 
expected that participants of the G-IC interpreted outcomes that deviated from 
their expectation stemming from “error”, such as bad expertise of co-agents, 
human mistakes or “bad cognitive skill” by co-agents.  
The distinct information in each IC are considered public information and 
being part of the environmental conditions, however, their interpretations are 
considered as being in control of each agent. Therefore, “public information about 
environmental change” is part of environmental conditions, lying outside of the 
agent’s control, whereas their interpretation and ultimately their impact on the 
individual’s behavior is considered to be part of each agent’s control. 
Change stemming from environmental conditions are considered as being 
interpreted either as environmental or social influences. Environmental influences 
were defined as all influences which are not “man-made”. Social influences were 
defined as all influences which are “man-made”. It was expected that 
environmental influence interpretations (EI-I) led to participants trying to 
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maximize control over expected outcomes by sticking their routine strategy. It was 
expected that social influence interpretations (SI-I) led to participants trying to 
maximize control over expected outcomes by deviating from their routine strategy. 
The fluent transition from deviation distances stemming from EI-I and SI-I are 
explained by listing all information conditions. 
In the N-IC participants were expected to interpret deviations from expected 
outcomes mostly stemming from environmental influences, as the N-IC 
participants were not informed about there being human co-agents.  
In the G-IC participants were expected to interpret deviations from expected 
outcomes mostly stemming from social influences, as the G-IC participants were 
not informed implicitly that no agent was able to “outsmart” the hidden rules, 
other than by sticking to the regular single player rules. 
In the D-IC participants were expected to interpret deviations from expected 
outcomes stemming less from social influences than in the G-IC, as the D-IC 
participants were implicitly informed that all agents were “still putting their 
trousers on one leg at a time” and that looking for “patterns” to “outsmart” the 
hidden ruleset was a waste of time. D-IC participants were expected to interpret 
deviations from expected outcomes stemming less from environmental influences 
than in the N-IC, as D-IC participants still knew that they had “some control” over 
the outcomes, and in fact they did.  
The algorithm was written in such a way that each participant always had 
the chance of decisive impact on the group action’s outcome, and always had some 
impact on the group action’s outcome, while never having a chance of full control 
over the outcome, as order of inputs were decisive. Even if the entire algorithm was 
known, communication would be required in order to synchronize order of inputs 
with other co-agents, to obtain full control over the group action’s outcome. 
Although not entirely impossible, this thesis expects no game group to optimize 
control over game group outcomes. When the goal rod was the right rod, a game 
group could only “seemingly” optimize game group output. When the right rod 
was set to be the goal rod, a game group could solve ToE in 7 steps, with each 
individual agents sticking to the F-L, disregarding order of inputs. This was not the 
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case when the goal rod was the center rod. When the center rod was the goal rod, 
by F-L the optimal move was “S1”, with “S1, S1, S1” resulting in the small disc. The 
only realistic way of doing so without communication was if a game group stuck 
to a certain “rhythm”, meaning that order of information was stable, and at least 
one participant provided an input outside of F-L at the right moment. It was 
expected that such a dynamic decision-making equilibrium would not be observed. 
In the R-IC participants were expected to behave similar to G-IC participants, 
if R-IC participants (mostly) did still use directional buttons; should R-IC 
participants (mostly) refrain from using the directional buttons, then greater 
deviations than in the G-IC were expected. As the environmental condition “The 
directional buttons do not influence the game at all” will never influence any 
strategy performance, some participants in the R-IC were expected to still use the 
directional buttons due to routine strength. In other words, routine strength of 
pressing directional buttons was considered to dominate deviations from routine 
logic in some cases. Due to routine strength it was expected that participants who 
refrain from using the directional buttons, were still using them in some cases. R-
IC participants were expected to deviate more from their routine strategy than N-
IC, and more than D-IC, due to SI-I. 
In the C-IC participants were expected to behave similar to D-IG participants 
when directional buttons (mostly) were used, and greater deviations were expected 
when directional buttons (mostly) were not used. C-IC participants were expected 
to deviate more from their routine strategy than N-IC participants, less than G-IC 
participants, and less than R-IC participants. 
In order to formulate the according hypotheses, deviation distance from 
routine strategy has to be defined and expressed by an index in the following. For 
now all mentioned expected deviation distances (dd) in each condition are ordered 
as follows: 
dd(N-IC) < dd(D-IC) <= dd(C-IC) < dd(G-IC) <= dd(R-IC). 
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Therefore, the greatest deviations from routine strategy were expected in the 
R-IC and the least deviations from routine strategy were expected in the N-IC 
conditions. 
The greatest expected distance from routine strategy using the pretest was 
expected to be observed between D-IC and R-IC, as no N-IC data was available. In 
order to create the deviation distance from the routine strategy, several steps have 
to be taken. This is to be explained by example of the pretest again, using data of 
two game groups.  
First the proportion of ToH routine logic actions to the total amount of ToH 
actions were measured in two ways, being “ToH total” and ToH parts”. A ToH 
total index of e.g. 0.6842 with ToH routine F-L means that ToH games’ actions from 
level 2 to 7 were in 68.42 % of the cases F-L actions. A ToH parts index of “1,0 / 0,5” 
means that ToH games’ actions from level 2 to 4 were in 100 % of the cases F-L 
actions and from level 5 to 7 were in 0.5 % of the cases F-L actions.  
Since in ToH game 5 the goal rod changed from being the right rod to being 
the center rod, most players failed to solve ToH game 5 as efficiently as ToH game 
4, as players would use their level 4 strategy to begin level 5 with actions that 
deviate from the ideal path. The position of the goal rod was considered being a 
change of environmental conditions which affects a participant’s former routine 
strategy. Therefore, F-L has sub-routine strategies regarding the position of the goal 
rod. This effect was also expected in ToE games, since in game 4 the goal rod 
changed from being the right rod to being the center rod.   
The highest proportion of ToH logical actions was achieved by participant 7, 
who was ranked with high expertise. Lowest ToH logic proportion was achieved 
by participant 8, who was ranked with low expertise. It was expected that expertise 
rank and ToH total were to correlate, leading to the first two hypotheses. All 
hypotheses, dependent and independent variables are to be listed in the following 
sub-chapter. 
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5.2 HYPOTHESES AND VARIABLES 
As expertise and logic proportions were expected to correlate, and goal rod 
change was expected to influence performance, the first two hypotheses are as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the individual expertise rank, the higher the logic 
proportion “ToH total” is.  
Hypothesis 2: Change of goal rod during ToH and ToE games in the 4th level 
leads to the first actions in the same level deviating from the ideal path.  
As can be seen in table 13, all participants in the D-IC conditions stuck closely 
to their routine strategy’s logic during ToE levels one to three, obtaining logic 
proportion levels of 95.24 %, 100 % and 100%. Even though participants were facing 
environmental change, this change did not influence the routine strategy’s 
performance. As expected, the participants did therefore not deviate from their 
routine strategy at all (participants 5 and 6) or not nearly at all (participant 4). It is 
expected that participants of the N-IC will significantly show lower values of 
routine logic deviation than D-IC, leading to the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the N-IC condition show the highest logic 
proportions in ToE levels one to three, expressed by “ToE parts 1”, followed by 
proportions of D-IC participants, then C-IC, G-IC and R-IC. 
As expected, routine logic deviations in the R-IC condition were higher than 
in the D-IC condition. While playing ToE participants 4, 5 and 6 followed their 
routine logic in 76.27 %, 86.44 % and 74.58 % of all cases, and participants 7, 8, and 
9 followed their routine logic in only 23.57 %, 24.29 % and 22.86 % of all cases. N-
IC participants were expected to show even higher values in logic proportion than 
D-IC participants. This leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Participants in the N-IC condition show the highest total ToE 
logic proportion values, followed by proportions of D-IC participants, then C-IC, 
G-IC and R-IC. 
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By example of the small sample sized pretest, routine logic deviations grew 
in the D-IC condition, which was expected, due to the change of the goal rod 
position influencing strategy performance. However, the goal rod change during 
ToE games has to be treated differently from the goal rod change during ToH 
games. During ToH games the goal rod change will influence performance due to 
participants e.g. not paying attention to such change, using their F-L logic which 
would be ideal when the goal rod is “right” not “center”. This loss in performance 
can be quickly corrected during ToH by becoming aware of the goal rod change 
and adapting the F-L to the new goal rod position. It was expected that participants 
who deviate from the ideal path in ToH level 5, but performed well during ToH 
level 4, will either keep on “trembling” throughout ToH levels 5 to 7 where the goal 
rod was changed to being “center” or quickly learn and adapt their F-L to the new 
ToH goal rod conditions. However, ToH games participants are not expected to be 
“surprised” be their actions’ output, measured in “expected states” deviation.   
Goal rod change in ToE level 4 on the other hand also influences the participants’ 
expected states deviation, as for example an individual action input of “S1 r” might 
result in the small disk “seemingly” travelling to the left or might even result in the 
medium or large sized disk being moved; such cases are expected to create an 
“expected states deviation”. Such expected states deviation can lead to new 
interpretation of each individual agent. The influence of the environmental 
condition “goal rod change” in ToE level 4 is expected to be of lower influence to 
ToE routine logic deviations in levels 4, 5, and 6 than the “expected states 
deviation” experience. In order to measure this, ToE parts 1 logic deviations are 
also considered, where no goal rod change is yet performed. It was expected that 
“expected states deviation” is a better predictor of ToE logic deviation than the 
environmental condition “goal rod change”, as the former is expected to lead to 
interpretation changes, inducing deeper uncertainty than by the latter. Therefore, 
expected states deviations are expected to influence ToE logic deviations in all 
conditions of the experiment. In addition, higher expected states deviations were 
considered to lead to individual behavior which increasingly is not “captured” by 
any logic category, leading to low “logic marker” values. The logic marker reports 
the amount of actions in ToE games that are “0” in any logic category divided by 
total amount of actions. In other words, high values of expected states deviations 
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were expected to make participants behave “randomly” from the perspective of the 
experimenter. 
Hypothesis 5: The higher expected states deviation proportion values with 
respect to routine strategy during all ToE conditions, the higher logic deviation 
proportion values are. 
Hypothesis 6: The higher expected states deviation proportion values with 
respect to routine strategy during all ToE conditions, the lower the logic marker 
proportion values are. 




condition ToH total 
(parts) 
ToE total  
(parts 1 / 2) 
4 M F-L  F-L dir D-IC 0,6842 (1,0 / 0,5) 0,7627 (0,9524 / 
0,6579) 
5 M F-L  F-L dir D-IC 0,6111 (0,56 / 
0,6552) 
0,8644 (1,0 / 
0,7895) 
6 L F-L  F-L dir D-IC 0,5 (0,5227 / 
0,4737) 
0,7458 (1,0 / 
0,6053) 
7 H F-L F-L 
nodir 
R-IC 0,7037 (0,6071 / 
0,8077) 
0,2357 (0,1806 / 
0,2941) 
8 L F-L F-L 
nodir 
R-IC 0,4386 (0,2692 / 
0,5806) 
0,2429 (0,2361 / 
0,25) 
9 L F-L F-L 
nodir 
R-IC 0,6250 (0,6757 / 
0,5714) 
0,2286 (0,1806 / 
0,2794) 
Table 13: Results of example experiment for explanation, part 5. 
R-IC and C-IC are expected to create higher expected states deviation from 
routine strategy as these conditions “take away” the basis for reinforcing the 
routine strategy, i.e. by informing about the “uselessness” of the direction button. 
It was expected that during R-IC expected states deviation values with respect to 
routine strategy were higher during ToE parts 1 than in all other conditions.  
As the logic deviation distance of the G-IC was expected to be higher than of 
the C-IC, but the expected states distance of the C-IC was expected to be higher 
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than of the G-IC, ToE game group performance, measured in total amount of 
required steps to solve all six ToE games, are considered, to indicate, whether logic 
deviation or expected states deviation with respect to routine logic is a better 
predictor of ToE group performance. Expected states deviation can be considered 
as a measurement of “irritating” feedback when a certain logic is used and was 
considered to lead to fundamental interpretation changes. Expected states 
deviation is the result of action. Logic deviation on the other hand expresses 
already performed action, embedding some former expectation. High expected 
states deviation distance with respect to some logic is considered as “more random 
feedback”. By Hypothesis 5 and 6 this was considered to lead to higher logic 
deviation distances, and seemingly random behavior. R-IC was expected to induce 
radical interpretation problems, inducing participants to feel uncertain about their 
routine strategy. G-IC was expected to induce uncertainty by social influence, 
where participants would try to adapt their strategy according to certain 
“patterns”, ultimately adapting their strategy. In G-IC participants were expected 
to use different forms of logic, not just their routine logic, therefore both using F-L 
and NB-L, leading to a lower proportion of routine logic used than in the C-IC 
condition, as only one logic form can be the routine logic.  
 Routine consistency is the number of routine strategy actions during the ill-
defined stages that fall either into the F-L or NB-L category, divided by the total 
amount of actions during the ill-defined stages; sub-distinguishing elements of 
logic forms such as dir, nodir and ideal are disregarded for the calculation of 
routine consistency. When an action falls neither into the F-L or NB-L category, this 
action still is added to the total amount of actions, by which the number of routine 
strategy actions during the ill-defined stages is divided. Actions that fall outside of 
any known logic category are measured by the logic marker. For instance, a player 
has developed routine logic F-L from the well-defined stages. He has used 100 
actions total during the ill-defined stages, with 90 F-L actions (80 times dir, 5 times 
nodir, 5 times ideal) and 10 NB-L actions (4 times dir, 2 times nodir, 4 times ideal), 
and therefore has a logic marker of 0 (0.00 %), since all actions are part of known 
logic categories. The resulting routine consistency is 0.90 (90 %).  
Low routine consistency in G-IC ultimately was expected to lead to greater 
logic deviation distance from routine logic than in the C-IC condition, and due to 
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logic volatility, to also lead to a higher deviation of expected states with respect to 
the routine logic. In the C-IC condition participants were expected to “stick with 
one logic” as they were “discouraged” by dissolution, still being induced by a 
lowered form of social influence and interpretation uncertainty. The D-IC lacks the 
interpretation uncertainty regarding the direction buttons, and comes with a 
lowered form of social influence. In other words, participants in the R-IC were 
expected to use different kinds of logic forms or strategies, and are induced with 
deep uncertainty with all strategies they tried, perhaps even leading to participants 
actually performing actions arbitrarily. Participants in the G-IC were expected to 
use different kinds of strategies, without being induced with deep uncertainty. 
Participants in C-IC were induced with deep uncertainty, however, were expected 
to be less volatile in their strategy forming than in G-IC, still deviating more from 
their routine strategy than in D-IC.  
Hypothesis 7: Expected states deviation proportion values during ToE parts 
1, ToE parts 2 and ToE total in R-IC are the highest, followed by G-IC, C-IC, D-IC 
and lastly N-IC. 
Hypothesis 8: Routine consistency is the lowest in R-IC, followed by G-IC, C-
IC, D-IC and N-IC. 
Group performance, measured in numbers of group actions required to solve 
all ToE games, depends on the order of group actions. The algorithm is 
implemented in such a way that when all participants of a game-group at least 
agree on the optimal disk to be moved, this collectively chosen disk will always be 
moved, and the game group will outperform randomness greatly, even with 
different strategies in mind on how to move the disk. However, it was expected 
that even this “fundamental logic” will be dissolved with inducing deep 
uncertainty by telling participants the truth about “the direction buttons not 
working”. It was expected that the proportion of actions where participants did 
agree on one disk, disregarding whether it was the optimal choice, was the best 
predictor for group performance, expressed by the “fundamental index”.  
Hypothesis 9: The lower the fundamental index the lower game group 
performance.  
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Finally, it was expected that group expertise rank explains inter-condition 
logic deviations amongst groups. 
Hypothesis 10: Lower inter-condition group expertise rankings lead to lower 
logic deviation proportions. 
In the following, table 14 (own source) will list all dependent and 
independent variables required for all 10 hypotheses and their according 
hypothesis (H). 
Independent variable Dependent variable H 
ind. expertise rank logic proportion “ToH total” 1 
goal rod change, level 4 starting routine logic values of 0 
in ToH and ToE, all conditions 
2 
public information logic proportion “ToE parts 1” in order 
N-IC > D-IC > C-IC > G-IC > R-IC 
3 
public information logic proportion “ToE total” in order 









logic marker proportion 
during all ToE conditions 
6 
public information expected state proportion ToE total, ToE parts 1 
and ToE parts 2 
R-IC < G-IC < C-IC < D-IC < N-IC 
7 
public information strategy consistancy index 
R-IC < G-IC < C-IC < D-IC < N-IC 
8 
fundamental index game group performance 
during all ToE conditions 
9 
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group expertise rank logic proportion ToE total, ToE parts 1 and ToE 
parts 2 
10 
Table 14: Independent and dependent variables, with according hypothesis. 
 
6 RESULTS 
An attempt to conduct an experiment with 330 US-American MTurks failed 
due to server memory capacity with the Amazon AWS “t2.micro    1 GiB”. After 
upgrading the server to 32 GB of working memory with the Amazon AWS 
“t2.2xlarge    32 GiB”, an experiment with 180 US-American MTurks was 
conducted, from which data of 87 participants was used. As estimated, more than 
50 % of participant data was lost due to connection errors, incorrect raw data, 
participants leaving the experiment or participants playing in a game group with 
one or more bots. CPU capacity reached 55 % during the experiment, and it is not 
advised to try larger numbers of participants with mentioned settings. 
29 female and 58 male participants aged 33.16 years on average were 
analyzed. From 87 participants 9 reported having conducted the experiment before, 
63 reported not having conducted the experiment before, while 15 participants did 
not answer to this question. By comparing MTurk ID tables all 9 participants, who 
reported having conducted the experiment before, were part of the 330-participants 
experiment, which crashed before the ToE stages were reached. Therefore, all 
participants were included. Participants from the example experiment mentioned 
before were not included. 
Chapter 6 will analyze all hypotheses in according sub-chapters, beginning 
with testing variables for parametric or nonparametric distribution. 
6.1 TESTING FOR NONPARAMETRIC DISTRIBUTION 
Variables were tested for nonparametric distribution using the One-Sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. Each null hypothesis that the variable was distributed 
normal was rejected for 11 variables with high significance, being listed in figure 
22. Distribution of individual expertise occurring with equal probability was 
rejected at the 0.01 level of significance. The list includes variables for individual 
expertise, routine consistency, all logic proportions from the well-defined stages, 
all logic proportions from the ill-defined stages, all expected states from the ill-
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defined stages and the logic marker index. Using Shapiro-Wilk testing, all 12 null 
hypotheses stating normal/parametric for the same variable distributions were 
rejected with very high significance (p = 0.000). For this reason, distributions are 
considered being nonparametric, and therefore, with exception of Hypotheses 2, 
nonparametric analyses are used. 
 
Figure 22: Test results for nonparametric distribution of variables 
[source: own source]. 
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6.2 EXPERTISE RANK AND LOGIC PROPORTION 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the individual expertise rank, the higher the logic 
proportion “ToH total” is. 
Individual expertise rank was categorized either being „low“, „medium“ or 
„high“. Agents who failed more than one ToH game due to the timer running out 
were always part of the “low” expertise rank. Agents who completed 4 or more 
ToH games in 7 steps were part of the “high” expertise category. Agents who 
completed two or three ToH games in 7 steps were part of the “medium” category. 
Agents who completed one or no ToH game in 7 steps were part of the “low” 
category. 
33 agents were part of the „low“ expertise group, 16 agens were part of the 
„medium“ expertise group and 38 agents were part of the „high“ expertise group. 
„ToH total“ is the proportion of ideal routine strategy steps used in all ToH 
games, with exception of the first game. Spearman’s rho showed a correlation 
significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed), as shown in figure 23. 
 
Figure 23: Correlation results of expertise and ideal routine strategy in “well-defined” stages. 
[source: own source]. 
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Agents with low ToH expertise (0) had a mean index of 0.4463 ToH total (std. 
error 0.0338, std. deviation 0.1943). Agents with medium expertise (1) had a mean 
index of 0.7231 ToH total (std. error 0.03646, std. deviation 0.1458). Agents with 
high expertise (2) had a mean index of 0.9080 ToH total (std. error 0.0172, std. 
deviation 0.1063). Figure 24 shows specifics as a box-plot diagram.  
Kruskal-Wallis H shows group differences in ToH total index by ToH 
expertise to be highly significant (H(33, 16, 38), H = 60.604, p = 0.000). 
Hypothesis 1 is therefore confirmed. Differences in routine logic deviation 
correlate significantly with the ToH total index and differences are significant. 
Means of high expertise participants and low/medium expertise participants vary 
significantly in terms of logic proportion “ToH_total”. 
Figure 24: Boxplot results of expertise levels and logic proportion during „well-
defined“ stages 
[source: own source]. 
RESULTS 167 
6.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND HUMAN ERROR 
Hypothesis 2: Change of goal rod during ToH and ToE games in the 4th level 
leads to the first actions in the same level deviating from the ideal path. 
In order to confirm or not confirm this hypothesis, all first actions of all six 
ToH games were analyzed, whether or not this first move was an “ideal” move by 
F-L. This analysis excludes NB-L, as not a single ToE game was started by any of 
the 87 participants via an ideal NB-L move. The hypothesis was not analyzed for 
ToE games as too many factors influenced individual behavior aside from the goal 
rod change, making a statistical analysis questionable. The hypothesis was then 
modified to: 
Hypothesis 2: Change of goal rod during ToH games in the 4th level leads to 
the first actions in the same level deviating from the ideal path. 
As shown in table 15 (own source), not ideal first moves from ToH games one 
to three sunk from 45,98 % (n = 87) to 30,59 % (n= 85). With the introduction of goal 
rod change in ToH game 4, the not ideal first move proportion had risen to 51,16 % 
(n=86), even being higher than the initial “mistake” proportion. 
Mean average proportion of not ideal first moves of 0.4180 (std. deviation 
0.0685, std. error 0.0278) differs significantly from 0.5116 (51.16 %) with p = 0.020.  
Mean average proportion of not ideal first moves do not significantly differ from 
the second highest value 0.4598 (45.98 %) with p = 0.195. 
Modified Hypothesis 2 is therefore confirmed. Mistake rates on the first 
action in game 4, where the goal rod was changed, differed significantly from mean 
average mistake proportion.  
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not ideal 40 36 26 44 35 34 
ideal 47 50 59 42 50 51 
total 87 86 85 86 85 85 
rel. not 
ideal 
0,459770115 0,418604651 0,305882 0,511628 0,411765 0,4 
rel. ideal 0,540229885 0,581395349 0,694118 0,488372 0,588235 0,6 
Table 15: Impact of “macrostructure shift” on decision-making performance 
[source: own source] 
6.4 INFORMATION CONDITIONS AND LOGIC DEVIATION 
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the N-IC condition show the highest logic 
proportions in ToE levels one to three, expressed by “ToE parts 1”, followed by 
proportions of D-IC participants, then C-IC, G-IC and R-IC.  
 Logic proportion is an index representing the proportion of actions being 
routine logic actions. The lower the index is, the higher the agent deviated from its 
routine strategy. The index „ToE parts 1“ refers to the first three ToE games, which 
could be solved in 7 steps by sticking to the framed logic. The anticipated order by 
hypothesis 3 was: N-IC > D-IC > C-IC > G-IC > R-IC.  
18 agents were part of the N-IC condition (6 groups), 24 agents were part of 
the G-IC condition (8 groups), 15 agents were part of the D-IC condition, 15 agents 
were part of the R-IC condition (5 groups) and 15 agents were part of the C-IC 
condition (5 groups). This was true for all hypotheses. 
Mean average ToE parts 1 index of the N-IC was 0.7113 (std. error 0.6772, std. 
deviation 0.2873), with a range of 0.8. Mean average ToE parts 1 index of the G-IC 
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was 0.7596 (std. error 0.0580, std. deviation 0.2841), with a range of 0.75. Mean 
average ToE parts 1 index of the D-IC was 0.6429 (std. error 0.0689, std. deviation 
0.2666), with a range of 0.8. Mean average ToE parts 1 index of the R-IC was 0.9179 
(std. error 0.0508, std. deviation 0.1966), with a range of 0.36. Mean average ToE 
parts 1 index of the C-IC was 0.7685 (std. error 0.0508, std. deviation 0.1966), with 
a range of 0.3636. Figure 25 shows the box-plot data.  
 
Kruskal-Wallis H shows significant differences between conditions 
regarding the ToE parts 1 index, with (H(18, 24, 15, 15, 15), H = 10.119, p = 0.038). 
Hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed. The observed order of ToE parts 1 by 
information condition is R-IC > C-IC > G-IC > N-IC > D-IC, while the conditions‘ 
differences by this index were measured to be significant. The „routine information 
condition“ shows the lowest routine logic deviation, while the „dissolution 
information condition“ shows the highest routine logic deviation during the first 
three ToE games. 
Figure 25: Boxplot results of logic proportion during “metastable” conditions over 
all information conditions: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC. 
[source: own source]. 
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6.5 COMPLETE LOGIC PROPORTIONS OVER INFORMATION 
CONDITIONS 
Hypothesis 4: Participants in the N-IC condition show the highest total ToE 
logic proportion values, followed by proportions of D-IC participants, then C-IC, 
G-IC and R-IC. 
The index „ToE parts total“ refers to the all six ToE games. The anticipated 
order by hypothesis 4 was: N-IC > D-IC > C-IC > G-IC > R-IC.  
Mean average ToE total index of the N-IC was 0.7000 (std. error 0.0551, std. 
deviation 0.2339), with a range of 0.7218. Mean average ToE total index of the G-IC 
was 0.7409 (std. error 0.0580, std. deviation 0.2841), with a range of 0.6923. Mean 
average ToE total index of the D-IC was 0.7148 (std. error 0.0611, std. deviation 
0.2366), with a range of 0.6768. Mean average ToE total index of the R-IC was 0.7970 
(std. error 0.0475, std. deviation 0.1839), with a range of 0.5584 Mean average ToE 
total index of the C-IC was 0.7609 (std. error 0.0546, std. deviation 0.2114), with a 
range of 0.6205. Figure 26 shows the box-plot data.  
Kruskal-Wallis H shows no significant differences between conditions 
regarding the ToE total index, with (H(18, 24, 15, 15, 15), H = 2,408, p = 0.661). 
Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed. The observed order of ToE total by 
information condition is R-IC > C-IC > G-IC > N-IC > D-IC, while the conditions‘ 
differences by this index were not significant. The „routine information condition“ 
shows the lowest routine logic deviation, while the „dissolution information 
condition“ shows the highest routine logic deviation during the first three ToE 
games. However, the differences by this index were not significant. 
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6.6 EXPECTED STATES AND LOGIC PROPORTION 
Hypothesis 5: The higher expected states proportion values with respect to 
routine strategy during all ToE conditions, the higher logic proportion values are. 
Expected states proportion is an index referring to the proportion of actions 
that were followed by the expected outcome, with respect to the actions’ routine 
logic. The higher the expected state proportion the lower the expected state 
deviation. The lower the expected state proportion the higher the expected state 
deviation. Hypothesis 5 therefore assumed low expected states proportion to 
correlate with low logic proportion values, and high expected state proportion to 
correlate with high logic proportion values. 
Just like logic proportion indexes there exist three expected states proportion 
indexes: “ToE_X_tot” refers to the expected states in all six ToE games. 
“ToE_X_parts1” refers to the expected states in the first three ToE games. 
“ToE_X_parts2”  refers to the last three ToE games. All three expected states 
Figure 26: Boxplot results of logic proportion during “ill-defined” conditions over 
all information conditions: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC. 
[source: own source]. 
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indexes were compared to all three logic proportion indexes, being ToE total, ToE 
parts 1 and ToE parts 2.  
Spearman’s rho correlation was significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
between all expected states and logic proportion indexes. Figure 27 sums up all 
mentioned data.  
 
Hypothesis 5 was confirmed; expected states correlations with logic 
proportion were found to be highly significant. 
6.7 EXPECTED STATES AND LOGIC MARKER PROPORTION 
Hypothesis 6: The higher expected states proportion values with respect to 
routine strategy during all ToE conditions, the lower the logic marker proportion 
values are. 
Figure 27: Correlation results between expected states and logic proportion 
[source: own source]. 
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Logic marker is an index representing the proportion of ToE actions of an 
agent which were not “captured” by any logic index. From the perspective of this 
thesis’ model, such actions can be regarded as “random”. It was expected that the 
agents who experience many actions to be followed by their expected outcome, 
would stick to some logic being framed by the model. In other words, it was 
expected that agents who experience seemingly “random” outcomes would also 
behave randomly. The higher the logic marker index is, the more “random” the 
agents behaved. The lower the logic marker index, the more this thesis’ model can 
make sense of its behavior. Therefore, high expected states proportion was 
anticipated to lead low logic marker values and therefore “less random behavior 
from the model’s perspective”. 
 
ToE_X_tot correlation with logic marker values was significant at the 0.01 
level (2-tailed). ToE_X_parts1 correlation with the logic marker values was 
significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ToE_X_parts2 correlation with the logic 
marker values was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Table 28 sums up the 
results. 
Figure 28: Correlation results between expected states and logic marker 
[source: own source]. 
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Hypothesis 6 was confirmed. All expected states indexes correlations with 
the logic marker index were either significant (p = 0.024) or highly significant (p = 
0.000).  
6.8 COMPLETE EXPECTED STATES OVER INFORMATION CONDITIONS 
Hypothesis 7: Expected states proportion values during ToE parts 1, ToE 
parts 2 and ToE total in R-IC are the highest, followed by G-IC, C-IC, D-IC and 
lastly N-IC. 
The anticipated order of expected states proportion values was: R-IC > G-IC 
> C-IC > D-IC > N-IC. 
Mean average ToE_X_total index of the N-IC was 0.4435 (std. error 0.0573, 
std. deviation 0.2431), with a range of 0.7358. Mean average ToE_X_total index of 
the G-IC was 0.5322 (std. error 0.0490, std. deviation 0.2401), with a range of 0.7407. 
Mean average ToE_X_total index of the D-IC was 0.5322 (std. error 0.0490, std. 
deviation 0.2401), with a range of 0.7407. Mean average ToE_X_total index of the 
R-IC was 0.5171 (std. error 0.0486, std. deviation 0.1882), with a range of 0.68 Mean 
average ToE_X_total index of the C-IC was 0.4076 (std. error 0.0620, std. deviation 
0.2401), with a range of 0.6552. Figure 29 shows the box-plot data.  
 Differences by ToE_X_total in all five conditions were not significant 
according to Kruskal-Wallis-H: (H(18, 24, 15, 15, 15) = 4.766, p = 0.312). 
Nevertheless, the observed order by this index was G-IC > R-IC > D-IC > N-IC > C-
IC. 
Mean average ToE_X_parts1 index of the N-IC was 0.5374 (std. error 0.0672, 
std. deviation 0.2853), with a range of 0.8571. Mean average ToE_X_parts1 index of 
the G-IC was 0.6620 (std. error 0.0537, std. deviation 0.2633), with a range of 0.8667. 
Mean average ToE_X_parts1 index of the D-IC was 0.5730 (std. error 0.0536, std. 
deviation 0.2075), with a range of 0.5826. Mean average ToE_X_parts1 index of the 
R-IC was 0.6983 (std. error 0.0464, std. deviation 0.1797), with a range of 0.6750 
Mean average ToE_X_parts1 index of the C-IC was 0.5119 (std. error 0.0666, std. 
deviation 0.2579), with a range of 0.6971.  
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Differences by ToE_X_parts1 in all five conditions were found to be 
significant at the 0.1 level according to Kruskal-Wallis-H: (H(18, 24, 15, 15, 15) = 
8.944, p = 0.063). The observed order by this index was R-IC > G-IC > D-IC > N-IC 
> C-IC. 
 
Mean average ToE_X_parts2 index of the N-IC was 0.3920 (std. error 0.0525, 
std. deviation 0.2227), with a range of 0.6774. Mean average ToE_X_parts2 index of 
the G-IC was 0.4667 (std. error 0.0455, std. deviation 0.2228), with a range of 0.7. 
Mean average ToE_X_parts2 index of the D-IC was 0.4655 (std. error 0.0537, std. 
deviation 0.2078), with a range of 0.7. Mean average ToE_X_parts2 index of the R-
IC was 0.4210 (std. error 0.0566, std. deviation 0.2192), with a range of 0.7 Mean 
average ToE_X_parts2 index of the C-IC was 0.3585 (std. error 0.0653, std. deviation 
0.2528), with a range of 0.6389.  
Figure 29: Boxplot results of expected states during “ill-defined” stages over 
information conditions: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC. 
[source: own source] 
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Differences by ToE_X_parts2 in all five conditions were found to be not 
significant according to Kruskal-Wallis-H: (H(18, 24, 15, 15, 15) = 3,874, p = 0.423). 
The observed order by this index was G-IC > D-IC > R-IC > N-IC > C-IC. 
Hypothesis 7 was not confirmed. Observed order by expected state 
proportion differed between ToE_X_total, ToE_X_parts1 and ToE_X_parts 2, while 
only ToE_X_parts1 differed between conditions with low significance (p = 0.063). 
6.9 ROUTINE CONSISTENCY 
Hypothesis 8: Routine consistency index is the lowest in R-IC, followed by G-
IC, C-IC, D-IC and N-IC. 
The routine consistency is the proportion of all actions during the ill-defined 
stages falling into the routine logic category (either F-L or NB-L), where 
dir/nodir/ideal or not distinguished. Actions that do not fall into any category are 
added to the total amount of actions. The higher the routine consistency, the more 
actions by an agent fall into the routine strategy category. The lower the routine 
consistency the higher an agent’s routine volatility. Since it was anticipated that 
agents would switch their strategy in the R-IC the most, this condition was 
anticipated to show the lowest routine consistency. The anticipated routine 
consistency order was N-IC > D-IC > C-IC > G-IC > R-IC. 
Mean average routine consistency of the N-IC was 0.6511 (std. error 0.0491, 
std. deviation 0.2081), with a range of 0.72. Mean average routine consistency of the 
G-IC was 0.7250 (std. error 0.0490, std. deviation 0.2400), with a range of 0.69. Mean 
average routine consistency of the D-IC was 0.7140 (std. error 0.0615, std. deviation 
0.2382), with a range of 0.68. Mean average routine consistency of the R-IC was 
0.7853 (std. error 0.0533, std. deviation 0.2066), with a range of 0.63 Mean average 
routine consistency of the C-IC was 0.7607 (std. error 0.0544, std. deviation 0.2108), 
with a range of 0.62.  
Differences by routine consistency in all five conditions were found to be not 
significant according to Kruskal-Wallis-H: (H(18, 24, 15, 15, 15) = 5.018 , p = 0.285). 
The observed order by this index was R-IC > C-IC > G-IC > D-IC > N-IC. 
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Hypothesis 8 was not confirmed. The routine consistency did not differ 
significantly over all information conditions, and the observed order by routine 
consistency differed from what was anticipated. 
6.10 FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGY AND GROUP PERFORMANCE 
Hypothesis 9: The lower the fundamental index the lower game group 
performance. 
The fundamental index shows the proportion of group decisions, where all 
agents agreed upon, which disk to move. The lower the proportion, the higher the 
number of steps were expected to, represented by the variable “performance_toe”. 
Again, “performance_toe” is the number of steps saved by a group solving all ToE 
games. However, if a game group failed to solve a ToE stage in time (3 minutes), 
the number of steps saved does not represent the number of steps required to solve 
a ToE stage. 
If this was ignored, Spearman’s rho showed the correlation between the 
fundamental index and the number of steps saved for a group attempting to solve 
all ToE games to be significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), with p = 0.002. Therefore, 
the lower the fundamental index was, the higher the variable “performance_toe”. 
However, the number of steps required to solve all ToE games is not 
represented by “performance_toe”. For this reason, the “solved” variable was 
included, which marks group games, which were solved. However, the variable 
“solved” was unreliable, marking game group games which were not solved by 
action, but by failing to solve them in time. 
Therefore, hypothesis 9 was not confirmed. The lower the proportion of 
group actions, where all agents agreed upon which disk to move, the more steps it 
took to solve all ToE games, however, the number of steps required did not 
represent group performance. 
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6.11 GROUP EXPERTISE AND LOGIC PROPORTIONS 
Hypothesis 10: Lower inter-condition group expertise rankings lead to lower 
logic deviations proportions. 
Group expertise is calculated by individual expertise levels of one game 
group (see table 11). It was assumed that group expertise correlates with group 
behavior and therefore impacts logic deviation. When information conditions are 
disregarded, group expertise seems to highly correlate positively with the 
proportion of routine strategy actions over all information conditions (N-IC, G-IC, 
D-IC, R-IC, C-IC) and all ill-defined system states (metastable, instable). The higher 
the deviation proportion index, the less an agent deviated from its routine from the 
well-defined stages. Group expertise correlated significantly and positively at the 
0.01 level with the deviation proportion index of all ill-defined stages (ToE tot, p = 
0.001), with metastable ill-defined stages (ToE 1, p = 0.000) and correlated 
significantly and positively at the 0.05 level with the deviation proportion index of 
instable ill-defined stages (ToE 2, p = 0.028). To avoid confusion it should be noted 
again that this means that this analysis, on first sight, can be interpreted as: the 
higher the group expertise, the less the group deviates from its routine strategy, 
which was learned during the well-defined stages. 
 However, these results were considering 87 individuals that are surrounded 
by the according group expertise. It is debatable whether or not these results are 
valid, as group expertise has to be considered to be the result of an entire group, 
which is facing different information conditions. Therefore, the following analysis 
is more precise, considering groups as a whole and the according information 
conditions. 
In the N-IC condition, which held 18 participants amongst 6 game-groups, 9 
agents were part of a game-group with a group expertise of “3”. Three agents were 
part of a game-group with a group expertise of 5, of 7 and of 9 respectively. 
Kruskal-Wallis H (7.066) showed the difference of ToE total indexes amongst the 
game group expertise in N-IC to be of low significance, with p = 0.070. Spearman’s 
rho measured the correlation between N-IC group expertise surrounding an agent, 
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and the agent’s ToE total index to be significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), with p = 
0.015. 
In the G-IC condition, which held 24 participants amongst 8 game-groups, 6 
agents were part of a game-group with group expertise of “1” and “10”. Three 
agents were part of a game-group of group expertise “2”, of “3”, of “8” and of “10” 
respectively. Kruskal-Wallis H (12.951) showed the difference of ToE total indexes 
amongst the game group expertise in G-IC to be significant, with p = 0.024.  
Spearman’s rho measured the correlation between G-IC group expertise 
surrounding an agent, and the agent’s ToE total index to be significant at the 0.01 
level (2-tailed), with p = 0.009. 
In the D-IC condition, which held 15 participants amongst 5 game-groups, 
three agents were part of a game-group with group expertise of “1”, of “2”, of “5”, 
of “7” and of “8” respectively. Kruskal-Wallis H (11.387) showed the difference of 
ToE total indexes amongst the game group expertise in D-IC to be significant, with 
p = 0.023.  Spearman’s rho measured the correlation between D-IC group expertise 
surrounding an agent, and the agent’s ToE total index to be not significant, with p 
= 0.113. 
In the R-IC condition, which held 15 participants amongst 5 game-groups, 
three agents were part of a game-group with group expertise of “2”, of “5”, and of 
“9”, respectively. 6 agents were part of a game-group with group expertise of “10” 
Kruskal-Wallis H (8.221) showed the difference of ToE total indexes amongst the 
game group expertise in R-IC to be significant, with p = 0.042.  Spearman’s rho 
measured the correlation between R-IC group expertise surrounding an agent, and 
the agent’s ToE total index to be not significant, with p = 0.209. 
In the C-IC, which held 15 participants amongst 5 game-groups, three agents 
were part of a game-group with group expertise of “8”. 6 agents were part of a 
game-group with group expertise of “3” and “9” respectively. Kruskal-Wallis H 
(2.663) showed the difference of ToE total indexes amongst the game group 
expertise in C-IC to not be significant, with p = 0.264.  Spearman’s rho measured 
the correlation between C-IC group expertise surrounding an agent, and the 
agent’s ToE total index to be not significant, with p = 0.758. 
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Results for hypothesis were mixed, as N-IC and G-IC showed very significant 
relations between group expertise and logic deviation proportions, as well as solid 
differences regarding overall logic deviations. D-IC barely touched significance at 
the 0.1 level for correlation between group expertise and logic deviations, but has 
shown highly significant difference regarding overall logic deviation. R-IC and C-
IC results showed no significant correlation between group expertise and logic 
deviation, but groups in R-IC differed significantly regarding overall logic 
deviation. The latter supports the hypothesis and shows the high context 
dependency, which is regarded as natural, due to the high complexity of this 
analysis. 
Hypothesis 10 cannot be clearly confirmed considering all details and can 
only be confirmed partially. However, results are regarded as promising enough 
that the correlation between group expertise and logic deviation can be drawn. 
After thorough consideration hypothesis 10 is therefore confirmed, and will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
6.12 GENDER EFFECTS 
While no significant differences regarding performance between female and 
male agents in NPS was measured (Chlupsa & Strunz, 2019; Strunz & Chlupsa, 
2019), which even held true for all country-origins (Strunz, 2019), adaption 
efficiency to more effective strategies had shown gender effects in behavioral 
experiments (Casal et al., 2017).  
Hypotheses that potentially relate to strategy adaption efficiency are 
analyzed for gender effects. It is hypothesized that no significant gender effects will 
be found at all, as NPS performance, free of gender effects, is regarded as most 
fundamental for all forms of strategy adaption. 
All 87 participants consisted of self-reported 29 female and 58 male 
participants. 
Boxplot figure 30 shows that no significant gender effect testing hypothesis 1 
seems to be visible. 
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Strategy adaption efficiency during well-defined stages is implicitly 
expressed by ToH expertise. As agents who fail to adapt their strategy during the 
well-defined stages to the new goal rod position will have a lower chance of falling 
into the high or medium expertise category.  
Spearman’s rho shows significant correlation at the 0.01 level between 
expertise and well-defined logic proportion (ToH total) for all 29 female 
participants. Spearman’s rho shows significant correlation at the 0.01 level between 
expertise and well-defined logic proportion for all 58 male participants. Therefore, 
no gender effect was found for hypothesis 1.  
 
Analyzing hypothesis 2 for gender effects, not ideal first moves proportion 
by female participants during stage 1 was identical with not ideal first moves 
during the stage 4 (44,83 %), where this performance does not significantly differ 
from the mean (sum of rel. not ideal divided by 6) of overall not ideal first moves 
(41.38 %), with p = 0.174. The results are summarized in table 16.  
Figure 30: Boxplot graph showing no gender effect between expertise and well-
defined logic proportion: 1 = female, 2 = male 
[source: own source]. 
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Not ideal first moves by male participants during stage 4 reached their 
maximum (54,39 %), which differed from the mean from not ideal first moves  
(42.00 %) at the 0.05 level with p = 0.13. The results are summarized in table 17. 
Female participants outperformed male participants regarding strategy adaption 
with goal rod changes during well-defined stages. Not ideal first move proportions 
are marked bold at game stage 4, where the goal rod change takes place and the 
former strategy has to be adapted efficiently. 
 
Table 16: Impact of “macrostructure shift” on female decision-making performance 
[source: own source]. 
   
 Whether or not a gender effect was found for hypothesis 2 is debatable, as 
sample sizes differ greatly and are limited in their statistical validity. For both 
sexes, a global or local maximum of not ideal first moves was reached during stage 
4. However, numbers have shown that female participants outperformed male 
participants regarding adaption to a “sudden” goal rod change, which required 
immediate, effective and efficient change of strategy.  
This results suggest that, contrary to the findings of Casal et al. (2017), there can be 
particular cases where female participants are more likely to adapt their strategy 

















ideal 13 13 9 13 12 12 
ideal 16 16 20 16 17 17 
total 29 29 29 29 29 29 
rel. not 
ideal 0,448276 0,448276 0,310345 0,448276 0,413793 0,413793 
rel. 
ideal 0,551724 0,551724 0,689655 0,551724 0,586207 0,586207 
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efficiently although this result must be considered cautiously since the small 
sample size of the female group in this experiment. Whether or not this observation 
was enough to be regarded as a gender effect required further analysis, perhaps by 
inclusion of reflection times and greater sample sizes.  
 

















ideal 27 23 17 31 23 22 
ideal 31 34 39 26 33 34 
total 58 57 56 57 56 56 
rel. not 
ideal 0,465517 0,403509 0,303571 0,54386 0,410714 0,392857 
rel. 
ideal 0,534483 0,596491 0,696429 0,45614 0,589286 0,607143 
Table 17: Impact of “macrostructure shift” on male decision-making performance 
[source: own source]. 
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Analyzing for gender effects in hypothesis 3, logic deviation proportion 
results for the metastable ill-defined stages are shown in boxplot figure 31.  
 
While deviation does not directly translate to a more efficient strategy, meta-
stable stages benefit from sticking with well-defined strategies, as the metastable 
stages can be experienced as “well-defined” levels. For female participants, 
Kruskal-Wallis H showed weak significant differences at the 0.1 level (p = 0.91) 
amongst information conditions. 
Differences amongst the information conditions regarding logic deviation in 
the metastable stages were less significant amongst male participants (p = 0.156). 
Mann-Whitney U shows no significant differences between female and male 
deviation distances in metastable stages (p = 0.401).  
As Mann-Whitney U shows no significant differences between female and 
male deviation distances amongst all ill-defined stages (p = 0.543), hypothesis 4 is 
not analyzed in further detail. 
Figure 31: Logic deviation during metastable ill-defined stages: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 
2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC, and regarding sex: 1 = female, 2 = male 
[source: own source]. 
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Regarding hypothesis 5, expecting a positive relationship between expected 
states proportions and logic deviation proportions, for both female and male 
participants, all expected states indices and all logic deviations indices correlated 
at the 0.01 significance level without exception. Figure 32 shows boxplot results of 
expected states proportion for all ill-defined stages.  
 
Mann-Whitney U does not show significant differences regarding any 
expected state proportion (ToE X tot: p = 0.746, ToE X 1: p = 0,438, ToE X 2: p = 
0,759). 
Figure 32: Expected states proportion during ill-defined stages: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 
2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC, and regarding sex: 1 = female, 2 = male 
[source: own source]. 
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Therefore, no significant gender effects were found for hypothesis 5. 
Regarding the logic marker analysis for hypothesis 6, Mann-Whitney U shows no 
significant difference regarding “strategy randomness” between sexes (p = 0.389). 
Boxplot figure 33 shows logic marker results for all information conditions. 
 
To avoid confusion, it should be noted that the higher the logic marker index 
results, the more random a participant behaved. Spearman’s rho results are as 
follows: For female participants, expected states index results of all ill-defined 
stages (ToE X tot) correlated at the 0.01 level with logic marker results; expected 
states index results of metastable ill-defined stages (ToE X 1) correlated at the 0.05 
level (p = 0.023) with logic marker results; expected states index results of instable 
ill-defined stages (ToE X 2) correlated at the 0.01 level with logic marker results. 
Results for male participants were slightly different. For male participants, 
correlation between expected states indices and logic marker results were 
significant at the 0.05 level for all ill-defined stages (ToE X tot, p = 0.017) and for 
Figure 33: Logic marker results during ill-defined stages: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-
IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC, and regarding sex: 1 = female, 2 = male 
[source: own source]. 
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instable ill-defined stages (ToE X 2, p = 0.024), but failed to show significant 
correlation for metastable ill-defined stages in isolation (ToE X 1, p = 0.397). 
Therefore, small differences between female and male participants regarding 
“randomness” in their behavior was found during the metastable ill-defined stages. 
It seems that random behavior during metastable ill-defined stages are less 
explainable by (supposedly) personal expectation amongst male than amongst 
female participants. However, since all “random” logic forms are not framed by 
the experiment’s model, influences stemming from other sources cannot be 
excluded and are, in fact, unknown. Thus, whether this was a true gender effect 
remains, at least, uncertain for hypothesis 6.  
 As described above, no significant differences between sexes regarding 
expected state proportion was found. Gender effects for hypothesis 7 are therefore 
disregarded.  
As for hypothesis 8, routine consistency does not differ significantly between 
sexes according to Mann-Whitney U (p = 0.732). Boxplot figure 34 shows routine 
consistency (strategy volatility marker 1) of both female and male agents over all 
conditions.  
Minor differences can be seen in the C-IC, however, whether or not this 
difference is related to gender cannot be clearly derived, especially as this 
information condition is the most complex with regards to public information 
content. In addition, the boxplot graphic does not differentiate between different 
ill-defined system states, being metastable and instable. 
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For hypothesis 9, both fundamental index and game group performance were 
considered. However, game group performance cannot be analyzed, as raw data 
does not offer a reliable way to filter successfully solved stages. However, the 
fundamental index implicitly relates to the proportion of some group having used 
an effective strategy. From 29 game groups, 2 game groups were female only, 10 
game groups were male only and 17 game groups were mixed with female and 
male participants. Female-only game group with game group ID 65 was part of the 
N-IC and female-only game group with ID 68 was part of the R-IC condition. While 
no correlation between information condition and results of fundamental index 
was found (Spearman’s rho of p = 0.429), female and male only groups are sorted 
by conditions first. 
Results for female-only game group with ID 65 (N-IC) showed that 32 % of 
all game group actions collectively agreed upon, which disk to move. 
Figure 34: Routine consistency results during ill-defined stages: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 
2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC, and regarding sex: 1 = female, 2 = male 
[source: own source]. 
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Results for female-only game group with ID 68 (R-IC) showed that 95 % of 
all game group actions collectively agreed upon, which disk to move. 
From the 10 male-only game groups, game group 15 and game group 35 were part 
of the N-IC conditions. Male-only game group 43 was part of the R-IC condition. 
 Results for male-only game groups (in N-IC) showed that 59 % (game group 
15) and 85 % (game group 35) of all game group actions collectively agreed upon, 
which disk to move. 
 Results for male-only game group 43 (R-IC) showed that 92 % of all game 
group actions collectively agreed upon, which disk to move. 
Kruskal-Wallis H showed no significant difference between mixed, female-only 
and male-only results regarding fundamental index (p = 0.602). Fundamental index 
average of mixed groups was 0.7506 (SD = 0.1950), average of female-only groups 
was 0.6350 (SD = 0.3451), average of male-only groups was 0.7810 (SD = 0.2048). 
Figure 35 shows boxplot results of fundamental indices. 
Figure 35: Fundamental index results for mixed sexes (0), female-only (1) and male-
only (2) game groups. 
[source: own source]. 
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Therefore, no significant gender effect regarding hypothesis 9 was found. 
The final hypothesis 10 considers group expertise. Kruskal-Wallis H shows no 
significant differences between mixed, female-only and male-only groups 
regarding group expertise (p = 0.720). Figure 36 shows boxplot results for group 
expertise in mixed, female-only and male-only game groups.  
Gender effects for hypothesis 10 regarding correlation between group 
expertise and logic deviations were tested for mixed-gender, female-only and male-
only game groups. This analysis was done without considering different 
information conditions, as this was not considered to be relevant for gender effects 
analysis. 
For mixed-gender groups Spearman’s rho correlation between group 
expertise and all ill-defined logic proportions (ToE tot) was significant at the 0.05 
level (p = 0.011). For the two female-only groups Spearman’s rho showed 
significance at the 0.05 level (p = 0.017). For the ten male-only groups Spearman’s 
rho showed significance at the 0.05 level (p = 0.014). Therefore, gender effects are 
disregarded for hypothesis 10. A detailed discussion follows in chapter 7. 
Figure 36: Group expertise results for mixed sexes (0), female-only (1) and male-
only (2) game groups. 
[source: own source]. 
 
7 DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the empirical results, adds additional results, and 
compares derived insights to other scientific conclusions from the domain of 
behavioral economics. The first subchapter sums up understandings of agent 
behavior by the results of the various hypotheses, and includes further results from 
statistical analyses. The second subchapter discusses strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats of the scientific methods used. The third subchapter 
provides an overview of all limitations, and the fourth subchapter suggests 
potential methodological variations and recommendations for future research.  
7.1 DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Evaluating individual expertise of the well-defined problem “Tower of 
Hanoi” by the number of “perfectly solved” games, and filtering by “failing not 
more than one game” has proven to categorize participants very reliably by their 
logic deviation. This is not only true for the well-defined problem-solving stage. 
For the ill-defined problem solving stages, where ToE has to be played, Kruskal-
Wallis-H shows significant differences by individual expertise regarding ToE total, 
(H(33, 16, 38) = 7,775, p = 0.021) and regarding ToE parts1, (H(33, 16, 38) = 10.692, p 
= 0.005). The individual expertise difference only fails to show clear significant 
differences in the “chaotic” ill-defined stages, (H(33, 16, 38) = 4.526, p = 0.104). Still, 
overall the expertise categorizes show significant difference in the ill-defined 
stages. Correlation of expertise with all ill-defined logic proportions shows 
significance at the 0.01 level for ToE total, with Spearman-Rho p = 0.005, shows 
significance at the 0.01 level for the “metastable” ill-defined stages ToE parts1, with 
Spearman-Rho p = 0.001, and shows significance at the 0.05 level for the “chaotic” 
ill-defined stages ToE parts2, with Spearman-Rho p = 0.038.  
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Agents with higher expertise in the well-defined problem-solving stages also 
behaved less “random” in the ill-defined stages, at least from the perspective of the 
methodological model. Kruskal-Wallis-H shows highly significant differences 
regarding logic marker proportions amongst the expertise levels, with (H(33, 16, 
38) = 18.835, p = 0.000), and Spearman-Rho correlation between well-defined 
problem solving expertise and logic marker proportions proves to be significant at 
the 0.01 level, with p = 0.000. The logic marker is an index representing the 
proportion of ToE actions of an agent, which do not fall inside a known logic 
category. In addition, as shown in figure 37, the higher the expertise levels, the 
more actions during the ill-defined stages conform to the routine logic. Expertise 
levels are measured by skillful puzzle-solving of well-defined ToH stages, where 
the routine strategy is defined. The ToE tot variable represents the proportion of 
actions, which are part of the routine strategy. In other words, the higher individual 
expertise in the well-defined stages, the less participants seem to leave their routine 
strategy path during ill-defined stages. 
Figure 37: Boxplot results of logic proportion during „ill-defined“ stages over 
expertise levels 
[source: own source]. 
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Therefore, problem solving expertise, as is measured in this thesis, not only 
relates to well-defined problem-solving performance, but also to ill-defined 
problem-solving behavior. Agents with high well-defined problem-solving 
expertise deviated less from their routine strategy and also behaved less random 
during the ill-defined problem-solving stages.  
This is shown in figure 38, as higher individual expertise levels led to less 
actions by participants, which were not part of any category and are thus 
considered “random” actions. This correlation is shown by the logic marker 
variable, which represents the proportion of actions, which do not fall inside 
known logic categories, and expertise, which represents skill-full puzzle-solving of 
well-defined ToH stages. In other words, the higher individual expertise in the 
well-defined stages, the less random individuals behaved during ill-defined stages. 
As expected, the environmental change of the goal rod position influenced well-
defined problem-solving performance significantly. Individual expertise can be 
linked to these agents, who did not fall for the goal rod change, and immediately 
shifted their routine strategy. From 33 low expertise agents, only 8 managed to start 
Figure 38: Boxplot results of logic marker proportions over expertise levels 
[source: own source]. 
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ToH level 4 with an ideal action. From 16 medium expertise agents, only 4 managed 
to start ToH level 4 with an ideal action. From 36 high expertise agents, 30 managed 
to start ToH level 4 with an ideal action. Those who do a mistake at the first move 
at ToH level 4, where the goal rod was changed, are more likely to be found in the 
“low” or “medium” expertise categories. Individual expertise significantly 
correlates with agents avoiding this mistake at the first action at level 4. Spearman-
Rho shows the 2-sided correlation between expertise and this mistake to be 
significant at the 0.01 level, with p = 0.000, and Mann-Whitney-U shows the 
differences in expertise between agents who did the mistake and agents who did 
not to be highly significant, with (U(45, 42) = 436.000, z = - 4.673, p = 0.000). 
During metastable stages, Kruskal-Wallis H showed expected states 
deviation to differ significantly at the 0.1 level (p = 0.063) amongst the 5 information 
conditions during metastable conditions (ToE X parts 1), as shown in figure 39. This 
shows that agent experience regarding feedback was different, depending on the 
information conditions – yet, expertise remained a reliable predictor of consistent 
behavior. 
Figure 39: Boxplot results of expected states proportion during „metastable“ stages 
over information conditions: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC. 
[source: own source]. 
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This insight adds another important property to the significance of the 
expertise categories. Agents with high expertise were significantly more likely to 
adapt to visual environmental change, which influences their strategy 
performance, than agents with medium or low expertise. 
Regarding all logic proportion analyses, behavior in the routine logic 
deviation was most surprising. Agents did not, as anticipated, deviate strongly 
from their routine strategy, and did, in fact, more or less stick to their routine 
strategy. It was rather the behavior in the no information condition and dissolution 
information condition that fulfilled the behavior that was thought to be measured 
in the routine information condition. Therefore, all anticipated orders of logic 
proportions were roughly observed to be turned “upside down”. 
Significant difference in routine logic proportion was found during the 
metastable ill-defined stages, where behavior in the routine information condition 
has proven to deviate least from its routine logic, while behavior in the dissolution 
information condition deviated the most. When logic proportions were analyzed 
over all ill-defined stages, including the “chaotic” stages, this statistical significance 
vanished. Differences in routine proportions were especially insignificant, when 
only the “chaotic” ill-defined stages are observed, with Kruskal-Wallis H (H(18, 24, 
15, 15, 15) = 1,440, p = 0.837). 
The proportion of individual experienced expected outcome was shown to 
correlate with individual logic proportions at the 0.01 level. Also differences in 
experienced expected outcome proportions only differed amongst the information 
conditions in the metastable ill-defined stages (figure 39) with weak significance (p 
= 0.063). Overall differences between the information condition regarding 
experienced logical feedback were not significant (p = 0.312), especially during the 
“chaotic” stages (p = 0.423). In other words, all agents experienced comparable level 
of “chaotic feedback” and did not differ too much in their behavior. Only during 
the metastable ill-defined stages, meaningful statements can be made regarding 
behavior and experience. Here, behavior in the routine information condition 
deviated least from its routine strategy, and feedback was the least “chaotic”. 
During ill-defined and instable ToE stages, no significant difference in deviation 
from routine strategy (ToE parts 2) amongst information conditions was found, as 
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shown in figure 40. In other words, agent behavior regarding logic deviation was 
comparable during stages that provided more chaotic feedback. 
  
Random agent behavior, expressed by a high logic marker, did not differ 
amongst conditions significantly, with Kruskal-Wallis H being (H(18, 24, 15, 15, 15,) 
= 5.714, p = 0.222), but was shown to correlate with experiencing “chaotic” feedback 
amongst all ill-defined stages. As chaotic feedback was comparable amongst all 
conditions, this result was no surprise. In addition, routine consistency did not 
differ significantly amongst the information conditions as well. Routine 
consistency described how many actions performed were following the routine 
strategy category. High individual expertise was found to significantly correlate 
with low random behavior, and is also found to correlate at the 0.01 level with high 
routine consistency, with Spearman-Rho of 0.002. Difference in routine consistency 
proportions amongst individual expertise was found to be highly significant, with 
Kruskal-Wallis-H (H(33, 16, 38) = 9.844, p = 0.007).  
Figure 40: Boxplot results of logic proportion during „instable“ stages over 
information conditions: 0 = N-IC, 1 = G-IC, 2 = D-IC, 3 = R-IC, 4 = C-IC. 
[source: own source]. 
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The higher individual expertise in well-defined problem solving, the more 
routine strategy actions were performed or in other words, the higher individual 
expertise the higher the routine consistency, as can be seen in figure 41. 
  
Game-group performance was found to rely heavily on agents agreeing 
which disk to move, which enhances the chances to beat randomness significantly. 
In order to know how many moves were required to solve ToE when actions are 
being chosen randomly, five bot groups played 6 ill-defined ToE settings, with the 
goal rod changing at the fourth level, just as in the main experiment. The bot groups 
required more than 166 steps on average to solve a ToE game with the goal rod 
positioned at the center, and more than 113 steps on average to solve a ToE game 
with the goal rod positioned right. The minimum number of steps solving any ToE 
stage randomly was 25, the maximum number of steps solving any ToE stage 
randomly was 727. The bots required more than 139 steps on average to solve any 
ToE stage. At the time of measurement, the bot game group was implemented in 
such a way that all three bots would have the identical random input, therefore 
Figure 41: Boxplot results of routine consistency over expertise levels. 
[source: own source]. 
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always having a fundamental index of “1”. For this reason, the bot groups did not 
behave perfectly random, as all bots agreed on disk and distance. From all 29 
groups observed, only two groups did not outperform randomness, requiring more 
than 139 steps to solve all ToE stages. Due to unreliable variables it was unclear 
which game group managed to finish a ToE stage due to solving it properly in time 
or failing to solve it in time. Time in seconds required per game was saved, but also 
deemed unreliable. For this reason no statement about group performance can be 
made.  
Correlation between group expertise and ToE logic proportions was 
significant at the 0.05 level for the N-IC and significant at the 0.01 level for the G-
IC. Analysis with Kruskal-Wallis H was significant in all but the C-IC condition. 
Statistical analysis has shown enough potential correlations between group 
expertise and logic deviations to confirm hypothesis 10.  
Gender effects were tested in detail and while some small deviations between 
female and male behavior were found, but in general, the existence of convincing 
gender effects was disregarded. Some small differences between goal rod change 
strategy adaption performances were found, where female participants 
outperformed. Random behavior by female participants was more framed by the 
experiment’s model than was male behavior. Aside from these two minor 
differences, gender effects are not visible. This is in line with research regarding 
NPS performance, where no gender effects were visible for any age or country-
origin (Strunz, 2019; Strunz & Chlupsa, 2019). 
After thorough analyses the most promising independent variable was 
individual expertise. Agents with high expertise not only performed well during 
the well-defined problem-solving stages, adapting their strategy instantly to 
environmental change, but showed less routine logic deviation in the ill-defined 
stages, and behaved less random and volatile solving ill-defined games. 
7.2 METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
The transfer from offline to online experimental analysis was a success, as 
interpersonal communication between agents was avoided. In addition, the online 
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functionality enabled experiments to be done in a matter of minutes. Experiments 
running on CuriosityIO can be modified quickly if required. CuriosityIO enables 
live-observation of each agent. By implementing bots and time limitations, and 
kicking inactive players automatically, ethical payment was preserved, as agents 
played 31 minutes on average for a 6.10 USD pay. It took dozens of iterations to 
structure the multi-agent experiment in such a way that average completion time 
could be anticipated. As a safe-line, Amazon Mechanical Turks should be informed 
that submitting incomplete data would not lead to a rejection if a certain threshold 
of time was exceeded, in this case, 50 minutes. Otherwise MTurks tend to rather 
cancel the experiment without submitting the data, in order to avoid rejection. For 
MTurks the rejection rate is more important than financial loss, as the HIT rejection 
rate is the most common filter for experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and 
usually lies between 95 and 99 %. When a large experiment fails due to a server 
crash for example, it is better to have MTurks to submit incomplete data quickly, 
as compensation of MTurks who did not submit their data comes along with 
problems. In such cases, individual “fake” experiments or “compensation HITs” 
have to be started for each agent. This can lead to huge organizational work. 
MTurks who failed to submit due to the server crash with 330 MTurks participating 
were partially compensated via paypal, however, paying MTurks via paypal is a 
violation of Amazon Mechanical Turk’s terms of services. Also, live support via 
email during large online multi-agent experiments is mandatory. Participants need 
to be answered with a response time less than 2 minutes in order to make them feel 
guided. Many questions arise during all online experiments, leading to dozens and 
hundreds of emails to be answered in very short timeframes. The experimenter 
should prepare experiments accordingly to avoid being overwhelmed by 
organizational work due to compensation or support requirements. As 
experimenters are being rated online and MTurks are well connected, experimenter 
should take ethical payment and sound experiment structure seriously. 
All in all, the way Amazon Mechanical Turks works deems to be not ideal for 
conducting multi-agent experiments under uncertainty. In order to avoid bots or 
low-quality data, the HIT rejection rate should be greater than or equal to 99 %. 
However, with such a high HIT rejection rate not enough participants will join in a 
short time span. Many agents had to join in a short amount of time, so that a game 
group was not automatically filled with a bot, in order to gain enough meaningful 
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data. A bot had to be implemented, so that MTurks would not have to wait longer 
than a couple of minutes. This was mandatory for ethical payment, as for any HIT 
the time limit for a participant has to be pre-set. If a participant fails to finish a HIT 
(paid task like this experiment) in that pre-set amount of time, the MTurks will not 
be able to submit and the experimenter has a hard time to compensate. However, 
pre-setting the number of minutes is mandatory in order for the MTurks to 
calculate and anticipate their earnings. When the HIT rejection rate is lower than 
99 %, the experimenter risks lower individual quality data, but enables more 
participants to join in a short time span. When the HIT rejection rate is lower, 
paradoxically data quality rises for this particular experiment, as more data 
becomes meaningful, but with a too low HIT rejection rate, individual data quality 
becomes less valuable. For the main experiment, a HIT rejection rate of “greater 
than 95 %” was chosen, and it is recommended that the experimenter takes into 
consideration the perspectives of the MTurks, via online communication channels 
such as “Reddit”. Here the author gained enough insight by MTurks to find the 
ideal HIT rejection rate for the experiment.  
Even though there exist many studies about the behavior and data quality 
gained by conducting experiments with MTurks, not much can be known about 
each participant. More information about each individual MTurk should be 
obtainable for the experimenter, and a lobby where MTurks can idle without losing 
time and money would have to be implemented for multi-agent experiments to be 
more effective, ethical and efficient. As most freelancers working with Amazon 
Mechanical Turk are either from India or US-America, alternatives to Amazon 
Mechanical Turk should be regarded if participants from e.g. Europe are required. 
The Amazon Mechanical Turk business model gains popularity, and many 
alternatives are currently being developed, which offer more information about the 
individual freelancers, and also enough European participants for more diverse 
country-origin experiments. 
As response times are valuable predictors for behavior, online experiments 
should run on stable infrastructure, in order to ensure the saved response times to 
not be erroneous. Even after one year of optimizing both infrastructure and 
software performance, response times deemed to be not reliable enough to make 
statistically meaningful analyses. In addition, any server running multi-agent 
DISCUSSION 201 
experiments should be equipped with way more memory capacity than anticipated 
to be required. While it was suggested that a server holding 1GB of working 
memory would certainly suffice for an experiment with 330 agents, the server 
crashed, and even a 32GB working memory server had a CPU load of 55 % while 
calculating an experiment with only 180 agents. The author recommends at least 
128 GB working memory for experiments with a 4-digit number of participants. In 
addition, at least one stress test with a couple of hundred non-simulated 
participants should be conducted beforehand. 
7.3 LIMITATION 
Participants were confronted with the cognitive puzzle game “Tower of 
Hanoi”, and its multiplayer version “Tower of Europe”. As for some participants 
this puzzle game might be an undefined or well-defined task from the very 
beginning, ex-ante expertise can lead to a fast learning curve in the well-defined 
problem-solving stages. In addition, some participants self-reported having 
encountered the experiment before, and might have had some a-priori knowledge. 
However, none of the participants who self-reporting having encountered the 
experiment before could have been playing the ill-defined stages. However, 
statistical analysis did not treat these participants differently.  
After the well-defined stages, the experiment makes the transition to an ill-
defined problem, with the first three games being “metastable” and the last three 
games representing “chaotic” decision-making circumstances. The order of the 
experiment’s problem-solving stages, being well-defined, ill-defined and 
metastable, ill-defined and chaotic, models real world experiences and challenges, 
but is also a limitation in itself, as in real world decision-making any order of 
problem categories or decision system states might occur.  
Participants received information on the outcome of their individual action, 
but no further details about how the hidden ruleset works, i.e. how their decision 
influenced the outcome. Participants therefore received simple feedback and not 
rich feedback; therefore, learning was limited. 
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No analysis including response times was conducted, due to yet unreliable 
data. Group performance could not be evaluated due to yet missing variables that 
clearly indicate, whether an ill-defined stage was solved via performing the right 
actions. Some statistical evaluations would clearly benefit from a larger pool of 
participant data; however, software efficiency and stability have to be tweaked 
further to enable experiments with more than one thousand participants. It is 
estimated that in order to derive insights with sound, statistical analyses about 
inter-group differences with five conditions, at least 2.700 participants would be 
required for nonparametric statistics. With a data dropout rate of about 50 %, 
participants should be in the thousands in order to ensure data quantity. This thesis 
relies on 87 data points derived from a pool of 180 participants; therefore, all 
insights are limited in their statistical validity. 
7.4 FUTURE OUTLOOK 
“Flag Run” and “Tower of Europe” experiments might benefit from scientific 
insights regarding insight problem solving, working memory capacity, cultural 
uncertainty avoidance, and from conducting the experiment with different models 
of learning environments. Multiple learning environments could be simulated via 
altering the content of the instruction or implementing rich feedback. Multiple 
games can be used, which differ in their visual representation, still running on the 
identical logic, such as a stock exchange game. Interpersonal communication can 
be included via chat windows, which include certain predefined text-passages 
which can be chosen from. The algorithm ensures that in any case, a multi-agent 
group decision making domain is created, where each individual decision 
influences the outcome, while not necessarily having impact. The algorithm is fair, 
unbiased, and even if its rules are known, it can only be taken advantage of, when 
agents can agree on their order of action input. However, the algorithm can be set 
arbitrarily complex, so that even if communication between agents was enabled, 
and agents would communicate their order of inputs, they would not be able to 
take full control over the outcome. Therefore, stable, metastable and chaotic 
decision-making environments can be easily simulated. An arbitrary number of 




The aim of this thesis was to create a decision-making domain in which 
multiple agents would collectively engage a problem, without being able to 
communicate with each other. Furthermore, the group decision making was 
structured such that each agent would always have an influence over the outcome, 
but could not control the impact of their decisions. Different information conditions 
simulated information asymmetries, from which potential behavioral changes 
were to be analyzed. Agents were able to build up expertise in a well-defined 
learning environment, and later engaged in an ill-defined, metastable and instable 
decision-making domain, which was either dominated by seemingly deterministic 
or chaotic feedback. In order to create a problem under uncertainty, “Tower of 
Hanoi” was chosen as the problem for analysis, which lacks any numerical 
representations, and thus further avoids subjective or even objective probabilities 
being built up by human mental models. Different variations of logic, strategies, 
and feedback were examined in order to derive as much information as possible in 
this group decision making experiment. The core idea was that this experiment 
represents reality, where an agent would first gain experience and learn about the 
systematics of a market, (e.g. by visiting a business school), engaging in well-
defined problems. Upon having gained some expertise, which varies amongst the 
agents, they could then explore the real world, and solve ill-defined problems with 
their expert knowledge. Real world problems were first simulated as metastable, 
changing to a more chaotic problem afterwards. Many economic decisions are 
taken without communicating directly with all shareholders- or stakeholders, and 
agents collectively solve ill-defined problems, with each agent having different sets 
of information, and different strategies and ideas about the “hidden rules” of some 
market or complex decision-making domain. From this idea, five different research 
questions lead to 10 different hypotheses. The first research question probed, 
whether public information about environmental change would necessarily lead to 
a change of behavior, when the new environmental conditions would not have an 
impact on some strategy’s performance. The routine information group has proven 
that this was not the case. Agents in the routine information group stuck to their 
routine strategy from the well-defined problem-solving stages during the 
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metastable condition. The second research questions asked, whether change in 
behavior was the case if environmental change actually does have an impact on 
some strategy’s performance; here, individual expertise has proven to be a strong 
predictor, of whether or not an agent was able to adapt or stick to an effective 
routine strategy. High expertise lead to less random and volatile behavior in the ill-
defined problem-solving stages, and enabled agents to adapt quickly to 
environmental conditions in well-defined stages. The third research question 
regarded deviation from routine strategy when different types of information, their 
contents being truthful and deception-free, were provided. Here, results were not 
so clear, and individual expertise was certainly a stronger predictor than was 
public information. The fourth research question can also be answered by focusing 
on individual expertise, rather than on public information: the higher the 
individual expertise in the well-defined problem-solving domain, the higher the 
chances were that participants would maintain an effective routine strategy or 
adapt their routine if necessary. While public information did not significantly 
influence the overcoming of parts of a routine strategy, it seems that the dissolution 
information group deviated the most. Perhaps public information about the 
individuals being unable to obtain helpful information about the hidden rules 
discouraged agents, favoring random behavior or absorbed individual motivation 
to engage in problem-solving with smart heuristics. Further research on the 
influence of public information that favors a belief of lack of control could shed 
light on this assumption. The fifth and final research question was partially 
answered. Individual expertise in the well-defined problem-solving stage showed 
a strong significant correlation with behavior in the ill-defined stages. While the 
experiment failed to come to conclusions about group performance, the role and 
impact of individual expertise was surprising, truly holding more predictive power 
regarding group decision-making than public information. 
All hypotheses were analyzed in detail for gender effects and no convincing 
differences in behavior between female and male participants led to the 
assumption that gender effects were found. Just as for NPS performance, where no 
gender effects were found for any age or country-origins, such as US America, 
India and Germany, solving ToE in a smart and intuitive way disregarded gender 
effects. If anything, female participants outperformed in strategy adaption during 
well-defined stages, which was a crucial part to rank high in individual expertise. 
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Obviously, this result is very favorable for the idea of inclusion in modern 
workspaces, where NPS performance and smart decision-making under 
uncertainty will play an ever-growing role. 
Expert knowledge could be the key factor for global and interconnected 
problems, where interpersonal communication is impossible or vastly limited. 
Identifying the ideal decision-making positions for experts through quick and 
effective online experiments could lead to less volatile, less chaotic system 
performance, from which all decision-makers can profit.  





Annex 1: Software Development Milestones 
[source: own source] 
Date Protocol Code Content (shortened) 
19.01.2018 2018/06us milestone First milestone; zTree 
legacy software 
development start; 
implementing ToH and 
ToE with zTree; 
introduction to zTree. 
05.02.2018 180205 meeting Specifics on experiment 
are presented: game-
group output, state-
output function, GUI. 
Next meeting scheduled. 
12.02.2018 180212 meeting First pretest presentation 
of GUI and 
functionalities, disk 
choice via mouse-click, 
colored disks, game goal 
state implemented, 
calendar-time data, 
“please wait” screen. 
Next meeting scheduled. 
19.02.2018 180219 meeting Grouping of 
participants. GUI color 
and popup fixes, 
correction of illegal states 
implemented, data 
format being discussed, 
goal state output 
changes, multiple goal 
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states settings. Next 
meeting scheduled. 
19.02.2018 2018/13us milestone Second milestone; ready-
made ToH single player 
version; first ToE testing. 
26.02.2018 180226 meeting GUI fixes including rods, 
disks, 0-moves excluded, 
all data in calendar time, 





Colored goal state. Fixes 
with move-stone data. 
Adding ID to data 
export. Pretest with 9 
players discussed. Next 
meeting scheduled. 
26.02.2018 2018/14us milestone zTree legacy version ToE 
partially implemented. 
12.03.2018 180312 meeting Multiple pretests, final 
version discussed, data 
and format discussed. 
Draft for manual created. 
Bat-data for multi-client 
auto-start. Calendar time 
to seconds. Grammar 
and spelling fixes. Add 
goal-reached data. Data 
export as .csv.  
03.04.2018 2018/24us milestone Nearly bug-free ToE tests 
possible. 
26.06.2018 2018/45us milestone Legacy zTree software 
fully developed and 
ready for experiment. 
07.11.2018 2018/85us milestone Curiosity IO framework 
and Flag Run experiment 
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presented, and software 
development initiated. 
08.01.2019 2019/01us milestone Flag Run ready-made for 
first field-experiment. 
19.02.2019 2019/12us milestone Additional games added 
to framework. 
08.04.2019 2019/29us milestone GUI changes, bug fixes, 
data-export variables 
added.  
10.05.2019 2019/37us milestone Tower of Hanoi port 
initiated. 
06.08.2019 2019/59us milestone Curiosity IO Tower of 
Hanoi ready-made for 
first online-experiment. 
05.09.2019 2019/70us milestone https://curiosity-
data.com, data being 
saved on own server 
16.10.2019 2019/csv new .csv data export 
20.11.2019 2019/final csv and .exe revision of .csv data 
export and executable 
file for Curiosity IO 
 
Annex 2: Data output „Survey.csv“ with explanations and examples 
[source: own source] 
Survey.csv raw data Explanation Example 
playerID ID provided to each agent 
after finishing the session.  
1 
uniqueId Session specific ID 
assigned to agent data. No 
duplicate exists.  
15708813121471 
sex Self-reported sex of agent. male 
age Self-reported age of agent. 31 
playerGroup Survey Group, so far only 
relevant for “Dynamic 
Flag Run” games. 
1 
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difficulty Experiment level setup, so 
far only relevant for 
“Dynamic Flag Run” 
games. 
1 
1_1 [Question_Text] Answer to question one in 
first survey (pre-survey). 
No. 





1_1_duration Number of seconds it took 
agent to submit answer to 
question one in first 
survey. 
127 
2_1_duration Number of seconds it took 
agent to submit answer to 




Annex 3: Data output „ToH.csv“ with explanations and examples 
[source: own source] 
ToH.csv raw data Explanation Example 
player_id ID provided to each agent 
after finishing the session.  
1 
game_no Index of ToH game. 1 
group_id Index of game-group. 0 
experiment_group_id Index of experiment-group. 0 
information Intended to assign an 
integer to each public 
information – not yet used. 
 
close_popup_time Number of seconds it took 
agent to close popup. 
21.3 
start Integer indicating which rod 
is starting rod; 1: left rod, 2: 
middle rod, 3: right rod. 
1 
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goal Integer indicating which rod 
is goal rod; 1: left rod, 2: 
middle rod, 3: right rod. 
2 
start_state Integer indicating starting 




input Disk and number of steps 
chosen; s: small disk, m: 
medium or large disk, 1: 
distance of one, 2: distance 
of two. 
m1  
direction Direction chosen; l: left, r: 
right. 
r 
logic Integer indicating if action 
follows “ToH border logic”; 
0: illogical, 1: logical. 
1  
no_border_logic Integer indicating if action 
follow “ToH no border 
logic”; 0: illogical, 1: logical. 
0  
response_time Number of seconds required 
until confirming input with 
“GO” action. 
2.88 (example 
of player ID 1 of 
main 
experiment) 
response_time_average_game Average number of seconds 
required for all actions of a 
game. 
6.34 (example 
of player ID 1 of 
main 
experiment) 
input_amount Amount of inputs 
performed by agent during 
move; includes click on disk, 
click on steps button, click 
on direction button, click on 
“GO”. 
4 
input_amount_average_game Average amount of inputs 
performed by agent during 
ToH game. 
4.14 
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reponse_time_average_all_ga
mes 
Average number of seconds 
required for all games. 
4.39 (example 





Average amount of inputs 
performed by agent during 




Average amount of inputs 
performed by all agents of 





Average number of seconds 
required by group to solve 
game. 
16.69 (example 





Average amount of inputs 
performed by all agents of 
same game-group during all 




Average number of seconds 





Solved Boolean, if 0 then game is 





Boolean 1 is 




Steps Number of steps performed 
for game. 
3 (example of 
player ID 1 of 
main 
experiment). 
Steps_all_games Number of steps required 
for all games. 







player ID 1 of 
main 
experiment). 
Game_time Number of seconds required 
for game. 
35.84 (example 
of player ID 1 of 
main 
experiment). 
All_games_time Number of seconds required 
for all games. 
366.52 
(example of 





Annex 4: Data output „ToE.csv“ with explanations and examples 
[source: own source] 
ToE.csv raw data Explanation Example 
game_no Index of ToE game. 1 
group_move_no Index of game-group’s 
move in current game. 
0 
group_id Index of game-group. 0 
experimental_group_number Index of experiment-
group. 
0 
information Not yet used.  
start Integer indicating which 
rod is starting rod; 1: left 
rod, 2: middle rod, 3: 
right rod. 
1 
goal Integer indicating which 
rod is goal rod; 1: left 
rod, 2: middle rod, 3: 
right rod. 
2 
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start_state Integer indicating starting 




move_state Index of selection made 
by entire game-group 
(see appendix 45). 
5  
first_player_id Player ID of agent first 





Number of seconds it 
took first agent to close 
popup. Empty when bot 
agent. 
 
first_player_input Disk and number of steps 
chosen by first agent; s: 
small disk, m: medium or 
large disk, 1: distance of 
one, 2: distance of two. 
s1 
first_player_direction Direction chosen by first 
agent; l: left, r: right, n: 





Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE 
framed direction logic”; 




Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE 
framed no-direction 





Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE 
framed ideal logic”; 0: 





Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE no 
border direction logic”; 0: 




Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE no 
border no direction 





Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE no 
border ideal logic”; 0: 
illogical, 1: logical. 
1  
second_player_id Player ID of agent 
secondly confirming 




Number of seconds it 
took second agent to 
close popup. Empty 
when bot agent. 
14.16 
second_player_input Disk and number of steps 
chosen by second agent; 
s: small disk, m: medium 
or large disk, 1: distance 
of one, 2: distance of two. 
s2 
second_player_direction Direction chosen by 
second agent; l: left, r: 
right, n: none. Always n 




Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE 
framed direction logic”; 




Integer indicating if 
second action follows 
“ToE framed no-direction 
1  
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Integer indicating if 
second action follows 
“ToE framed ideal logic”; 




Integer indicating if 
second action follows 
“ToE no border direction 





Integer indicating if 
second action follows 
“ToE no border no 
direction logic”; 0: 




Integer indicating if 
second action follows 
“ToE no border ideal 
logic”; 0: illogical, 1: 
logical. 
0  
third_player_id Player ID of agent thirdly 





Number of thirds it took 
third agent to close 








third_player_input Disk and number of steps 
chosen by third agent; s: 
small disk, m: medium or 
large disk, 1: distance of 
one, 2: distance of two. 
s1 
third_player_direction Direction chosen by third 
agent; l: left, r: right, n: 
n  
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Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE 
framed direction logic”; 




Integer indicating if third 
action follows “ToE 
framed no-direction 





Integer indicating if third 
action follows “ToE 
framed ideal logic”; 0: 




Integer indicating if third 
action follows “ToE no 
border direction logic”; 0: 




Integer indicating if third 
action follows “ToE no 
border no direction 





Integer indicating if third 
action follows “ToE no 
border ideal logic”; 0: 
illogical, 1: logical. 
1  
order Player IDs by order of 
action input.  
10000, 1, 
10001 
FL_exp_dir_1 Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE 
expected result by 
direction logic”; 0: 
illogical, 1: logical. 
0 
FL_exp_ideal_1 Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE 
0 
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expected result by no-
direction logic”; 0: 
illogical, 1: logical. 
FL_exp_dir_2 Integer indicating if 
second action follows 
“ToE expected result by 
direction logic”; 0: 
illogical, 1: logical. 
1 
FL_exp_ideal_2 Integer indicating if 
second action follows 
“ToE expected result by 
no-direction logic”; 0: 
illogical, 1: logical. 
0 
FL_exp_dir_3 Integer indicating if third 
action follows “ToE 
expected result by 
direction logic”; 0: 
illogical, 1: logical. 
0 
FL_exp_ideal_3 Integer indicating if third 
action follows “ToE 
expected result by no-
direction logic”; 0: 
illogical, 1: logical. 
0 
NB_exp_dir_1 Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE 
expected result by no-
border with direction 
logic”; 0: illogical, 1: 
logical. 
0 (example 
of player ID 
1 of main 
experiment). 
NB_exp_ideal_1 Integer indicating if first 
action follows “ToE 
expected result by no-
border without direction 
logic”; 0: illogical, 1: 
logical. 
0 (example 
of player ID 
1 of main 
experiment). 
NB_exp_dir_2 Integer indicating if 
second action follows 
“ToE expected result by 
0 (example 
of player ID 
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no-border with direction 
logic”; 0: illogical, 1: 
logical. 
1 of main 
experiment). 
NB_exp_ideal_2 Integer indicating if 
second action follows 
“ToE expected result by 
no-border without 
direction logic”; 0: 
illogical, 1: logical. 
0 (example 
of player ID 
1 of main 
experiment). 
NB_exp_dir_3 Integer indicating if third 
action follows “ToE 
expected result by no-
border with direction 
logic”; 0: illogical, 1: 
logical. 
0 (example 
of player ID 
1 of main 
experiment). 
NB_exp_ideal_3 Integer indicating if third 
action follows “ToE 
expected result by no-
border without direction 
logic”; 0: illogical, 1: 
logical. 
0 (example 
of player ID 
1 of main 
experiment). 
response_time_1 Time in seconds it took 
first agent to confirm 
action. 0 if bot and first 
move. 
0 
response_time_2 Time in seconds it took 
second agent to confirm 
action. 0 if bot and first 
move. 
2514.23 
response_time_3 Time in seconds it took 
third agent to confirm 
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response_time_average 
_game_1 
Number of seconds it 
took agent to confirm 











Number of seconds it 
took agent to confirm 











Number of seconds it 
took agent to confirm 
action on average during 
game. 
510.74 
input_amount_id_1 Player ID referring to 
input_amount_1 
10000 
input_amount_1 Amount of inputs 
required by agent for this 
action. 0 if bot agent. 
0 
input_amount_id_2 Player ID referring to 
input_amount_2 
10001 
input_amount_2 Amount of inputs 
required by agent for this 
action. 0 if bot agent. 
0 
input_amount_id_3 Player ID referring to 
input_amount_3 
1 
input_amount_3 Amount of inputs 
required by agent for this 











Amount of inputs 
required by agent for this 











Amount of inputs 
required by agent for this 











Amount of inputs 
required by agent for this 
game on average. 0 if bot 
agent. 
4.4 
group_time_average_game Not yet used for analysis.  
group_input_amount_average 
_game 
Average number of 
inputs required per 
action by game-group 




Not yet used for analysis.  
response_time_average 
_all_games_id_1 
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response_time_average 
_all_games_1 
Average time in seconds 











Average time in seconds 











Average time in seconds 











Amount of inputs 
required by agent for all 











Amount of inputs 
required by agent for all 












Amount of inputs 
required by agent for all 





Not yet used for analysis.  
group_input_amount_average 
_all_games 
Average number of 
inputs required by game-
group over all games. 
Meaningless when bots 




Average number of 
seconds required by 
group to solve a game 
over all games. 
5.64  
(example of 
player ID 1 
of main 
experiment). 
solved Boolean, if 0 then game is 
not solved. If 1 then game 
is solved. Also gives 1 to 
time-out games. 
0 (example 
of player ID 
1 of main 
experiment). 
steps_all_games Number of steps 
required by group to 
solve all games. Includes 
steps by time-out games. 
69 (example 
of player ID 
1 of main 
experiment). 
game_time Number of seconds 




player ID 1 
of main 
experiment). 
all_games_time Number of seconds 
required for group to 
solve all games. 
494.84 
(example of 
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Annex 5: Data output „Master.csv“ with explanations and examples 
[source: own source] 
Master.csv raw data Explanation Example by 
main 
epxeriment 
groupID Index of group. 0 
playerID Index of player. 1 
number_of_F_L_strat Number of games 
solved by framed logic 
strategy. 
6 
number_of_NB_L_strat Number of games 
solved by no-border 
strategy. 
0 
routine_strategy ToH routine strategy. 
FL when number of FL 
strat is 4 or higher. NB 
when number of NB 
strat is 4 or higher. 
Mixed when number of 
FL/NB is three. Index is 
0: FL, 1: NB, 2: Mixed. 
0 
expertise Individual expertise. 
Index is 0: low, 1: 
medium, 2: high. 
2 
group_expertise Not yet implemented. 
Calculated manually. 
5 
condition Not yet implemented. 0 
direction_index Proportion of actions 
without direction input. 
0 
strategy_volatility_marker1 
(strategy consistency index) 
Proportion of ToE 
routine actions. 
0.58 
performance_relation_total Number of total actions 
required for ToH games 
per number of total 
actions required for ToE 
0.74 
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games. Also includes 
time-out levels. 
performance_relation_parts1 Number of total actions 
required for first three 
ToH games per number 
of total actions required 
for first three ToE 
games. Also includes 
time-out levels. 
1.32 
performance_relation_parts2 Number of total actions 
required for last three 
ToH games per number 
of total actions required 
for last three ToE 
games. Also includes 
time-out levels. 
0.34 
ToE_strategy Relative majority of 
actions define ToE 
strategy; if no relative 
majority then ToE 
routine strategy is 
„mixed“. Index for each 
routine as follows. 0: 
FL_dir, 1: FL_nodir, 2: 
FL_ideal, 3: NB-L_dir, 4: 
NB-L_nodir, 5: NB-
L_ideal, 6: Mx-L  
1 
ToE_exp_state Relative majority of 
group outcomes 
following actions define 
ToE expected state; if no 
relative majority then 
ToE expected state is 
„mixed“. Index for each 
expected state as 
follows: 0: FL-X_dir, 1: 
FL-X_ideal, 2: NB-
0 
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X_dir, 3: NB-X_ideal, 4: 
Mx-X.  
ToH_tot Final proportion of ToH 
routine strategy actions. 
0.8824 
ToH_parts1 Final proportion of ToH 
routine strategy actions 
after first three stages. 
0.8 
ToH_parts2 Final proportion of ToH 
routine strategy actions 
after last three stages. 
1 
ToE_tot Final proportion of ToE 
routine strategy actions. 
0.5797 
ToE_parts1 Final proportion of ToE 
routine strategy actions 
after first three stages. 
0.6071 
ToE_parts2 Final proportion of ToE 
routine strategy actions 
after last three stages. 
0.561 
ToE_X_tot Final proportion of 
expected states during 
ill-defined stages with 
respect to ToE routine 
strategy. 
0.3913 
ToE_X_parts1 Final proportion of 
expected states after 
first three ill-defined 
stages with respect to 
ToE routine strategy. 
0.4286 
ToE_X_parts2 Final proportion of 
expected states after last 
three ill-defined stages 
with respect to ToE 
routine strategy. 
0.3659 
logic_marker Proportion of actions 
that are assigned 





fundament Proportion of game 
group actions having 
chosen the same disk 
(s/m). 
0.96 




least_amount_of_steps_toh The least amount of 
steps required to solve 
any well-defined stage. 
7 
number_of_7_steps_toh Number of well-defined 
stages solved in 7 
actions. 
5 
steps_in_total_toh Number of actions 
performed in all well-




left_direction Number of actions 
performed with having 




right_direction Number of actions 
performed with having 




no_direction Number of actions 
performed with having 




F_L_dir Amount of actions 
assigned categories 
36 
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„FL_dir“ during ill-
defined stages. 

























FL_X_dir Amount of actions 
followed by outcomes 





FL_X_ideal Amount of actions 
followed by outcomes 





NB_X_dir Amount of actions 
followed by outcomes 






NB_X_ideal Amount of actions 
followed by outcomes 






Annex 6: Data output „Progress.csv“ with explanations and examples 
[source: own source] 
Progress.csv raw data Explanation Example 
player1_toh_logic_total Action series of ToH FL 
logic proportions. 
0.4 
player1_toh_logic_parts Action series of ToH FL 
logic proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0.4 
player1_toh_noBorderLogic_total Action series of ToH no 
border logic proportions. 
0 
player1_toh_noBorderLogic_parts Action series of ToH NB 
logic proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0 
player1_flDir_total Action series of ToE 
FL_dir proportions. 
0.8 
player1_flDir_parts Action series of ToE 
FL_dir proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0.8 
player1_flNoDir_total Action series of ToE 
FL_nodir proportions. 
0.8 
player1_flNoDir_parts Action series of ToE 
FL_nodir proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0.8 
player1_flIdeal_total Action series of ToE 
FL_ideal proportions. 
0 
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player1_flIdeal_parts Action series of ToE 
FL_ideal proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0 
player1_nblDir_total Action series of ToE NB-
L_dir proportions. 
0.1 
player1_nblDir_parts Action series of ToE NB-
L_dir proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0.1 
player1_nblNoDir_total Action series of ToE NB-
L_nodir proportions. 
0.2 
player1_nblNoDir_parts Action series of ToE NB-
L_nodir proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0.2 
player1_nblIdeal_total Action series of ToE NB-
L_ideal proportions. 
0 
player1_nblIdeal_parts Action series of ToE NB-
L_ideal proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0 
player1_flXDir_total Action series of ToE FL-
X_dir proportions. 
0.5 
player1_flXDir_parts Action series of ToE FL-
X_dir proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0.5 
player1_flXIdeal_total Action series of ToE FL-
X_ideal proportions. 
0 
player1_flXIdeal_parts Action series of ToE FL-
X_ideal proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0 
player1_nbXDir_total Action series of ToE NB-
L-X_dir proportions.  
0.1 
player1_nbXDir_parts Action series of ToE NB-
L-X_dir proportions, 
separated by goal state. 
0.1 
player1_nbXIdeal_total Action series of ToE NB-
L-X_ideal proportions.  
0 
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player1_nbXIdeal_parts Action series of ToE NB-
L-X_ideal proportions, 
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